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REGIONAL SECURITY:

Important Developments in the Indian Ocean
Area
Security In Southeast Asia

ENERGY AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY:

Indonesia: Situation, Policies and Research and
Development Needs of the Energy Sector
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Some Characteristics of Government and Quasi-
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The Migration of the People of South Sulawesi
in the Pacific Region

SOCIOLINGUISTICS: NOTES

Pidgin Malay as Spoken in Irian Jaya
The Vocabulary of the Elite in Indonesia



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FROM THE EDITOR

The Indian Ocean area has become the focus of world attention on account of its potential to generate major shifts in the global power balance. This area has been and still is an area of rivalries between the US and Soviet Union because of its strategic importance. Whoever controls this region will certainly enjoy a strategic advantage, says Kirdi DIPOYUDO. So both major powers are competing for control of this strategically important region. It is therefore not unlikely that American-Soviet naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean will continue. The question is now how to maintain balance of their military presence as low a level as possible for such a balance should make it possible to avoid a competitive escalation of forces and to guarantee stability, peace, and security in the region.

Security arrangements in Southeast Asia is very difficult to establish because of the region's marginal economic and military importance viewed from the United States' and Soviet Union's interests. This is compounded by a balance of weakness within the regional states. In his article, Juwono SUDARSONO pointed out that the asymmetry of major power relationship and the balance of weakness within the regional states made it difficult to make attempts at regional or comprehensive solutions.

Energy is of vital importance to Indonesia, which is just beginning to emphasize industrial development. For this reason A. ARISMUNANDAR describes the situation, policies and institutional arrangement within the energy sector and suggests needs for energy research and development in conformance and in support of the aforementioned policies.

J. PANGLAYKIM highlighted the economic structure and strategy of Indonesia and Korea with the emphasis on development cooperation between the two countries.

Government documents reflect not only the government officials' attitude underlying their analysis but also the concepts which guide future planning. Thus, according to W. Donald McTAGGART, a review of the documents, on the one hand, might reveal the position of official government analysis of socio-economic conditions in South Sulawesi; on the other hand it might open opportunities to modify the concepts and to make them more applicable to the problems currently faced by the province. This would be certainly beneficial to the development of that region.

Accordingly a paper on migration of the Bugis in the South Pacific region, especially the Indonesian Archipelago, would be of great significance to the development in South Sulawesi. This article is contributed by Prof. Andi Zainal ABIDIN, of the Faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University, Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi).

In order to have a better insight on the rich treasury of the Indonesian culture, two short articles on Pidgin Malay in Irian Jaya and the Vocabulary of the Elite in Indonesia are appended. The articles are written consecutively by R.S. ROOSMAN and Michael SMITHIES.

IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA*

Kirdi DIPOYUDO

In recent years, the Indian Ocean area, comprising both the ocean and its littoral and hinterland states, has become the focus of world attention and has posed a serious question in international politics. It has become the region with the potential to generate major shifts in the global power balance for the future. This is mainly due to two things: the strategic importance of the region, and important developments which represent growing superpower struggle for control of this region and its resources.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

The Indian Ocean area has been and still is an arena where the rivalries of the great powers from outside the region are played out because of its strategic importance. This is chiefly due to its geographical location, the important sea routes which traverse it, and the wealth of natural resources of the densely populated countries on the shores of the ocean. There is in this ocean a network of essential trading routes which connect, by way of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the countries of the Far East and Australasia with the Middle East, and by way of the Suez Canal, the Far East and Australasia with Europe and America. Besides, the countries on its shores possess a wealth of natural resources such as wool, jute, tea, rubber, tin, copper, gold, diamonds, uranium and magnesium, chromium and antimony, in addition to oil which is today one of the most important resources. The countries of the Middle East are estimated to contain nearly 60 per cent of the world's proven reserves. This figure should be contrasted with that of less than 11 per cent in the Soviet Union and about 7 per cent in the United States. Six countries in the area are producing about 33 per cent of world production and are able to increase

*Paper prepared for the Third India-Indonesia Seminar, New Dehli, 25-28 January, 1982.

production to meet demands. Western Europe depends for two-thirds and Japan for four-fifths of their respective oil needs on this source, and this dependence is likely to remain in the next decade. American dependence has been increasing and may account for 30-40 per cent of its needs by 1985 as supplies in the Western Hemisphere fall behind rising demands, and most of these oil movements have to go through the Indian Ocean. Approximately 200 tankers a day pass through the Strait of Hormuz bound for Europe, America and Japan. The disruption of this oil flow for any prolonged period would paralyse the economies of the industrialized West and Japan. The industrial economy of the West now depends on oil, and the entire military machine of the West runs on oil. Control over the West's oil lifeline is control over the West's life. The Persian Gulf region is, therefore, vital to the future of the world. If the Soviet Union succeeds in taking control of this region, Europe and Japan will be at its mercy.

In addition, there is today the important role the Indian Ocean can play in the global nuclear strategies of the superpowers. The United States of America can deploy in its waters nuclear submarines and carrier strike forces carrying nuclear warheads as a strategic deterrence to Soviet aggression and invasion of neighbouring countries. To counter those forces which are covering strategic targets in its territory, the Soviet Union must deploy some naval vessels as well in its waters to mark them in peace-time and to attack them in the event of nuclear war.

Under prevailing international conditions, thus, any power maintaining a massive military presence in the Indian Ocean is sure to enjoy a global strategic advantage. Admiral Alfred Mahan is supposed to have said: "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the Seven Seas. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters." More recently, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. has stated: "The Indian Ocean has become the area with the potential to produce major shifts in the global power balance over the next decade. It follows that we must have the ability to influence events in that area; and the capability to deploy our military power in the region is an essential element of such influence." A power having a massive naval presence in this ocean would be able to control the shipping routes as well as the supply of oil and raw materials which are so vital to the West and Japan. Besides, from this ocean the USA can effectively deter Soviet aggression against itself and its allies.

A NEW COLD WAR

In recent years, several developments have taken place which amounted to a growing superpower struggle for control of this strategically important

region. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and used its army to depose an obstreperous ally and install a puppet government. This Soviet action has been interpreted as a signal that the Soviet policy is now entering a more aggressive and overtly expansionist phase and it has raised fears of a revival of the cold war in an era of infinitely greater destructive power.

The USA and its allies regard the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the accompanying Soviet military build-up in the Middle East as a serious threat to the vital interests of Western countries and Japan. As Soviet troops fanned out across Afghanistan, President Carter traded harsh words with Moscow and ordered a tough set of economic and political reprisals against the Soviets. Carter told a team of counsellors called at the White House: "This is the most serious threat to world peace during my administration. It is even more serious than that in Hungary and Czechoslovakia." Tensions rose between the two superpowers and snuffed out what was left of detente, threatening another arms race and pushing them into a new cold war.

President Carter calculated that the most sensible policy was to draw a line in front of the Soviets before things got worse. He recalled US Ambassador Thomas J. Watson from Moscow, took the case against the Afghanistan invasion to the UN, put the SALT II treaty on the backburner, where it may remain for good, and directed Defence Secretary Harold Brown to take soundings in Peking on ways of countering the Soviets. He also urged Congress to renew military aid to Pakistan, Afghanistan's nearest neighbour-in-peril. He called the Soviet invasion a callous violation of international law and the UN Charter, and for the first time he sounded a public alarm against Soviet designs on Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf as a stepping stone to possible control over much of much of the world's oil supplies. He said: "The world simply cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity. The Soviet action touched off a seismic shift in superpower relations."

According to Washington, the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan represented a severe threat to western interests. Control of Afghanistan would put the Soviets within 350 miles of the Arabian Sea, the oil lifeline of the West and Japan. Soviet warplanes based in Afghanistan could cut the lifeline at will; even if they never go that far, the threat alone expands Moscow's influence in a vital part of the world. The invasion of Afghanistan may also set a precedent that will make it easier for the Soviets to consider the military option in future crises. And the rapid growth of Soviet military power will enable Moscow to operate farther from its own borders the next time if it wants to. For twenty years Soviet talk of peaceful coexistence and detente has raised hopes that Moscow wants accommodation. But the Soviet Union has shattered such

hopes once in each decade: in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet policy has changed little since the original cold war.

It takes, however, two superpowers to wage a cold war, and the Soviets themselves had been disquieted by many recent developments. NATO's decision to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe alarmed the Soviets. President Carter switched his position and endorsed an increase in U.S. defence spending, and as the Presidential campaign heated up, nearly all candidates talked tough. The Soviets may have been genuinely rattled by the politics of the USA. The measures Carter announced in response to the Soviet invasion only confirmed Soviet suspicions that the USA was on a hard line course. Accordingly, Moscow accused Washington of returning to the cold war.

THE CARTER DOCTRINE

In the wake of the Invasion of Afghanistan, the USA actually undertook what appeared to be a fundamental reappraisal of its foreign policy. In addition to measures directed specifically to the Afghanistan issue, there were efforts to project a much tougher long-range posture in general. These included attempts to enlist the active support of allied and non-aligned governments, unilateral steps to strengthen American military capability and presence in the Indian Ocean region, and rhetorical militancy, culminating in the State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980.

More than anything else, President Carter said in this address, an act of aggression in Afghanistan was shaping the state of the nation and of the world. He drew a line around the Persian Gulf the Soviets could not miss. The stakes in the Gulf region which constitutes the pumping heart of the West's economic and defence system are very high. If the Soviet Union makes a grab for the Gulf, the West has no alternative but to go to war. The commitment made by President Carter is unequivocal: "Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

To show that he meant it, he asked for authority to revive registration for the draft, called on Congress to increase the defence budget by at least 5 per cent above inflation during the next five years, to grant a hefty package of military aid to Pakistan, and to expand the US military presence in the Indian Ocean.

This so-called Carter Doctrine, thus, extended the strategic umbrella that the USA has unfolded over Western Europe, Japan and Israel to a turbulent region stretching from the oilfields of Saudi Arabia to the far reaches of Pakistan. The President, however, was deliberately vague about when and where and how the US might step in militarily should the need arise. But his message to the Soviets was direct. "The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values."

Carter's speech signaled an about-turn in the US approach to policing the Persian Gulf. Previously Washington relied on the Shah of Iran to keep peace east of Suez. With the fall of the Shah, that policy was in shambles, and momentum began building for the creation of a US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for possible use in the region. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the RDF became a key element in the American defence planning for the 1980s.

THE US RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

As currently conceived, the RDF would consist of more than 200,000 troops, based in the US or East Asia but ready for quick airlift anywhere. Except for small arms and air support, their equipment and supplies would already be on-station aboard specially designed "roll-on/roll-off" ships, deployed near potential trouble spots. The RDF would enable the USA to oppose a Soviet thrust toward the Persian Gulf. But such force is several years and US\$ 10 billion away from full deployment.

The troops and hardware are beginning to be ready for the US speediest military build-up since Vietnam, and Washington has been bargaining hard for facilities to support them. The effort still amounts to a bluff, but the stakes for both sides are rising. The RDF is mainly designed to beat the Russians to any developing showdown in the oilfields. Essentially it is a strategy born of weakness in the vital region. Lacking reliable bases and stable allies around the Gulf since the fall of the Shah of Iran, American planners have opted for seapower and quickness rather than military superiority to give the Soviets second thoughts about a military adventure that could lead to a superpower showdown. It is a bold strategy of confrontation that has never been tested.

The idea of a RDF has been around in the US Administration since August 1977, when Carter's Presidential Directive 18 ordered up a mobile force that could respond to brushfire wars without diverting American troops from European and Asian arenas. But the order got stuck, until Iran's revolution knocked out the corner post of US influence in the oil region and the Soviets

invaded Afghanistan. Within weeks planners set a late - summer deadline to improve US readiness in the Persian Gulf area. The US had already shored up its presence in the area. Since the hostage crisis, the US Navy has kept a formidable armada in the Arabian Sea, including two aircraft carrier battle groups of about 25 ships, 150 warplanes and an 1,800-man Marine amphibious unit. But the only base anywhere near is at Diego Garcia, some 2,500 miles southeast of the Persian Gulf. To improve logistics for the RDF, the US went looking for friends in the region who could offer facilities closer to the action and have met with some success.

In an emergency, the Americans can use facilities at Berbera, Somalia, at Mombasa, Kenya, and at Masirah and elsewhere, Oman.

US planners have acquired 7 freighters and tankers assigned to sit on station in the Indian Ocean with two weeks of supplies for 12,000-man brigade and several fighter squadrons.

To give the RDF credibility for the future, the Carter Administration has budgeted billions of dollars to improve its reaction time over the next seven years. It has asked Congress to buy 8 high-speed SL-7 cargo ships that can steam to the Persian Gulf in about fifteen days, half the time needed at present, and to build a fleet of as many as 18 special pre-positioning ships for the US Navy. To improve the US airlift capability, the US is overhauling its present C.141 and C-5 transport planes to extend their capacity and service life, and to press Congress to approve the new CX cargo transport, designed for rugged and short runways.

The US also wants more than moral support from its allies. It has asked its European allies to take over more of the burden of NATO, freeing the US military to earmark some of its own backup NATO forces for duty in the Persian Gulf. Australia as well has been approached about providing a permanent home port for an US carrier task force on its West Coast.

If all works as planned, the strike force is supposed to give the US President the flexibility whatever a crisis calls for. The show is to be run from Tampa's MacDill Air Force Base where the Headquarters of the RDF has been established. The commander controls no troops directly, but in a crisis he would borrow select units trained for the mission.

THE FORCE AVAILABLE

The military build-up to protect the Persian Gulf region from a real or imagined threat by the Soviet Union has been moving faster than might be

commonly realized. A great deal has happened since the Iran crisis, when the US started from scratch in the region. At present these forces are available to the US in the region.

The Navy has managed to keep a roughly 25 ship fleet in the Indian Ocean, including two aircraft carriers and about 150 fighter planes, though at the cost of reducing carrier strength in the Mediterranean and Pacific and at considerable strain on crews.

A five-ship 1,800-man Marine amphibious force that has been sent to the region will stay there most of the time, with units rotating from the Mediterranean and Pacific.

Seven cargo ships are anchored at Diego Garcia carrying enough equipment and supplies for an enlarged 10,000-man Marine brigade for two weeks, plus some air force squadrons.

Air force fighters and the big new radar-packed early warning planes (AWACs) have operated out of fields in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to gain experience in the area.

The small Middle East task force based in the Persian Gulf has expanded from three to five ships.

Arrangements have been made with Kenya, Somalia and Oman for access to their ports and airfields in a Gulf emergency. Egypt and Israel have also made clear that their facilities would be available in a crisis.

The NATO allies have been told that there may be fewer US reinforcements for Europe and at least some of those countries have given a good response in terms of making some quick improvements to their own forces and considering greater efforts.

In the event of a crisis in the Persian Gulf region, the US would probably ferry over elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airmobile Division, both based in the US. Their mission would be to harass and delay an enemy assault and buy time for the heavier units that would follow.

The first elements of the heavier force would probably also be in the air. They would include a substantial body of Marines, perhaps a whole division, being flown over seas in widebodied US passenger jets hastily commandeered from the airlines. Their heavy weaponry would be awaiting for them in cargo ships, steaming from Diego Garcia to a seaport near the crisis area.

But all that would not be enough. The two army divisions are light-infantry units with limited firepower; they could be outnumbered by as much as 10-to-1 by Soviet troops with tanks and heavy artillery. The American forces could do little more than conduct a delaying action.

The Soviet Union has a formidable force on its southern border. There are at present 12 divisions stationed along the border with Iran in the Trans-Caucasus Military District and 20 more nearby. Three of these are tank divisions, two of them airborne and the rest of them motorized divisions. Because of the Soviet communication system, maybe 30 more divisions could be dispatched fairly quickly to the southern front if the need arises.

The crack air-borne divisions could be airlifted to take over an oilfield, although only one at a time. The Soviets have seven such divisions altogether and another one is being assembled; they are trained for desert warfare. In manoeuvres, the Soviets have shown that they can further airlift as many as 100,000 men in less than 10 days.

Thus, the Soviets would probably have superiority in any conventional showdown on the ground with American forces around the Persian Gulf. But the RDF is designed to deter aggression, not to overcome it. Accordingly American planners see their own force basically as a tripwire that the Soviets should take care not to touch, because it would mean war with the US .

SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION

There is thus a formidable high seas confrontation between the superpowers. The American fleet clearly rules the waves of the Indian Ocean. There are as many as 27 warships simultaneously. More crucial than raw figures is the power of the American force. There are two carriers with their full battle groups of guided missile cruisers, destroyers, frigates, oilers and other supporting ships. Along with them are cruising undisclosed numbers of US submarines with their deadly SLBMs.

Confronting the Americans is a Soviet fleet of about ten guided missile cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and more than a dozen support ships. There are also a number of other Soviet naval vessels in the South China Sea which can speedily join them if necessary. The Soviet ships shadow every US movements. In addition, Soviet IL-38 reconnaissance planes, based in Aden or Ethiopia, regularly drop to within 1,000 feet of US ships for close peeks, as do "Hormone" helicopters from Soviet vessels.

For its part, the American fleet can identify and track every Soviet ship within 300 miles of an US naval formation. Since each armada is able to intercept the other's radio transmissions, all important messages are scrambled before being sent. But there have been times when the two sides have communicated with each other, usually using signal lights or flag hoists.

The two armadas are involved in a potentially deadly game, for their ships constitute a formidable high seas confrontation between superpowers. The commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, has declared that "sooner or later the US will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas." But Chief of US Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward has stated that "the American force clearly signals that the US has adequate force to take the initiative if we feel that it's in our interest to do so. And it can be done now, without delay."

In addition, US allies have deployed naval task forces as well in the Indian Ocean to help safeguard the oil supplies of the West and Japan. As a result, the West has preponderant power in the ocean to establish a rough balance of military power in the region. Given the massive Soviet military power just over the border, that military presence of the West constitutes a minimum requirement.

CONCLUSION

The military build-up of the USA and its allies in the Indian Ocean may be an effective deterrence to Soviet aggression against the Persian Gulf nations. The Soviet Union is not to do something which can lead to a nuclear confrontation with the US which will destroy the industries it has built with a lot of sacrifices during so many years. But in the event of a civil war in Iran between the right and the left, the temptation could be too great for the Soviets not to take the opportunity. It could invade Iran as it has invaded Afghanistan with the hope to be able to occupy it before the Americans could do anything to counter it. This possibility seems to be slight as the RDF could arrive first on the spot. An invasion needs preparations which could be easily detected by the Americans. However, such a possibility should not be ignored, particularly because the stakes are very high indeed. As discussed above, if the Soviet Union succeeds in taking effective control of the Persian Gulf, Europe and Japan will be at its mercy. In this connection we may recall the words of President Brezhnev spoken in confidence to Somalian President Siad Barre, then an ally of the Soviet Union: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends — the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."

Indonesia deplores this growing superpower rivalry and arms race in the Indian Ocean region. She is apprehensive that such a rivalry could not only lead to an armed confrontation, but might also generate undesirable pressures and demands on littoral and hinterland nations. Accordingly Indonesia supported the idea to have the Indian Ocean internationally declared as a zone of peace, free from foreign military power and bases. As early as March 1970, Foreign Minister Adam Malik stated that Indonesia did not see any justification for foreign military bases and he stressed that the Indian Ocean nations themselves should be responsible for the security of the region through increased economic strength and low-key "understanding" rather than military pacts against outside threats.

Consequently, Indonesia endorsed at the UN General Assembly, on 16 December 1971, Resolution 2832 (XXVI), entitled "Declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," and all subsequent resolutions confirming the resolution and urging great powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean.

In 1974, Indonesia expressed regret at the proposed American build-up at Diego Garcia. In the words of Adam Malik: "Indonesia regretted the failure of the superpowers to understand the desire of many countries to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. If the United States of America enlarges its naval facilities on Diego Garcia because the Soviet Union possesses military facilities in the area, the Indian Ocean will become a zone of confrontation instead of peace." Indonesia is also one of the signatories of the Political Declaration of the Colombo Non-Aligned Summit Conference (August 1976), which condemns the establishment, maintenance, and expansion of foreign military bases and installations, such as Diego Garcia, by the great powers.

At the same time, however, Indonesia is fully aware that the Indonesian Ocean zone of peace proposal, under present circumstances, is rather unrealistic and impractical. The Soviet military presence that was being established just at the time when the British were withdrawing is an uncomfortable reality. As she rejects the supremacy or hegemony of any power in the region, she believes that it is in the best interests of the Indian Ocean nations to have an equilibrium between the superpowers. And this means that as the Soviets have already established a naval presence in the ocean that was previously an exclusive western reserve, in addition to the formidable land force just over the border of the Persian Gulf region, the United States would be welcome to establish a strong naval presence in the ocean as a counter force to deter Soviet aggression against any of the littoral states.

In the light of history as well as of the modern facts of power and vested interests, Indonesia is rather sceptical about the implementation of the UN

resolution, being aware that the world is not yet run on the spirit of brotherhood nor on the rule of law, and that internationally guaranteed disarmament has not been achieved because of mutual distrust of the superpowers. She infers that as long as these circumstances persist, the superpowers will maintain a strong defence posture and balance of nuclear strength, and that, consequently, American-Soviet naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean, as elsewhere, will continue. However, their military presence in the region must be maintained in reasonable balance at as low a level as possible. Pending the achievement of the Indian Ocean peace zone, such a balance should make it possible to avoid a competitive escalation of forces and to guarantee stability, peace and security in the region.¹

¹About Indonesia's position on the matter, see further Ali Moertopo, "Indonesia and the Indian Ocean," *IDSJ Journal* (New Dehli), January-March 1977, pp. 197-219.

SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CIRCLE OF CONFLICT*

Juwono SUDARSONO

THE MATRIX OF CONFLICT

From both theoretical and practical points of view Southeast Asia ranks as one of the more complex regions resulting in difficulty in establishing conceptual, much less policy-relevant, security arrangements.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union regard the entire region as an area of vital security interests. Their marginal economic and military involvements absolve them from pursuing any sustained, concerted or coherent effort from both sides in the manner that Central Europe provides a stabilising framework leading to the institutionalised security interests through NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces.

Of the two other major powers, neither Japan nor China possesses both overwhelming political *and* economic preponderance over the entire region essential in devising a durable security framework commensurate with its short-term and long-term interests.

It is this marginality and asymmetry of major power interest in the region that makes attempts at regional or comprehensive solutions difficult at best. A distribution of relative indifference among major powers can to some extent work to the advantage of regional powers seeking an autonomous solution to the security of the indigenous states. But this presumes that the regional states themselves see some commonality in extra-regional sources of security threat.

Indeed, the very fragility of most of the Southeast Asian states (and, no less importantly, of their governments) in turn often calls for periodic

*Paper presented at the US-ASEAN Conference on Economic, Political, and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s, November 3-5, 1981, Denpasar, Indonesia.

interventions by extra-regional powers to secure the survival of assorted regimes within the region. Coupled with attendant problems of socio-economic development and of domestic political management, a circle of conflict arises and creates a momentum of its own, one which neither major powers nor the indigenous states themselves are able to control.

The asymmetry of relationships among the major powers is compounded by a balance of weakness within regional states. Not one of the Southeast Asian states is likely to be able to bear its full imprint on the entire region. Vietnam since 1975 and particularly since 1979 may have achieved *de facto* primacy over the Indo-China region and the ASEAN states after the Bali summit of early 1976 may claim to some semblance of influence to determine the parameters of international politics in the maritime portion of the region. But neither the Indo-Chinese nor the ASEAN grouping are likely to be able to claim full authority over the entire area.

The conflicting ebb and flow of major power involvement, the diverse strategic outlook of the Southeast Asian states in regard to the form and source of extra-regional threats and, not least, the differing priorities in economic development efforts defy attempts to achieve an immediate and practical solution to the current crises in the region.

The *fait accompli* which the Vietnamese presented to the region in 1978-1979 heightens the complexity of the regional security situation at present. In addition to the interplay of major power involvement, regional security interests are defined by individual countries of the region at varying levels of perception and interpretation. At times even a single country's security perception changes markedly with the re-shuffling of the composition of its government. Often the style of a particular leader or of an important faction can substantially change previously agreed understandings, necessitating perhaps a fundamental re-examination of past initiatives and commitments.

THE REGIONAL APPROACH

First attempts at unraveling the crisis precipitated by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia were inspired by a common diplomatic perception among the ASEAN states that the *fait accompli* in Kampuchea was unacceptable on grounds of principle.

Throughout most of 1979 the ASEAN states, with the support of the United States, Australia and New Zealand, condemned Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia and its attendant policy of evicting mainly ethnic Chinese nationals from the country. Diplomatic victory was achieved in

November 1979 when the United Nations General Assembly called for the withdrawal of foreign troops in Cambodia.

Indonesian perceptions of the nature of the problem (and to the manner of its resolution) changed in early 1980. Apart from its empathy towards Vietnamese revolutionary achievements, the Indonesian government began to emphasize the need to re-evaluate the main source of threat to the region in the long-term.

Despite outward appearances of ASEAN solidarity or common outlook, it was clear that Indonesia saw China as the greater threat to regional order. While Thailand and Singapore regard Vietnam as nothing more than a proxy for the Soviet Union, Indonesia (and to some extent Malaysia) tended to accept some of the more political as well as military justifications for the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. In effect, this was the beginning not only of a reconsideration of past events in Indochina of the 1977-1978 period (particularly as regards Chinese provocations toward Hanoi through the Pol Pot government) but more importantly, of the desirable course of diplomatic action to break out of the Cambodian logjam.

The Kuantan Principle, while admonishing the Vietnamese for their action in Cambodia, in effect constituted an attempt by the Indonesian and Malaysian governments to seek a more regional approach in resolving the crisis. Perhaps it may have inadvertently inspired later counter-proposals by the Indochinese governments to construct a dialogue between ASEAN and the three Indochinese states, rather than to broaden the issue by encompassing extra-regional powers.

Apart from differences regarding the main source of threat to the region, the Indonesians and Malaysians also differed with the Thais and Singaporeans in respect of resisting the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh. While Singapore often spoke openly of a strategy of attrition to bleed the Vietnamese, Indonesia and Malaysia felt inclined to consider with sympathy Vietnam's fears in respect of Chinese threats toward it from three sources: the Sino-Vietnam border, the Cambodian-Vietnam border during the Pol Pot regime's control over Cambodia and the role of the ethnic-Chinese in the Vietnamese economy.

The Kuantan Principle almost immediately lost its lustre in the wake of the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand in June, 1980; Indonesia and Malaysia were subsequently put into a defensive position and ASEAN's diplomatic unity was regained with the repeated call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in October 1980. The meeting also called for the holding of an international conference as part of a continuous effort to achieve a comprehensive solution to the

Cambodian crisis. In effect, the holding of the conference in July this year marked the formal end on the part of the Indonesians to seek a more regional-centred solution.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Despite the failure of the Indonesians and Malaysians to convince their ASEAN colleagues of their more sympathetic approach towards Vietnam and their acquiescence to the formal declaration of the United Nations Conference on Cambodia, the Indonesians continued to maintain sporadic dialogue with the government in Hanoi.

The decision to continue the dialogue with Hanoi in part reflects the previous emphasis on the nature of the long-term threat to Southeast Asia from China. But it also in part stem from a growing realisation that a comprehensive and internationalised (as opposed to a region-based) approach to the Cambodian question bring more complications to the issue in question.

In the first place, by recognizing the legitimate interests of all parties concerned, the conference approach institutionalises the essentially extra-regional character of the Sino-Soviet conflict as a substantially more impelling issue than the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.

While recognizing the fact that one of the more important reasons for Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was its growing enmity with China, the Indonesians view that two extra-regional dimensions were too difficult a task to handle by all conflicting parties concerned.

In addition, resort to a comprehensive approach, even if it places priority on an understanding reached among Southeast Asian nations, necessarily reduces the prime responsibility of the Southeast Asian states in initiating breakthroughs involving matters of concern to the region. To the Indonesians and Malaysians, the comprehensive effort smacks of a great power imposition of a security arrangement which primarily serves the interests of the United States, China and Japan.

In deference to Thailand, however, both Indonesia and Malaysia for the moment seem to be willing to give the comprehensive approach a chance. In the meantime, both governments (or, at least elements within respective governments) will out of choice and opportunity be eager for a more propitious moment for another round of an intra-regional centred understanding.

The Malaysian foreign minister only recently warned China that its strategy of attempting to bleed the Vietnamese into submission was foolish and bound to fail. Coming as it does prior to the current deliberations at the United Nations on the Cambodian question, it may portend further evidence of a two-track diplomatic cum military approach evidently pursued by Indonesia and Malaysia on the one hand and the unified ASEAN stand on the other.

INDONESIAN VIEWS TO THE CONFLICT

The Indonesian clear preference for a regional approach rests on three premises which differ distinctly from the underlying principles governing the objectives of the conference approach.

In the first place, the Indonesian view is different from that of Thailand and Singapore on the motives of Vietnamese intervention into Cambodia. While it cannot openly endorse the installation of a government through the use of armed force into a neighbouring country, most Indonesian observers view the Pol Pot — Ieng Sary government as having been overtly provocative toward a nation which, from an Indonesian point of view, have strong claim and legitimate position of dominance within the Indochina region.

In addition, whatever misgivings China may have over Vietnam's treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, the Indonesians view with sympathy Vietnamese apprehension over the degree of control that the ethnic Chinese have over the commercial economy.

Finally, in strategic terms a strong Vietnam within a consolidated Indochinese front would act as an important buffer against Chinese expansionism in the long-term. Indeed, concern over the future of Chinese conventional and nuclear capability, helped by current American and Japanese diplomatic and economic support (particularly after the August 1978 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the recognition of the Beijing government in January 1979) has underscore Indonesian concerns over the future of regional resilience, one of Indonesia's principal tenets of national defence.

Viewed from Indonesia's defence perspective, of concentric circles emanating outward against extra-regional threats, a convergence of interests between ASEAN and the Indochinese states would constitute a formidable bulwark against China as well as insurance against potential domestic fifth columnists.

Understandably, the Indonesian views are viewed with strong suspicion and alarm in Thailand. Thailand's traditional rivalry with Vietnam for

influence over Laos and Cambodia has in the past aligned it with China for precisely these reasons. Thailand was also fully aware that ASEAN unity could only go as far as concerted diplomatic efforts; the combined forces of the ASEAN countries remain no match for the battled-hardened Vietnamese army.

Whereas Indonesia had strong reservations about China's punitive action toward Vietnam in February-March 1979, Thailand was relieved that China's limited attack forced the Vietnamese to think twice about possible consequences of a second front should it contemplate moving its troops well beyond Indochina. Thailand was also relieved to note that there were limits to the Soviet support of Vietnamese regional ambitions when the Soviet Union only provided verbal support to Vietnam during the Chinese attack.

Since in the view of Thailand only China retains any semblance of effective deterrent against Vietnamese aggression westward, there are also important discrepancies in respect of Thai and Indonesian tactics in regard to the Thai-Cambodian border area. Thai units are known to resupply Khmer Rouge forces who cross the border and then return to fight Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces; Thailand has also permitted movement of Chinese military supplies for the anti-Heng Samrin resistance forces. The Indonesians view such tactics as not only perpetuating the border area conflict, but more importantly, as exacerbating the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Also, the Indonesian and Malaysian view of a strong Indochina acting as a buffer zone against China is in direct conflict with the Thai view that it is only Vietnam that poses an imminent threat to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia.

The second point of contention between Indonesia and Thailand in regard to extra-regional dimensions involve the role of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union recognize the different perceptions among the ASEAN states concerning the sources of instability to the region. As the Chinese and American governments gradually moved toward normalisation of diplomatic relations and Vietnamese hoped of diversifying its major power relationships were constricted by Chinese pressure and American vengeance, the Soviet Union successfully persuaded Vietnam that a Soviet-Vietnam alliance was firm guarantee in securing economic and military assistance.

From the Thai perspective, Vietnamese dependence on Soviet support only enhanced its perception of an increased Vietnamese capability to strike across the border toward a wider regional dominance. The Indonesian view, on the other hand, was that the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance came as a result of American failure to give the Hanoi "titoists" with a fair chance to embark upon a more flexible and independent foreign policy stance. That this

American failure was perpetuated in tandem with the Carter Administration's obsession with its strategic understanding with China was all the more reason for Indonesian empathy to the Vietnamese predicament. More importantly for the Indonesians, American obsession to reach a strategic understanding with China, Subordinating Hanoi's concern with the larger perceived threat of Soviet naval power, only served to confirm the belief that the sooner ASEAN and the Indochinese grouping agreed to a region-based and region-centred security arrangement the better it would serve the long-term interests of all the states concerned.

In the eyes of the Indonesians what has transpired in the past five years in the broader spectrum of East Asia has not been favourable to Southeast Asian regional stability. A system of quasi alliances has polarized the East Asian setting in the six months between July 1978 and January 1979, one which only served to aggravate the intraregional nature of the conflict centering on Cambodia.

First Japan concluded with China (at the active encouragement of the Carter Administration) the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. It was immediately viewed by Moscow a major breakthrough as part of an effort to establish an East Asian anti-Soviet alliance.

When the deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese and American-Vietnamese relations finally brought about the Soviet-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the Chinese in turn foresaw the prospect of a Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia. China then normalized diplomatic relations with the United States, hoping that it would deter Vietnam from overturning the Pol Pot government. When it failed to do so, the American connection seemed sufficient to deter Soviet military reaction to China's subsequent military action into Northern Vietnam in February-March 1979.

The crisis in Cambodia, initially a conflict among fraternal Communist states within Indochina has, in less than a year, thrust itself into three layers of extra regional conflict: the Sino-Vietnamese dispute, with strong implications for both intra-ASEAN and ASEAN-Indochina relationships; the hardening of Sino-Soviet competition with respect to their secondary security relationships in Southeast Asia; and Soviet-American rivalry at the global level, specifically at "periphery areas."

Given the intricacies of the issues involved, it is doubtful whether a comprehensive solution as envisaged through the United Nations conference system, can ever have a chance to succeed. Indeed, the long-term and internationalised nature of the comprehensive approach only serves to confirm Indonesian fears that the circle of conflict in Southeast Asia is beyond the capacity and political willingness of the Southeast Asian states to break.

INDONESIA: SITUATION, POLICIES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF THE ENERGY SECTOR*

A. ARISMUNANDAR

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a vast archipelago, stretching more than 5,100 kilometres along the equator. Its 13,000 islands largely sit atop one of two large continental shelves: the Sunda stretching down from the Asian mainland or the Arafura reaching up from Australia. Indonesia's land area is about four times the size of Sweden; its water area is twice the land area. Indonesia is the fifth most populous country in the world. Its 147 million people (1980 census) inhabit some 1,000 islands, with the bulk of the population (91 million) living on the island of Java which has about 7% of Indonesia's land. While blessed with generally fertile soil and a number of natural resources, Indonesia is just beginning to industrialize and its national income is only about \$ 400 per person.

Indonesia's energy resources include: oil (about 50 billion barrels of recoverable deposits); natural gas (32 trillion cubic feet); coal (about 18 billion tonnes of possible reserves); hydro power (31,000 megawatts, potential); geothermal energy (8,000 — 10,000 megawatts, potential); and peat (200 billion tonnes, potential). Since Indonesia is a tropical country, among its renewable sources of energy potentially the most significant are solar energy (average insolation 1,800 kWh/m²), and biomass energy from its tropical forests as well as from forest and agricultural wastes.

With the above as background information, this paper describes the situation, policies and institutional arrangements within the energy sector, and suggests needs for energy research and development in conformance and in support of said policies.

*Updated version of paper presented at the International Workshop on the Strengthening of Energy Research Capacity in Developing Countries, Stockholm (Sweden), 18-22 January 1982.

ENERGY SITUATION

Commercial Energy

Commercial energy consumption Indonesia has been expanding at a very high rate. Table 1 shows that there were two periods of growth: 5.2 per cent a year during the period 1963-1969 (before the five year National Development Plan or PELITA), and 14.0 per cent a year during the period 1970-1980 (covering two PELITAs).

The rapid growth of energy consumption as shown in Table 2, was partly due to a population growth rate of 2.3 per cent per annum, but also to a growing demand from the industry and transport sectors and demand for a better standard of living.

The most important sectors consuming energy were industry, transport, household and electric power generation (see Table 3).

Commercial energy consisted of oil, natural gas, coal and hydropower (see Table 4).

The problem with commercial energy is that, as shown in Table 1, requirements have been increasing at a high rate and that, as shown in Table 4, although decreasing (90 per cent in 1977 to 82 per cent in 1980), the largest portion of these requirements have been satisfied by one source of energy, namely oil. The problem is serious because oil has been the most important source of state revenue and foreign exchange earner to finance the country's development plans. In fiscal year 1980/81 oil and gas contributed 69 per cent of budget revenues and 73 per cent of export earnings.

Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 3, a large position of commercial energy has been consumed in the non-productive household sector, in the form of kerosene (33 per cent of oil consumed in 1980); consumption of electricity in the household sector in fiscal year 1978/1979 was 56.3 per cent of total consumption (public power supply only).

Consumption of commercial energy is likely to continue to increase as a result of increasing gross domestic product (GDP) and population. Assuming growth rates of GDP of 6 and 7 per cent (constant 1978 Rupiahs) and demand-GDP elasticity of 1.53, one obtains Table 5 which covers the remaining three years of PELITA III, PELITA IV and one year of PELITA V.

The problem with commercial energy is also that of overdependence on oil, while the other sources of energy are underutilized. Coal production, for

Table 1

COMMERCIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION

Year	Population	GDP	Consumption
	(mid year; million)	(trillion constant 1973 Rupiahs)	(million tce)
1963	100.230	3.718	6.937
1965	104.343	3.854	7.842
1968	111.171	4.508	9.136
1969	113.629	4.856	9.404
1970	116.175	5.258	9.851
1971	118.600	5.545	11.455
1972	121.528	6.067	12.042
1973	124.318	6.753	14.708
1974	127.172	7.269	16.301
1975	130.092	7.631	18.131
1976	133.079	8.156	20.766
1977	136.135	8.770	24.144
1978	139.260	9.483	30.966
1979	142.458	9.990	34.339
1980	145.700	10.954	36.542

Table 2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GDP GROWTH RATE AND THE COMMERCIAL ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH RATE

	1963-1969	1969-1974	1974-1979
Annual growth rate of GDP (percentage)	4.55	8.40	6.57
Annual growth rate of energy demand (percentage)	5.20	11.63	16.07
Energy demand elasticity to GDP	1.14	1.38	2.45

Table 3

COMMERCIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY MAJOR SECTORS (MILLION TCE)

Year	Industry	Transport	Electricity	Household	Total
1970	2.950 (29.9)	2.896 (29.4)	0.549 (5.6)	3.457 (35.1)	9.852 (100)
1972	2.918 (25.8)	3.498 (30.9)	0.713 (6.3)	4.189 (37.0)	12.042 (100)
1975	5.766 (31.8)	5.185 (28.6)	1.033 (5.7)	6.147 (33.9)	18.131 (100)
1977	7.919 (32.8)	7.178 (29.7)	1.573 (6.5)	7.499 (31.0)	24.144 (100)
1980	13.293 (36.4)	9.756 (26.7)	3.566 (9.8)	9.927 (27.1)	36.542 (100)

Note : Figures in parentheses are percentage.

Table 4

CONSUMPTION OF COMMERCIAL ENERGY (MILLION TCE)

Year	Oil	Natural gas	Coal	Hydro	Total
1969	8.066 (85.7)	1.021 (10.9)	0.171 (1.8)	0.146 (1.6)	9.404 (100)
1970	8.656 (87.9)	0.880 (8.9)	0.161 (1.6)	0.154 (1.6)	9.851 (100)
1972	10.962 (91.1)	0.724 (6.0)	0.187 (1.6)	0.159 (1.3)	12.042 (100)
1975	16.408 (90.5)	1.287 (7.1)	0.199 (1.1)	0.237 (1.3)	18.131 (100)
1977	21.670 (89.8)	2.077 (8.6)	0.178 (0.7)	0.219 (0.9)	24.144 (100)
1980	29.944 (81.9)	5.521 (15.1)	0.190 (0.6)	0.887 (2.4)	36.542 (100)

Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage.

Table 5

PROJECTION OF COMMERCIAL ENERGY DEMAND 1981-1990 (MILLION TCE)

Year	GDP Growth Rates (trillion Constant 1978 Rupiahs)	
	6%	7%
1981	39.450	41.513
1982	43.711	46.744
1983	48.431	52.633
1984	53.081	58.528
1985	58.177	65.083
1986	63.063	71.516
1987	68.361	78.465
1988	74.103	86.154
1989	80.328	94.598
1990	87.075	103.853

Note: Energy demand elasticity to GDP assumed 1.53

% = per cent

example, reached 2 million tonnes in 1942 two-third of which was consumed domestically, but declined steadily to a low 161,000 tonnes in 1970.

Non-Commercial Energy

With regard to non-commercial energy firewood has been the prime source of supply throughout rural Indonesia and played an important role in meeting the total energy demand. A survey of 800 rural households in 5 provinces in October 1980 indicated that 77 per cent of these households

Table 6

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF FIREWOOD AND AGRICULTURAL WASTE
(in million tonnes)

Year	JAVA			OUTSIDE JAVA			TOTAL		
	Pro- duc- tion	Con- sump- tion	Sur- plus	Pro- duc- tion	Con- sump- tion	Sur- plus	Pro- duc- tion	Con- sump- tion	Sur- plus
1967	32.43	21.69	10.74	35.01	12.72	22.29	67.44	34.41	33.03
1968	35.62	22.36	13.26	41.27	13.67	27.60	76.89	36.03	40.86
1969	35.01	24.78	10.23	35.03	14.78	20.25	70.38	39.56	30.82
1970	36.64	25.90	10.74	44.03	15.84	28.19	80.67	41.74	38.93
1971	36.86	27.77	9.09	47.96	16.94	31.02	84.81	44.71	40.10
1972	35.58	29.94	5.64	47.44	17.90	29.54	83.03	47.84	35.19
1973	39.27	30.59	8.68	51.61	19.29	32.32	96.89	49.88	47.01
1974	39.88	33.83	6.05	54.72	20.73	33.99	94.59	54.56	50.03
1975	38.77	35.15	3.62	50.88	22.32	28.56	89.70	57.47	32.23
1976	36.70	37.13	-0.43	51.87	24.18	27.69	88.57	61.31	27.26

consumed firewood, and that per capita consumption of firewood was 1.1 kilogrammes, and kerosene 0.17 litres per day, or 327 kilogrammes of coal equivalent per year. If the former figure is extrapolated to cover the whole rural population of Indonesia, total firewood consumption could be estimated to be 36.4 million tonnes in 1980. This is considerably lower than that estimated by an earlier survey, which showed consumption of firewood and agricultural waste in 1976 of about 61.3 million tonnes.¹

The problem with commercial energy stems from the fact that, as can be seen from Table 6, on the one hand on Java consumption exceeded production since 1976, whereas on the other hand on the other islands there was a surplus of production over consumption. The deficit of production on Java caused serious deterioration of forests and damage to the environment.

ENERGY POLICY MEASURES

Policy Measures

Although the per capita energy consumption was low (251 kce of commercial energy in 1980), it was considered important to economize on the

¹Abdul Kadir and A. Arismunandar, Energy Problems of the Developing Countries with Special Reference to the Firewood Dilemma in Indonesia, Transactions WEC 1980, Vol. 1B, p. 621.

use of oil resources in order to maximize their value either indirectly as a foreign exchange earner or directly as a fuel. This decision was supported by the knowledge that other types of energy were available. These could be used as oil substitutes. The following policy measures were taken by the Government:

- Exploration. To increase and expand the exploration of energy resources;
- Diversification. To reduce dependence on petroleum in the over all energy consumption pattern and later to replace it with the use of other energy sources. Measures were adopted to develop non-exportable and renewable resources of energy such as geothermal and hydropower to meet the needs of domestic consumption. Non-renewable and exportable resources such as oil were given priority as a means of increasing foreign exchange earnings which could then finance the country's development;
- Conservation. To economize on energy use and to use energy efficiently and wisely. The conservation programme was to involve the following steps:
 - (i) Sectoral identification of wasteful energy use;
 - (ii) Provision of information and educational programmes;
 - (iii) Implementation of measures through legislation and directives;
- Indexation. To match each energy need with the most appropriate energy source.

Implementation of Policies

The above policy measures may be regarded as preliminary steps in managing the energy transition from an oil-dependent system to a new system, in which the new and renewable sources of energy will play the dominant role. Today, exploration and development of Indonesia's oil resources is encouraged to increase oil production. The government welcomes foreign investment to explore and develop offshore and more remote onshore acreage.

The government has embarked on an ambitious program to diversify domestic energy sources away from petroleum to make available more of Indonesia's future oil production for export. Natural gas in the form of liquified natural gas (LNG) exports has emerged as a substantial foreign exchange earner. LNG is expected to make an ever increasing foreign exchange contribution, perhaps approaching that of oil exports by the beginning of the 1990s.

The government has an ambitious programme to develop the country's coal resources as a substitute for oil in all future steam power plants and, wherever feasible, in cement plants as well. A major project is under way at

Bukit Asam in South Sumatera to increase production from the current rate of 200,00 tonnes per annum to about 3 million tonnes in 1986. This coal will be transported by rail to the southern tip of Sumatera, where it will be transshipped to West Java to fuel an 800-megawatt power plant. By the early 1990's the plant's capacity will be expanded to 3000 megawatts at which time 9 million tonnes of coal per annum will be required from Bukit Asam. Other coal-fired electric power plants are now in the planning stage and coal from Bukit Asam and other mines (Ombilin in West Sumatera and Kalimantan) is expected to be used by other industrial facilities as well.

Wherever technically and economically feasible, hydropower and geothermal energy will be developed also. Currently, about 625 megawatts of hydropower capacity have been installed. Additional capacities in the near future include the ones at Asahan, North Sumatera of 1200 megawatts, primarily for utilization at a large aluminum complex, and at Saguling, West Java of 700 megawatts for connection to the Java electric power network. Other hydro plants with a total capacity of 3000 megawatts are planned to be on line by the year 2000, in addition to 450 megawatts of mini and micro-hydro units to supply rural and semi-rural areas.

At present, there is but one 250 kW geothermal unit in operation at Kamojang, West Java and one 2 megawatt unit just starting up on the Dieng Plateau of Central Java. Another 30-megawatt plant at Kamojang will be commissioned this year. Five additional areas of Indonesia have been identified as likely prospects, and it is the government's intention to invite foreign firms to submit proposals for the exploration and development of geothermal energy sources, and the installation of power generating facilities. It has been planned that by the year 1990, about 700 megawatts of geothermal capacity will be realized.

On energy conservation, the government has launched a national programme consisting of four parts:

- (a) Public education and campaign;
- (b) Technical information services;
- (c) Laws and regulations;
- (d) Research, development and demonstration.

The first part of the programme was launched in early 1980, the objective of which was to create public awareness of the Indonesian energy problem, and to educate the general public on the importance of energy conservation. Campaigns have been conducted through the mass media in the form of sponsored articles and advertisement in newspapers, and campaigns through the national radio (RRI) and television (TVRI) broadcasting system, by erecting billboards and distributing stickers and posters.

In spite of the newness of the concept for most Indonesians and the limited funds allocated to this programme the response of the general public is both positive and heartening.

Towards the end of 1980 the second phase of the programme was started by distributing thousands of leaflets on methods of energy conservation in the transportation and household sector, and also by publishing a popular bulletin on energy issues.

Today, it is felt that having been somewhat successful in the public education and technical information endeavours, the government is ready to begin the third phase of the programme, namely the formulation of laws and regulations on energy conservation. It is believed that it would be logical to start with laws and regulations in the industrial sector, as it would be in the best interest of industries to save energy to cut production costs. The larger industries would be the most logical target group because they form the largest energy users, and they are smaller in number compared with the medium and small-scale industries, and therefore easier to control.

No action has yet been taken on energy indexation as this would be the most difficult policy measure to formulate and implement. Quantitatively, it would require a great deal of analytical and modelling work in the formulation of the indexation scheme, and research and development in the implementation of the plan. If the plan involves people in the household sector, then it should also take into consideration levels of income and such intangible factors as social habits and social acceptance.

NEEDS FOR ENERGY R & D

Energy Sector Organization (Including Energy R & D)

The energy policy measures outlined above were officially approved by the 13-member National Energy Coordinating Board (BAKOREN), which is a recently established (August 1980) cabinet level policy board chaired by the Minister of Mines and Energy and includes: the Ministers of Public Works, Industry, Defense and Security, Communications, Agriculture, Research and Technology, Supervision of Development and Environment, and Administrative Reform (Vice-Chairman of BAPPENAS); the Director-Generals of the National Atomic Agency (BATAN), Oil and Gas and Energy; and the President Director of the State Oil & Gas Company (PERTAMINA).

The draft policy measures were prepared by the Technical Committee on Energy Resources (PTE), which was established in 1976 and is composed of

representatives from ministries and other organizations connected with energy affairs. The PTE's major responsibilities now include drafting energy policy proposals to BAKOREN and monitoring the implementation of approved policies.

The implementation of energy policies is the responsibility of the various government Departments and agencies concerned, with the Departement of Mines and Energy as the focal point. This is so, because the Department of Mines and Energy has a broad range of responsibilities including energy planning, resource delineation and development, oil and gas exploration, production and marketing, and development of the coal, geothermal and power sectors. In addition, the Department has overall responsibility for all mining activities, and geological surveys. The public or quasi-public corporations dealing with mineral industries and the energy subsectors are also under the overall supervision of the Department. These corporations have varying degrees of autonomy, with PERTAMINA (oil and gas) and PLN (power) retaining the most independence.

Current Status of Energy Research and Development

The implementation of energy research and development is undertaken by several institutions that fall under the direct supervision of either the Department of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Research and Technology (MNRT), the Department of Education and Culture and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). The Ministry of Research and Technology maintains an active and growing role in energy research and development through its two affiliated institutions, the Agency for Development and Application of Technology (BPPT), and the National Center for Research in Science and Technology (PUSPIPTEK). Of these two institutions, BPPT has ongoing pilot projects in the energy field. The main focus of its energy research programme is on renewable energy and is divided into three subprogrammes: utilization of biomass energy sources; utilization of alcohols (methanol and ethanol); and utilization of solar energy. Many of these projects have received foreign technical assistance. PUSPIPTEK will undertake testing and demonstration of specific energy conversion hardware. Included in the proposed list of technologies to be investigated within the PUSPIPTEK programme are solar, desalination, biogasification, solar thermal and photovoltaic electric power generation.

A number of research groups and faculties in Indonesia's universities have relatively strong programmes in energy research and development. These include the Development Technology Center at the Institute of Technology, Bandung (ITB), the Institute of Technology at Surabaya (ITS) and the University of Gaja Mada (UGM), Yogyakarta. A number of industrial

research institutes including the Forest Products Research Institute (LPHH), and the Volcanological Survey of Indonesia (VSI), etc. are expanding their energy focus.

Priorities for Energy Research and Development

It can be concluded from the above that there is a strong need for energy research and development. Furthermore, these energy R & D activities should be coordinated in order that they conform with the overall objectives of the national energy plan. This is possible since the Minister of State for Research and Technology is a member of BAKOREN. In this task the Minister is assisted by 5 working groups for the Formulation of National Research and Technology Programmes, one of which is Working Group II on Natural Resources and Energy (PEPUNAS-RISTEK II).

PEPUNAS-RISTEK II advises the Minister on national research and technology programmes pertaining to natural resources and energy. The group recently set the criteria for the selection of priorities for research and technology programmes on energy, in that the programmes should:

- (a) be supportive of and in conformance with the national energy policy (i.e. exploration, diversification, conservation and indexation; see paragraph 14);
- (b) be quick-yielding and/or have long-term strategic significance;
- (c) have socio-economic and political impacts in accordance with the Main Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN), among other things in enhancing employment opportunities, and equitable distribution of income, increasing production of goods and services, and in strengthening national resilience.

Many ongoing R & D programmes have met the criteria set out above. For example, research and development on the utilization of alcohols (methanol and ethanol), solar energy and biomass, and testing and demonstration of specific energy conversion hardwares, are all supportive and in conformance with the policy of energy diversification and oil substitution.

However, whether or not future programmes and projects can successfully satisfy all criteria remains to be seen. In this context, it should be emphasized that research and development should not be limited to renewable energy technologies only. In the future, the role and potential of renewable sources of energy in the world's energy mix and, in particular, its contribution to the development of the developing countries may be significant. However, until the potentiality and appropriateness of renewable sources of energy have been fully evaluated one should never overemphasize their role. To pursue

technologically unproven and commercially unavailable sources of energy would be obviously premature. Furthermore, the development and utilization of such resources should in no way pre-empt the developing countries from access to a greater share in the world's stock of oil.

The most important constraint to the energy programme presently envisaged for Indonesia will be the availability of trained engineers and scientists. It has been estimated that in 1979 the number of engineers were 15000, and scientists 5000. The annual output of Indonesian Universities in 1979 has been estimated to be 1400 engineers and 500 scientists.

Another major constraint will be the availability of funds for research and development in the energy sector. The cost to develop new and renewable sources of energy for a 20-year programme (1981 — 2000) has been estimated at US\$ 14 billion. If 2.5 percent of this amount is allocated to R & D, about US\$ 350 million would be required for energy R & D alone. This is very large compared to the national R & D budget for all sectors, which is US\$ 160.4 million for fiscal year 1981/82.

The latter constraint is a national problem of allocating one's own resources in accordance with one's national priorities. The former, however, is one where technical assistance can be given and international cooperation desirable with the view to strengthen the national scientific and technological capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

A background information has been given on the energy situation and policies of Indonesia, as well as institutional arrangements within the energy sector and the current status of energy research and development.

Furthermore, a description of the criteria for the selection of energy R & D programmes and constraints in implementing energy R & D programmes in Indonesia has been given as well.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that:

- (a) energy research and development should be supportive of and in conformance with national policies (national energy policy included);
- (b) if, in the above context, international cooperation or technical assistance from other countries or organisations is desired, then these should be geared towards the strengthening of national scientific and technological capabilities; only in this sense, will they be meaningful, and only in this way will the developing countries be able to help themselves.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION BETWEEN INDONESIA AND KOREA

J. PANGLAYKIM

INTRODUCTION

The economic structure of a country is one of the determinants that defines the strategy for the growth and development of its economy. If we observe the different strategies pursued by countries with different economic structures, we will come to the conclusion that there are at least three types of strategy, namely:

1. Domestic-Demand-Led Growth Strategy

Countries endowed with natural resources and big population bases have opted for the domestic-demand-led growth strategy. The United States of America with its huge reserves of natural resources and manpower, for instance, has developed its economy by adopting this strategy. Although the decline and maturing stage of its domestic economy has more or less forced the United States to pay more attention to the export sector, its exports still constitute a small proportion of its overall economic growth.

2. Export-Led Growth Strategy

Countries not or less endowed with natural resources apparently adopt the export-led growth strategy. Some of them have comparatively small population bases, some are seemingly backed by reservoirs of population and manpower. Japan is one of the countries which have chosen the export-led growth strategy in order to develop and expand their economies. It has a big population base and has benefited from the boom era, so its strategy has proven to be a success. It has become a world super economic power and its dominating position in the international market has attracted other countries

to follow in its footsteps. Those inspired by the Japanese model are probably Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and some Latin American countries. The so-called "NICs" have also been successful in their strategies but are increasingly facing a complex world of contradictions, non-tariff obstacles and a shrinking international market. They have, in a sense, deepened up their dependency upon the industrial world market.

3. Trade-Led Growth Strategy

Most of the ASEAN developing countries endowed with natural resources have been engaged in exporting their unprocessed raw materials to the industrial countries. If in the past this was the "role" imposed by the industrial countries upon the developing nations to be their producers and suppliers on unprocessed raw materials, this role has now been challenged by many of us in the developing world. So instead of an "imposed raw material export strategy," most of us are now changing the direction towards what we may term as "trade-led growth strategy."

Developing countries now want to change the trade and investment patterns. Instead of exporting unprocessed raw materials, we are now determined to trade in industrial raw materials and, at a later stage, also in manufacturing goods. Being resource-based countries, Indonesia and Malaysia might develop into competitive suppliers of industrial raw materials. This therefore means that a change is imperative, not only in the trade pattern but in the investment pattern as well. If the dominating joint-venture type of investment was the pattern of the last 15 years, many of the national entrepreneurs are now in a better position to establish operations based on their own resources and capabilities. This will enable them to tap international and regional resources, either financial, technical or services. In other words, the objective of the trade-led growth strategy is to advocate a change in the trade and investment patterns and also in other types of facilitating resources. It is aimed at relying more and more on the national capabilities and capacities while tapping the international resources at a more or less better bargaining position. Hence, the joint-venture package deal type seems to have served its purpose.

THE THREE STRATEGIES

These three types of strategy should be seen as the focus of each national economy in the realisation of its economic development. In reality, each country will also have to pay more attention to its domestic demand sector. However, there are countries like Singapore and Hong Kong whose population

bases do not permit them to focus their "engine of growth" through the domestic-demand-led growth strategy. Other countries, such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, although may have the domestic demand aspect, their main focus for the implementation of their industrialisation and growth process has been the export-led growth strategy.¹ Developing countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, which have big population bases, may be seen as having a combination of domestic-demand-led and export-led strategies, the latter mainly involving unprocessed raw materials with a focus, lately, on the trade-led growth strategy. Japan, which has a big population base, has focused its attention on the export-led strategy, although her domestic market is quite substantial. This can be seen from the way the Japanese have combined and mobilised their strength in order to succeed in the implementation of their strategy. All the combined strength and mobilisation of the seven "samurais" have given them the mechanism to acquire a dominant position on the international market.²

INDONESIA AND SOUTH KOREA

1. Indonesia

As we have seen from above, Indonesia's strategy has been gradually shifting to the trade-led growth strategy which means that in the years to come its industrialisation process will undergo changes. It will deepen up further its industrialisation process instead of widening more in breadth as in the past. It will go for a more integrated industrialisation process. The various linkages, upstream as well as downstream, will become the main objective and occupation of the policy-makers and implementators. This means that in the implementation of this strategy one of the objectives will be to organise and plan a change in the trade and investment patterns. Contrary to its policy in the past, Indonesia is no longer going to export unprocessed raw materials. Logs, for instance, will not be channeled to the international market as raw materials although a small percentage might in the next few years still be exported in their raw material form. Under the current change in the patterns, logs should henceforth be exported in the form of plywood or furniture and perhaps also in the form of pulp and, at a later stage, also in the form of paper. This will also be the case with the petro-chemical complex. The raw material, which is now still being imported for the manufacture of textile and weaving yarn, will

¹See article edited by Eddy Lee, entitled: *Export-Led Industrialisation and Development*, ILO, 1981.

²See J. Panglaykim's Confirmation Speech, University of Airlangga, September 26, 1981, "The Role of International Business in the Theory and Practice of International Trade."

later be produced domestically. Any excess capacity of this industrial raw material will be exported to the developed countries and the NICs, including South Korea.

From the above it will be clear that by adopting the trade-led growth strategy Indonesia will in the years to come deepen up its industrialisation process by producing forward and backward linkages that will result in the production of industrial raw materials and manufacturing finished products. It will go for a more integrated industrialisation process and, as mentioned earlier, these industrial raw materials and finished products will be traded on the international market.

2. South Korea

South Korea has been categorized as one of the successful NICs and until now it has successfully implemented the export-led growth strategy.¹ As an observer of the Korean business scenery, it seems that many of the institutions, organisational set-ups, vertical and horizontal integration of the South Korean conglomerates, export drive and methods may have been inspired by the Japanese success in the implementation of Japan's strategy of export-led economic development. The entrepreneurial drive and intense competition among the Korean giant enterprises have brought about cases of overlapping and waste of national strength and resources. Since the Korean drive in the international market seems to be predominantly export-oriented (perhaps they are between the 4th and 5th phase),² their export drive has not been very much supported by a substantial and diversified investment in the ASEAN and industrial countries.

These giant export firms (similar to the Japanese Sogo Shosha) have by-passed the stage of selling production capacities and reached the stage of selling assortments of products, that is, from television sets to frigidaires, machineries and manufacturing products under their own brands like Shamsung, Lucky, Hyundai, to name only a few.

They sell these products generally on a Letter of Credit basis and may have offered limited facilities such as those accompanying purchases of goods from the Japanese general trading firms. The South Korean general trading firms may still lack the support and infra-structure such as those owned and

¹Yung Chui Park's, "Export-Led Development: The Korean Experience 1960-1978," in E. Lee (ed.), *op. cit.*

²L.H. Wotzel and H.V. Wotzel: "Export Marketing Strategies for NIC and LDC-based Firms," *The Columbia Journal of World Business*, Spring 1981.

controlled by the financial institutions in Indonesia. Also the nature of the direct investment has not been so varied as is the case, for instance, in a country like Japan. South Korea has yet to develop its capabilities insofar as direct investment is concerned. Japan has been in the game for a much longer time than South Korea.

The South Korean export drive to countries like Indonesia will always be handicapped by the presence of joint ventures in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia. Although the South Koreans have been able to gain some kind of foothold in a number of products because they have a competitive edge price-wise, their activities, however, remain limited since others have yet to develop infra-structures and in order to be able to push their products into the Indonesian domestic market. This aspect might have already been observed by those South Korean firms which have representative offices in Indonesia. Perhaps some of them have already started to create such infra-structures through their facilities in Singapore or Hong Kong and perhaps through some of their banking correspondents in Indonesia.

BUSINESS AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The objective of the Indonesian business and institutional development may be directed towards:

1. Development of industrial projects and complexes aimed at producing industrial raw materials, manufacturing various types of components/spare parts, and producing capital goods and other manufactured finished products on the basis of a more integrated industrialisation programme.
2. Development in depth of the financial sector and resources not only in terms of institutions but also in the introduction and use of a variety of money instruments, including the development of our Stock Exchange, in order to back up the development of Indonesia's industrial projects and complexes.
3. Expanding Indonesia's financial resources and institutions outside the national boundaries in order to be able to tap the international financial resources.
4. Restructuring, refocusing and pooling existing combines as well as establishing new combines in the trading and commercial sectors aimed at the national and international markets, possibly in the form of general trading firms.

5. Development of Indonesia's financial, technological, commercial, research and development manpower as well as entrepreneurial groups in order to be able to man the development in the national institutional arrangements and re-arrangements, including shipping and other service arrangements.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

Looking from the Indonesian standpoint, the five areas just cited by the author could be seen as areas which the two countries could observe and study in order to come to an agreement on a possible development cooperation. South Korea has been through this exercise and has therefore gained some experience. This will enable Indonesia to learn valuable lessons about South Korea's successes and failures and be warned of certain mistakes, pitfalls and errors of judgment. Over-confidence and perhaps personal rivalry might be one of the pitfalls which South Korea has gone through. We might learn what has caused this over-confidence and how we could avoid this kind of behaviour.

Let us now try to discuss the five aspects which have been put forward in this paper as possible areas of development cooperation. This identification of areas serves as a kind of point of departure from which further discussions could be stimulated.

1. Development of Industrial Projects and Complexes

This area generally requires not only advanced technological knowledge but also huge capital input. As a resource-rich country Indonesia might be able to produce energy-based industrial raw materials on a very competitive basis if organised and managed properly. South Korea, which lacks these energy resources, might benefit from a possible cooperation in this sector, because its energy-based industries, which produce industrial raw materials, might not be very competitive.¹ By assisting and participating in the production development of industrial raw materials South Korea may benefit from this possible tie-up. Not only will the South Koreans be more or less assured of a regular supply of industrial raw materials, but they will also be able to assist Indonesia in marketing these industrial raw materials on the international market.

¹In 1978, 60% of South Korea's total exports consisted of industrial raw materials. See Yung Chui Park, *op. cit.*, Table 4.12.

We are aware that not all of these operations will allow foreign participation, but a team, assisted by their technical staff, would be able to identify possible areas of tie-up. It will not be surprising if the area of pulp and paper production will still be open for foreign participation. The amount involved in the production of these two kinds of industrial raw material will most probably be over and above the US\$ 200 million mark. South Korea is also quite experienced in the production of capital goods. This may be another area of a possible tie-up.

Indonesia's integrated industrialisation programme will, in our opinion, open up new opportunities for the South Korean industrialists, not only in terms of joint ventures but also in terms of technical agreements and consultancy. However, a kind of warning is perhaps proper here. Indonesia does not want firms which are only thinking of their own position and profits. It should really be based on mutual benefit and interest.

The South Korean industrialists are not the only group looking for new opportunities. The Japanese and other foreign investors might also get interested, partly for the purpose of securing the supply lines of industrial raw materials from resource-based countries and partly for the purpose of relocating their structurally depressed industries.

2. Development of the Domestic Financial Sector

As Indonesia starts with its linkages process as part of its more integrated industrialisation programme, we are confident that in the years to come the national banking industry and the non-bank financial institutions will have to increase their capability to back up the new development with a variety of credits, so that the national finance will be able to meet the new financial requirements and needs. At present the Indonesian Stock Exchange has successfully oversubscribed practically every issue of shares on the market. It appears that thousands of medium-sized and small investors are in the market for new issues of shares. It is most probable that new viable projects, backed by the government and the private companies, will find less difficulties in obtaining funds from national sources in their endeavour to finance their initial needs of long-term capital. If the State Plantations were to issue shares for a palmoil project tomorrow, I am confident that the public will subscribe to the new issue. In other words, the national banking industry and the non-bank financial institutions are moving in the right direction, but they have to keep pace with the new development in the industrial as well as other sectors in order to successfully support the new direction in the industrialisation process of Indonesia. It is also imperative that the monetary authorities of the country support the expansion drive in depth of the banking industry in order to be able to support the more integrated industrialisation process.

3. Tapping International Financial Resources

Past joint ventures have normally been established on a "package deal" basis. This has changed lately in a number of cases. South Korea with its experience in tapping international financial resources for its export-led industrial development has gained a certain degree of standing in the international capital market. Although there have lately been some mishaps, in general the South Korean standing as an international borrower is still good.

With Indonesian credit standing in the international capital market, it will most probably not be too difficult for any project embarked on a joint venture basis to look for international sources of finance. However, it may be rather difficult to agree that the joint venture float the funds on a joint venture basis and not separately. But floating it jointly will give the joint venture a stronger standing in the international capital market. Indonesia has the resources and possibly also the initial capital. South Korea has the required technical knowledge and the market for the products as well as the experience in marketing the surplus on the world market. So if they work on a joint venture basis, many financial institutions might find that they are knitted together nicely. This will make the project viable and economical and business-wise also feasible. So in tapping the international financial resources better terms and conditions might be obtained on that basis, which would not be the case if each side were to go on its own.

The South Korean financial institutions operating in various combinations and through their branch offices or representatives in such financial centres as London, Singapore and Hong Kong can cooperate closely with our financial institutions and their branch offices in these regions. Most probably this has already been done by the national banks of both countries, but it will be a good beginning if they start making advances at least in terms of contacts and inter-bank relations or loans. It has to be noted, however, that at present Indonesia's banking policy does not permit new foreign banks to operate in its territory. This means that Korean banks will still not be allowed to open their branch offices here. This fact should not be seen as an unavoidable handicap and should not be used also as a weapon to bargain for a branch office, because it might lead to a misunderstanding among the monetary authorities.

4. Restructuring, etc. of the Trade Sector

The South Korean general trading firms are considered as having successfully penetrated the international market. They have during the past few years gained experience as to how to deal with and maintain its market

share in the industrial and developing countries. Their network as well as manpower in the trading sector might well be of assistance to the newly established and newly reorganized or restructured Indonesian trading firms. Some kind of working arrangement and joint operation might be possible. If the two parties are willing and are also prepared to show their goodwill in making their ventures in the production field a success, the next step will be in the trading sector. This might be the most difficult part in the development cooperation, because in some way and in some products the two countries' general trading firms might be aiming at the same market or markets and might be more in a competitive rather than complementary situation. In a shrinking international market this might prove to be a difficult task. But the world market will not remain restricted as the situation is now. So it is hoped that in an expanding market, the cooperation between the two countries' general trading firms might be possible and profitable. There are a number of options and alternatives available where a possible collision could be avoided. The top people of these general trading firms should be in a far better position to study the options and alternatives. We will be doing things, of which we have no expertise, and the agreements and alternatives might be too technical for us all here.

5. Development of Manpower

South Korea might be in a position to provide assistance and work out an arrangement in the training of Indonesia's manpower with regard to certain technologies, including marketing skills and financial expertise. This should preferably be done on the job training level, because it might not be too feasible if done on the university educational level, taking into account the language and other requirements set by the universities on both sides.

With regard to shipping and other service arrangements, a conference has been established between Indonesia and South Korea. In other fields of services, such as consultancy and insurance, cooperation might also be possible as part of the development cooperation between the two countries as it develops in the years to come.

I have purposely excluded cooperation in the extractive industries, because South Korea is in this field still in the initial stage. South Korea has still to develop its skills in the field of oil exploration, although the first production sharing arrangement has been signed between Kodeko Group and Pertamina.

SUMMARY

Although the two countries have in terms of strategies taken different paths that lead their economies into the industrialisation stage, it appears that, in terms of development, development cooperation in a number of fields will exist. This will be part of Indonesia's integrated industrialisation programme.

In terms of industrial raw materials, consumers in South Korea may be interested in Indonesia since they are looking for sources of a continuous and secured supply. South Korea's energy-based industries will be in a less advantage position to compete in energy-based industrial raw materials. It will only be logical if one starts a joint operation in this field where both countries could work out a complementary working arrangement. As a consequence of ventures in the field of production of energy-based industrial raw materials, development cooperation should also be followed up in the trade, financial, training, shipping and other service sectors like insurance, consultancy, etc.

In presenting this brief article it is hoped that the two countries' private as well as state enterprises would start with the forming of a team entrusted with the task of identifying the projects that are feasible, viable and beneficial in terms of development cooperation. The team's task will not be easy, but it will certainly be a worthwhile exercise for the implementation of the development cooperation between the two countries.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT AND QUASI-GOVERNMENT WRITINGS DEALING WITH SOUTH SULAWESI

W. Donald McTAGGART

The intention in preparing this paper is to carry out a review of a wide range of government documents dealing with Sulawesi Selatan, and to provide a summary and review of their contents. It is believed that because in most underdeveloped countries local government officials have to function in a variety of different roles — that of planner, development engineer, agrarian adviser, as well as administrator — reports emanating from government service should strongly reflect the concepts which the authorities are in the habit of employing in their analyses of economic and social affairs. Such documents will reveal not only the attitudes which underlie existing analyses but, also, the concepts which guide future planning. A review of government writings would, therefore, presumably be able to do two things. It would be able, first of all, to assess the position of official government analyses of socio-economic conditions in Sulawesi Selatan. In the second place, it should provide some direction for modifications of these concepts to render them more applicable to the problems currently faced by the province.

In the event, the review followed a slightly different course. It was first of all sometimes difficult to decide what should be included in a review of "government reports." Concerning Sulawesi Selatan, there is a fair amount of material produced by government departments, both within and outside the province. This is usually clearly indicated in the publication credits and presents no problem. However, a good many reports, even some published by government departments, actually emanate from individuals, and have been written at the initiative of these individuals. At the other end of the scale, a great deal of important government material is not published at all. It consists of internal memoranda and correspondence passing between different offices and different levels of the administrative hierarchy. It is only occasionally and fortuitously that this kind of material becomes available as

part of the published record. In the second place, as is customary everywhere in government service, reports are written for a purpose. The purpose is not always clear from the title or from the foreword. It is usually in response to a request, and the circumstances surrounding this request are critical to an evaluation of the concept and the conceptual basis of the report that ensues.

In pursuing some of the available material, however, I was struck by what seemed to me to be a significant conclusion. It appeared that, broadly speaking, governmental agencies had to deal with two different types of problems. On the one hand, there were problems relating to the administrative structure of a province and the place and role to be accorded to its various parts. This portion of the administrative work is dealt with great firmness and great clarity throughout the administrative hierarchy. On the other hand, there are problems whose solution involves a response to an information flow. These are particularly the problems of economic and socio-economic development, the socio-economic status of the community and so on. In these, the decision-making capacity of the administration is much poorer. Primarily, it seems that the administration has no regular means of dealing with information and data flow. It creates a vast amount of data at every level of activity. Data are fed up from the villages through the *camat* to the *kabupaten*¹ and finally to the provincial level. At every stage in the process, the data are edited and, in some cases, shorn. But at no level in the administration is it thoroughly digested.

This paper will, therefore, attempt to illustrate the situation thus depicted. It will describe and analyze some of the differences between these two types of situations confronted by the administration and illustrate the different responses generated. Because, in Indonesia, the administration is a prime economic mover, as well as a prime creator and collector of economic data, the paper will go on to propose a possible method of handling and utilizing the great masses of data that the administrative information system is at present providing.

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS

It should be made clear at the outset that the following review is in no sense complete. It is extremely difficult to obtain a comprehensive bibliography of works published on South Sulawesi. It is even more difficult to find the works themselves. A certain amount of publication on the area is carried out by commercial publication houses in Indonesia, by the university located in Ujung Pandang (Universitas Hasanuddin), and a series of

¹Kabupaten = district; Kecamatan = subdistrict.

government departments at national, provincial, and sub-provincial levels. Publications which will be reviewed here represent merely a sample drawn chiefly from those available through a number of university libraries in the United States. However unscientific the sample may seem, it is probably nonetheless quite representative of the kind of works which are being published in Sulawesi at the present time. Consequently, a review of the problems covered, approaches adopted, and concepts utilized will probably touch upon some of the main themes which would be encountered in a wider perusal of the published materials.

Because the concentration here is on publications of Indonesian origin, it should be pointed out that no attempt has been made to review the work on the general plan for South Sulawesi coordinated between the government of Indonesia and Canada. Nor does the ensuing list contain works compiled or published as a result of the efforts of the Social Science Research Training Center in Ujung Pandang. Many of these, of course, have not been published and remain accessible only by application to the Center itself. We will review briefly a number of titles under various categories published by organizations which are both private and governmental. We will then review in more detail two government publications, one dealing with the economic situation in Sulawesi Selatan and the other with administrative structures.

The non-governmental publication industry in Indonesia is not highly active at the present time. Nonetheless, from private commercial publishers have appeared a number of books dealing with aspects of South Sulawesi which are of considerable interest. The theme of local regional history looms fairly large. Matadda (no date) is an extended study of the local history of the Luwu district from the earliest times until the present. There is, however, a heavy concentration in his book on the Dutch period, the Japanese period, but most especially the revolutionary period which succeeded the Second World War. The author was born in Luwu and participated in the independence struggle which he relates. The central theme of his book is the search for an explanation of why the small, scattered, disorganized and backward population of Luwu was able, during the independence period, to put up such a heroic struggle against the Dutch. A similar theme of regional pride is represented by a Patang (no date). His book is a compendium of sketches of Sulawesi, particularly heroes of the revolutionary period. Although the focus is on particular persons regarded as heroes, from the pre-Colonial period up until the present day, the framework is used to review much of the regional history at the same time, especially insofar as it is background to the struggles in which the heroes participated.

Another fairly commonly represented theme in Indonesia in writings about the area is ethnology or anthropology. Some sophisticated ethnographic

and anthropological writings have appeared in various professional research journals. These will not be referred to here. There is, however, a certain tradition of local publication by local observers. Two examples will suffice. The first is the Salombe (1972). This is a brief study of the Toraja people. It is a capsule history, but, in addition, it describes a number of major Toraja festivals and ceremonies. Although informative and in places quite detailed, it does not claim to present any conceptual analysis of Toraja culture or society. Much more analytical is the work of Suhamihardja (1977). His study deals more generally with the peoples of South Sulawesi, and he refers in particular to the Bugis, the Makassarese, the Toraja, and the Mandar peoples. More in the tradition of the Dutch writers on *adat*, Suhamihardja selects various cultural themes as organizing principles for his study. He talks, for example, about marriage customs among the various peoples and about death and funeral rites.

The third category is represented by Djamaluddin (1973). This study is representative of those which reflect the views of military personnel who have worked in one capacity or another in South Sulawesi; though a colonel in the army, the author served for a time as a civilian administrator. He was familiar with the typical range of development problems faced by administrators in the region but came to feel frustrated at the lack of progress in economic and social affairs. In his study he lists a series of problems, all of which will have to be tackled in South Sulawesi if development in his view is to proceed. For example, in particular, he deplores deforestation; and refers to the need to protect existing forests and to effect reforestation over much of the province. He recommends that efforts be made to increase the amount of agricultural land subject to programs of crop intensification. He refers to the need to raise the level of technical education among people dealing with agriculture so that costly technical failures will not take place. He refers to the need for modernization in livestock, fisheries, and forestry sectors. He hopes that the role of the *desa* administration will be strengthened and, in particular, that the persons chosen as village leaders will be well qualified and well trained to carry out their functions. He criticizes the poor use of data from village sources, and he laments the lack of financial institutions in the countryside capable of meeting the credit needs of the peasantry. His is a relatively common viewpoint among some of the more active military and civilian administrators. They exhibit, on the one hand, impatience with those features of social structure and behavior in Sulawesi which inhibit change, progress, and development. On the other hand, they are obviously intent on retaining and conserving certain important areas of traditional social behaviour, in particular those areas which contribute to social tranquility and national security.

A very strongly marked characteristic of most of this private writing on South Sulawesi is that it scrupulously avoids controversy. The authors are well aware that they have to reflect official attitudes. Those who deal with local history and ethnology are contributing to a growing awareness of regional diversity. However, they stay clear of controversial areas of study, such as the events of 1965 and 1966.

Concerns similar to the above emerge in the work of people who, although they write as individuals, have had their work published by official government agencies. The historical theme is reflected once again in the works of Haliem (1976). His is a brief account of the history of the independence struggle in the Mandar district of Sulawesi. It is like many of the publications of this genre, a reflection of his own personal experience during that period. Pabittei (1976) is a brief history of the Benteng or the fort in Ujung Pandang. The fort has been declared a national monument and is being preserved as such. It is an item of considerable historical interest and serves as a historical museum for Ujung Pandang. This account of its history is comprehensive, but it does not do much more than bring up to date some of the material already included in Patunru (1969). The ethnographic, anthropological stream is represented by Tangdilintin (1978) who presents a brief summary account of the Toraja people and their culture. As was the case with Salombe, referred to above, this work has no pretensions to present an analytical framework for Toraja culture, but is simply descriptive.

Universitas Hasanuddin has played an important role in furthering research efforts devoted to problems of Sulawesi Selatan. Many of the published results of this research are listed in a bibliography (Universitas Hasanuddin 1979). These studies cover a wide range of the development problems of the area but concentrate on major areas of economic importance, such as agriculture. Several examples will be referred to here.

A substantial portion of the research effort of the university has involved the sending of research and interview teams to different parts of the province to investigate particular problems. In many cases it appears that the university was requested by a government agency to conduct an inquiry. The reports, therefore, although not technically official, carry the hallmark of cooperation between the university and governmental agencies. Karim (1976) carried out a survey of the role of land renting in padi agriculture in the region. It is recognized that the distinction between land owners and land renters in the villages of South Sulawesi constitutes an important class division. In general, the owners are more wealthy, the renters less so. Karim investigated the economic status and standing of these two broad groups. Although technically speaking the relationship between owner and renter ought to be legally defined

by the *Undang-undang* of 1960, this legislation does not seem to have had very much effect in South Sulawesi, and traditional forms of relationship continue to apply. The renter continues to get a smaller share of the crop than the owner. The renter continues to have heavy responsibilities for the health of the crop and yet not to have much to say as to which crops shall be grown. He concludes that a very substantial portion of the *sawah* land in South Sulawesi is rented, but that many of the owners and renters do, in fact, live in the same *desa* or village and are known to each other, and may even be closely related. He finds that arrangements are generally verbal rather than written. Ratna Tayeb (1976) investigates the status of horticultural activities in South Sulawesi. A sample of growers and middlemen was drawn from three of the *Kabupaten* where horticulture is most important. This report provides an account of the cultivation and commercial methods of the horticulturalists and provides in addition some figures on production. It does not, however, come to any policy conclusions, nor does it provide any sustained analysis of the problems facing this sector of agriculture.

The theme of agriculture is also addressed, even if indirectly, in a report (Anon 1974) dealing with the development of leadership in cooperatives in South Sulawesi. It is a part of an ongoing study of cooperatives. Granted that the basic law of 1945, setting out the principles of the Indonesian constitution, stresses cooperation as the appropriate organizational form for the promotion of economic activity, it is perhaps surprising that the cooperative movement has had so little real success. The author argues that in the early days of the Indonesian republic cooperatives were imposed from above as a mandate of national policy, rather than encouraged to grow through the spontaneous volition of the rural people. It is maintained that poor organization and management, particularly of financial affairs, has kept back the cooperatives for many years. It is the conclusion of the report that, although cooperative activity has made a reasonable beginning in South Sulawesi, it has not gone nearly far enough.

Ambar Tadang *et al* (1976) has examined the condition of the indigenous small-scale commercial entrepreneur in Sulawesi Selatan. This again reflects one of the persistent problems perceived in development in Indonesia. Many of the small-scale entrepreneurs in retail trade and distribution are of Chinese ethnic origin. The success and solidarity of this group is seen as a barrier to the progress of commercially-minded Indonesian entrepreneurs, unable to break the monopoly held by the Chinese. Various government programs have sought to get around this problem by favoring indigenous business men. The conclusions of this team were that, although these efforts had been substantial, they were not enough to ensure success for more than a small number of

Indonesian commercial entrepreneurs. The amount of credit available, very often at concessional rates through banks and other agencies, was insufficient. Frequently, indigenous entrepreneurs, having obtained the necessary licenses, proceed to sell these to Chinese business men for a profit. We observe also that the indigenous businesses are poorly managed; for example, keeping no adequate records of inventory or accounts. It is therefore extremely difficult to tell whether they are, in fact, operating at a profit or at a loss; and, if the latter, in which precise area of the business it is occurring.

There are then a series of Unhas publications which deal with sociological and anthropological issues. Two of those that we refer to are anthropological in nature, in that they reflect a detailed investigation by a trained observer into the dynamics of small-scale communities in the region. Sunyoto Usman (1978) investigates the manner in which Bugis families handle the question of inheritance of housing. It has been observed that in many cases female children, rather than male children, tend to inherit the house. After investigation, the author feels that this reflects the tendency for female children more regularly than males to remain on in the house after marriage and therefore to be "in place" to inherit the house after the death of the parents. Walinono (no date) conducted a study of Tanete, a village in South Sulawesi. This study was defined as a thesis for a higher degree at the Universitas Hasanuddin. Consequently, although it deals with a topic which is of considerable practical and administrative interest, its approach is analytical. In the villages, Walinono sees conflict between the traditional elite and a new elite created by governmental action, bureaucratic appointments, and by new economic circumstances. He endeavors to document the compromises and adaptations made in the village he studied in order to permit the old elite, defined in religious and customary terms, to function alongside the new elite created by the bureaucracy and by the new forces of economic wealth. Mattulada (1977 and 1978) was the team leader in a couple of studies which investigated sociological problems of interest to the administration. In a sense, Mattulada's first study reflects that of Walinono just described. He is interested in the influence among the villagers of the *Ulama*, or traditional Islamic religious leaders. His team interviewed a large number of residents in the villages in the province, and they came to the conclusion that there is a distinct tendency for the villagers to become "more worldly" in their attitudes. Without abandoning religious values, it is clear that the villagers wish their children to have more secular education than their parents ever had. There is a clear economic value seen attached to the secular school education. Should there be insufficient time to give an equally thorough religious education, this no longer seems so important as it used to be. The conclusion of the team is that the government should not insist on maintaining separate religious schools, but rather should try to integrate an appropriate level of religious

training into the public school system. The second work is more a theoretical sociological review of forms of social structure. Recognizing that Sulawesi Selatan is divided up into a large number of village communities, Mattulada seeks to analyze the basis of this type of community organization. He discusses different forms of organization — genealogical units, territorial units, and functional units such as the fishing villages. He tries, also, to place his discussion within the general context of evolving academic writings in the field, including the analyses of some Indonesian anthropologists such as Koentjaraningrat as well as some earlier Dutch authors such as Boeke, Ter Haar, and Vollenhoven.

The studies published by Universitas Hasanuddin thus represent two important thrusts. On the one hand, there are studies virtually commissioned by local government departments in order to deal with particular problems. On the other, there are studies carried out as part of the wider academic mission of the university.

Direct publication by government departments represents an important body of information and analysis of the South Sulawesi situation. In general, such publications tend to be problem oriented. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, the Department of Education published a history of the rulers of Buton (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1977). This has as its objective the education of people in general, the increasing of their awareness of the historical past. As such, it is educational in intent rather than in problem solving. In point of fact, it goes through a long catalog of the rulers of the islands concerned and says something about their lives and accomplishments.

For the remainder, the problems tackled are many and varied. Two reports can be cited which deal with problems that are much wider than Sulawesi Selatan. On the one hand, there is a publication dealing with development of the Kampung improvement program in seven cities of Indonesia, one of which is Ujung Pandang (Direktorat Tata Kota dan Daerah 1978). In Ujung Pandang, four *kampung* had been selected for a concentrated effort in *kampung* improvement. This report describes certain aspects of the socio-economic conditions in these four *kampung* and gives a brief analysis of their respective problems. The targets of the *kampung* improvement scheme for these four villages are listed. As is customary with this program, most of the improvements are infrastructural — improved access pathways, improved drainage, improved water supplies, improved garbage disposal and sewage facilities. There is no analysis of the general direction of the *kampung* improvement for Indonesia as a whole.

Al Haddar (1979) is an evaluation report carried out in connection with the program to disseminate information about family planning. A number of rural villages had been selected to participate in a program wherein young persons who were considered to be some kind of informal village leaders were brought to participate in a campaign. The campaign had as its objectives the dissemination of information about family planning and achievement of a higher rate of acceptance due to the example set by the village leaders. The evaluation team interviewed a considerable number of people in the villages and was, in the end, cautiously optimistic. It was felt, however, that the persons participating in the program had been insufficiently trained. It was also clear that the kind of criteria adopted to measure success — the number of persons "motivated" — was very imprecise and was subject to various forms of reporting abuse. Also within the context of general problems in Indonesia is a report on the influence or the impact of the agrarian law of 1960 on forms of customary land ownership in South Sulawesi (Fakultas Hukum Unhas 1977). This short essay analyzes briefly some of the problems which have arisen as a result of the persistence of pre-colonial land tenure forms into the present period. The general intention of the 1960 land legislation and the reform legislation of the following year was to bring land ownership into an approximately uniform national code. Many forms of customary land ownership were therefore seen as temporary survivals, which in due course should be converted to new tenure forms. In South Sulawesi a number of these particular local forms of tenure existed, and they have persisted. Experience has shown that these forms did not disappear as easily as the drafters of the 1960 and 1961 legislation had expected. Certain forms of land tenure, which provided land for office holders in the pre-European period ("Tanah Jabatan") are one example; despite the fact that the Dutch administration paid off most of the rulers and officials who were supposed to hold this kind of land, traces of such tenures have remained. In Sidenreng, certain areas of land which were abandoned during the 19th century as a result of insecurity were subsequently taken over by the government; and, if relatives of the original owners could not be found, this land was given either to members of the military, or was retained by the ruler himself. Because most of the land in this category had been abandoned for quite some time, its re-use was contingent on clearing. Those who cleared the land created rights for themselves known as "opening up of land" rights. Thus, there appeared a dichotomy between the rights of the original owners of "Tanah awatreng," and those people who actually worked to open up the land. After 1963 many disputes arose between "owners" and "openers." The latter claimed that the original "awatreng" rights of the land had been paid off, the former denying this. The confusion is compounded from 1972 onwards, when the IPEDA began to move into the area and make assessments for land tax purposes. Their assessors simply were not sure whose name to utilize. Another form of land tenure referred to as

"Tanah telling" is described. This form provides harvesting rights over land annually flooded by the expansion of some of the lakes such as Danau Tempe. Owners of such rights usually made a small payment to the government. This work is interesting in that it focuses very clearly on the domain of administrative legal action. As will be argued below, the government and administrative structure of the province has a very clear, sharp vision of the necessity of maintaining administrative and hierarchical functions. This analysis of land tenure problems, albeit brief and sketchy, nonetheless deals with an aspect of administration which is clearly very well understood by the authorities concerned.

Three reports may be referred to exemplify the kind of straightforward problem investigation and reporting which is characteristic of much of government writing. In the first of these (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan 1975), a listing is provided of all those sectors in which capital investment would be welcomed by the local administration. These include but are not restricted to mining, forestry, portions of agriculture, transport, social infrastructure, hotels and tourist facilities, and water supplies. The intention of the report is to provide information for potential investors in the region, local and foreign. In another report, the problem of manufacturing standards is taken up by the Department of Chemistry (Balai Penelitian Kimia 1977). This report refers to a seminar which was held to investigate the standards of manufactured goods and products, especially chemical products being produced in Sulawesi Selatan. It was concluded that the lack of a real framework of national standards made it impossible for Sulawesi to act on her own. It therefore recommended that such national standards be established. In Sulawesi Selatan (1979), we have an example of administrative economic reportage. This report details a whole series of development programs which were funded through diverse government mechanisms during the period of the second five-year plan (1974-75 to 1978-79). Many of these are small projects funded through the president's special investment or development fund known as INPRES. Others were developments funded under the National Repelita Development Programs. Despite the detailed information on funding, there is no analysis or treatment whatsoever of the material presented.

In an important report (Department Pertanian Republik Indonesia 1978), a review is made of the provincial agricultural economy at the end of the second five-year development plan (that is, about 1978), prior to the opening of the third development plan. The importance of this document arises from the fact that it deals with the major economic sector of the province, and that it undoubtedly reflected official thinking on the subject at that time. This report provides a substantial amount of information at the provincial level,

concerning agriculture in Sulawesi Selatan. It notes the progress made by agriculture during the second five-year plan and underscores government hopes that, in the immediate future, the province will become an important surplus food producing region for other parts of Eastern Indonesia. Hopes for this development are being placed on the programs for agricultural intensification, namely, BIMAS and INMAS.

Several main sectors of the agricultural economy are distinguished. In the first place, there is a rice cultivating sector. Much of the rice is produced on rain fed or irrigated sawah land. But these forms of rice cultivation are also supplemented by important dry season or palawija crops which include corn, tubers, peanuts and soybeans. A second important sector of the agricultural economy is recognized in the "small-holder cash crop" sector. Crops here include coconuts, coffee, kapok, tobacco, cloves, cotton, and sugar. There are a few large scale or commercial type plantations producing rubber, coconuts and coffee. Other production sections recognized are those of fisheries and livestock. Forestry is also considered to be a sector in this area of production. As was indicated above, one of the main thrusts in agriculture is in the area of intensification of rice cultivation. This entails encouraging increased use of new high-yielding strains of rice along with increased use of necessary inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides. Total production of *padi* in these intensification areas has increased substantially since the early 1970s. Statistics show a 50% increase in the total *padi* production from intensified cultivation areas during the period 1974 to 1978. Production from other areas declined very slightly. There is, however, a recognition that with an increase in the area subject to intense cropping livestock rearing and *sawah* fishing tend to suffer. As far as livestock rearing in general is concerned, the department believes that the quality of pastures presents a serious weakness and that improvement in this area would enable much higher rates of stocking to be maintained. Fisheries are considered to be below their potential. This applies not only to coastal fishing but to various forms of inland fishing as well. In the case of forestry, the problem is not one of increasing production but rather one of urging the ideals of conservation and watershed management. Rural populations tend to degrade their local forest areas rather than preserve them, perhaps not realizing the ultimate danger to their own living areas.

It is pointed out that much of the largest proportion of South Sulawesi's work force is engaged in the agricultural sector. Two-thirds of the active work force is considered to be in agriculture-related sectors, including forestry. There were 1.32 hectares of land per worker in agriculture — a relatively high figure for Indonesia as a whole, although not abnormally high in "outer" Indonesia.

One of the overriding characteristics of this whole report is its attitude towards the farming population, whose activities it is reporting. The population of South Sulawesi is seen as being largely traditional in outlook. This is taken to mean that, in general, they are unwilling and perhaps even sometimes unable to change their ways and thus to effect their own improvement. In these circumstances, the best developmental strategy is to provide the technology and the capital for change as stimuli from the outside. This is perhaps incapsulated in the following passage taken from the report:

Namun demikian, salah satu ciri khas masyarakat tani di pedesaan ialah masih adanya sikap mental merasa cukup dan puas dengan cara-cara, hidup tradisional. Selesai panen menganggur tanpa memanfaatkan kesempatan kerja yang ada. Hal ini mengisyaratkan perlunya penyuluhan terus menerus secara intensif untuk merubah sikap mereka menjadi petani polyvalent yang berorientasi kepada teknologi baru di dalam meningkatkan taraf hidup mereka.

The first and most important part of this strategy is to change the mental attitudes of the population in the rural areas. They have to be converted from their idle ways and encouraged to adopt habits of greater industry. The second essential is that they should be provided with the necessary tools to do this.

An inevitable problem arises over the evaluation of the effectiveness of government policy. It is exceedingly difficult to measure change in attitudes, but it is relatively simple, assuming the figures are accurate, to measure changes in levels of input. Global success of the efforts during the second five-year term to improve agriculture is measured in terms of the rate of increase in production and in the use of high-yielding seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and other forms of capital input. No attempt whatever is made to ascertain whether these increases in utilization levels were appropriate or whether they took place in the most propitious of circumstances.

A number of serious problems are outlined. For example, serious difficulties have arisen in the sphere of marketing. Most producers in the Sulawesi Selatan economy are far removed from their markets, and any strategy to increase their market participation, which this one is, must overcome the problem of information flow. If peasants are to produce for the market, they must be encouraged to do so and feel that they will reap the reward of their labors. Steps have to be taken to improve the efficiency of the marketing system to avoid wastage and spoilage and to insure that products are adequately graded, packed, and transported. All of these operations remain exceedingly difficult in the face of the infrastructural problems faced by the province.

The report just reviewed is, as we have said, extremely important in the context of development policy in Sulawesi Selatan. It clearly reflects provincial

government attitudes towards the basic economic sector in the province. What it reflects are relatively low levels of sophistication in its analytical procedures. In the first place, the agricultural economy of the province is seen purely on a provincial scale, with no regional disaggregation whatsoever. Several subsectors within the field are distinguished; there is the distinction between *sawah* farming, dry-land farming, cash crop raising on a small scale, cash crop raising on a large scale, fisheries, forestry, etc. None of these are seen in conjunction. We do not have an analysis of what one might call the "enterprise," or even of the village community as an economic and social entity. The central theme of the report is that development is to be equated with an increase in gross material production of the province on the assumption that this increase can be adequately marketed and capitalized. The lack of a sense of linkages is particularly important, regrettable because the economy of Sulawesi Selatan consists of elements which are strongly interdependent. Changes in one sector will generate concomitant changes and adjustments in others. The vision is one of sectoral, rather than integrated spatial and social analysis or planning.

It is the opinion of this reviewer that a much higher level of sophistication is represented by another important government report on Sulawesi (Biro Hukum dan organisasi Sulawesi Selatan 1979). The trend which is reflected in this document is clearly that of a centralizing governmental administrative structure. Government initiatives come from the top down. The *desa* has been chosen by the government of Indonesia as the major unit of a small-scale administration. It is therefore important that the *desa* be a defined unit within the overall administrative hierarchy, with clarity of powers and procedures and relative uniformity of responsibilities. It is recognized that with the great variety of social situations represented in Indonesia, there will be very many different types of village community. In practice, however, most local communities have been classified as either customary, traditional communities, or as administrative and government-created. In the long run, however, both types have to function within the same overall framework and, consequently, there is a functional convergence towards a modern administrative *desa*. The *desa* is not necessarily a single village, but often a cluster of villages. The individual village is considered too small to function as a necessary administrative unit, which must have between five and ten thousand people to make it administratively viable.

The report consists of a series of documents, mostly correspondence between different levels of the government, which in the end has the effect of defining the nature of the *desa* as an administrative unit. The criteria for recognition of *desa* are set out. The manner in which the chief administrator of the *desa* is chosen and appointed is set out. He will be a prominent inhabitant

of the village, but he will, in fact, be chosen by the administration above. New *desa* may be created or recognized subject to certain criteria which are carefully spelled out. These relate to the size of the village, its population, its physical setting, and the likelihood that it will be able to function as an administrative unit. It is clear that the Jakarta government regards the *desa* as the critical unit around which the development process is to crystallize. It is for this reason that there must be procedures to create new *desa* when it seems appropriate to the local administration and, by implications, procedures to "disestablish" *desas* when they are no longer functional.

The form of the report is of great interest. As indicated above, it consists largely of a series of letters. These letters represent correspondence between the central government in Jakarta, the provincial government in Ujung Pandang and various other Kabupaten governments in different parts of Sulawesi. In certain other instances, they reflect actual pieces of legislation dealing with problems of *desa* or village administration.

Although this report is not, in itself, an analysis of the problems of *desa* administration, the correspondence and the legislation contained in it presents a very clear picture of the kinds of problems faced by *desa* administrators. In the eyes of the government of Indonesia, the *desa* should be able to function as a front-line economic and social development unit. Quoted in the report (page 151) is a document from the office of the Governor of Sulawesi Selatan concerning the functioning of *desa* administration which incorporates a statement of the philosophical underpinnings of *desa* administration as seen by the government. It designates the *desa* community as something which is not only physical but also spiritual, something that requires a proper blend of material and mental capabilities. Development is characteristic of a community rather than a quality that adheres to individuals; it has to be generalized throughout the whole *desa* territory and not be confined to certain privileged poles of development. It should not be limited to certain social groups within the community. The main objective in *desa* administration is to create in the populace a capacity for self-reliant growth and development. The *desa* and its development is the *subject* of a process of development not the *object* of a process.

The report recognizes the fact that *desas* in Sulawesi are different from those in Java. Many of the *desas* in Java have a long history of community solidarity, especially in the face of pressures from the outside. In Sulawesi, community groups are newer. Consequently, many of the *desas* which exist at the present time are artificial groupings created during the Dutch period (the so-called Adatgemeenschap) or assemblages put together subsequently, in particular since 1960, under the regulations now in force.

The *desa* itself is seen as a small enterprise. It receives a certain amount of revenue in local petty taxes, and it receives some subsidies from the central provincial government through the organ of the Kabupaten. However, the main overriding function of the *desa* is to act as the community organization. It is a fulcrum around which community and economic development can be expected to take place. Within the *desa* there will be smaller active economic sub-units, down to the scale of individual families, but all of these should relate to the *desa*. Above the *desa* level, it is possible to create further groupings of economic administrative organizations; for example, the Badan Usaha Unit Desa, or the Koperasi Unit Desa. These bodies are presently being formed to manage the process of local rural development. They have members, committees, boards of directors, and a professional manager. Generally, as an organizational unit, they will incorporate more than one *desa* because this level of professionalism is only justified at a larger scale. The *desas* do not function as independent entities within these units, but the relationship between the BUUD-KUD and the *desa* is intended to be very close.

One cannot help but be struck by the clarity with which the administrative problems of the *desa* are perceived in contrast to the relatively unsophisticated analysis offered of economic progress. As a bureaucratic administrative service, the Indonesian government machinery at all levels of its exercise seems, in fact, to have a much stronger grasp of administrative problems and procedures than of developmental realities. If this is a general conclusion of wide application, it should serve as an important point of departure for further discussions of the process of economic and social development in rural Indonesia.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

From the evidence from the reports that we have reviewed and examined, it can be concluded that a relatively sophisticated information-gathering mechanism is in place within the administrative hierarchy of the provincial government of South Sulawesi. However, its effectiveness is much higher in certain segments than in others. I would like to argue that it is highest at those segments which deal with the structural-functional aspects of the administrative machine and in broad zones of cultural social development. It is also quite effective in providing information and recommendations for dealing with carefully isolated specific problems. It is much less effective when dealing with major economic policy options and developmental strategies.

There may be several reasons for this. The first is that the administrative hierarchy lacks clear precise economic orientation which would enable policy statements to be made consistent with its underlying philosophy. In recent

years, there have been enormous efforts made by the Indonesian government to introduce *Panca Sila* as an underlying philosophical attitude. But, although there have been many seminars on the subject, and many Indonesian administrators have spent large amounts of time dealing with and discussing problems of *Panca Sila*, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no substantive economic analysis which consciously uses *Panca Sila* as a basis.

A second reason is probably the simple abundance of data. It is not always realized how much data actually exists within the Indonesian administrative hierarchy. At every level of the administration reports are constantly demanded. As a result, the village administrators spend a considerable portion of their time maintaining up-to-date records of the statistical profile of their individual areas of responsibility. These statistical profiles contain data on the village — its size, its population, the nature and structure of the agricultural and other enterprises, and even an examination of social and cultural infrastructural elements of the village.

To all intents and purposes, the administration is overwhelmed by this data. It is too voluminous to be adequately used. Nonetheless, it is a valuable resource in its own right. Certain elements in this data pool may be inaccurate, partly because questions are asked which cannot be properly answered. In other cases, there may be simple inaccuracies. But, as a rule, the data are being collected by people who know their village fairly well and it is, therefore, not likely to be seriously distorted.

A start at ameliorating the economic developmental performance of the Indonesian local administration could be made by substantially improving information handling. This would enable the administration to deal with the problem of the volume of data. It would also make it possible for all levels in the administration to deal more specifically with the policy portions of the economic problem and avoid being overwhelmed by raw data.

Information handling may be improved in a number of ways, but undoubtedly the most practical would be the constitution of a data bank system for the province. There are 1170 *desas* in South Sulawesi. Of these, 74 are urban, being contained in the cities of Ujung Pandang and Pare-pare. The *desa* is the reporting unit. Although they vary in size and, indeed, in population, they all hold the same position in the administrative hierarchy. Reporting by smaller units such as the individual household would be pointless in the present state of development in Indonesia — except, of course, for specialized census-taking operations. Decisions of the *kabupaten* and province level authorities in respect of resource allocation are made in terms of the suitability of individual *desa* communities. The factors which govern these decisions include the condition of the *desa* resource basis, its population, and

the level of energy and activity of its inhabitants. The setting up of a data bank would therefore be a relatively simple operation which would enable standardized information to be collected for each unit in the information system.

The kind of information which may be built into such a data bank includes the normal run of economic and demographic material. Because it relates to units of village scale, it is discriminating enough to show definite regional or local variations. In the event that the data bank can be maintained in the province it can be updated constantly, and reports may be drawn from it at any time. Thus, instead of having periodic, global assessments of economic conditions in the province, filtered through sub-regional offices, the province could interrogate its data bank at any time. Information could be extracted for any defined category of *desa*, any-region, any *kabupaten*; information could be extracted in respect of *desa* which fulfilled one or more of a specified set of conditions. Or, as was done in a pilot study of *desa* in North Bali (McTaggart 1980), *desa* can be classified in terms of their similarity, even if they are not spatially continuous, thus enabling the administration to devise appropriate responses to differing conditions among the rural population.

It would also be possible to integrate remote sensing data into such a system, although the precise procedures for doing so would have to be worked out. Multi-spectral Landsat data has relatively high resolution — pixels of about 60 x 80 meters — and would be a very useful adjunct to resource evaluation procedures. The problems of using such information in Indonesia have received a certain amount of attention, but progress has been limited so far (Lulla *et al* 1981, Malingreau and Santoso 1978, Susanto 1979, Malingreau 1978).

Among the essential differences between data-bank procedures and those methods currently employed in Indonesia we may note two. Firstly, data bank utilization is interactive. Questions may be posed, and in the light of the response, fresh questions or modified questions may immediately be attempted. Secondly, the analyst is freed from the need to absorb large amounts of data himself. He is, accordingly, free to operate intellectually at a policy and analytical level.

CONCLUSIONS

Our brief review of official Indonesian writings reveals a number of features. It shows that the administration is active in the collection of data as a generalized basis, but also in respect of specific problems. It shows that the

administration is concerned to use analyses based on careful data assembly in order to guide decisions in the realm of planning. But, at the same time, it reveals the common weakness of such reporting systems — namely, that apart from specific problem analysis, the amount of data generated cannot possibly be used efficiently. This stems not from the lack of ability, or even lack of numbers of trained administrators. It arises from the quantity of data. Sulawesi Selatan would benefit from an information system to handle both natural resources and socio-economic data, which would enable policy decisions to be made on the basis of adequate analysis. A combined social-ecological data bank would, with current technology, provide a relatively simple means to achieve this.

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THE MIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH SULAWESI IN THE PACIFIC REGION

Andi Zainal ABIDIN

I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE MIGRATION OF THE SOUTH SULAWESI PEOPLE

Anyone who reads I La Galigo's 6.000 page book, one of the remarkable literary works in the world, will find a clear description of Luwu, the oldest Kingdom in the eastern part of Indonesian which was wellknown for its wandering people. In this book the characteristics and the temperament of the people of South Sulawesi are clearly described as mobile (they like to wander to foreign countries) courageous and ambitious. Their main principle is to win in any war, in a fight for a lover or even in gambling. Under the guidance of La Ma'dukelleng, Sawerigading and Oponna Ware, the tutors of the Vice Roy of Luwu, young men, before becoming adults, have to explore the seas. Even those who wanted to become 'Raja Muda' of the provinces of Luwu have to undergo an initiation process before they were crowned; they have to join the group led by Sawerigading to visit various countries.

While putting their babies asleep, Bugis mothers always sang maritime lullabies. After becoming teenagers, these children have to listen to the adventurous tales of some famous seafarers, like Sawerigading and his son, I La Galigo. Since childhood, they have been inculcated with the spirit of globetrotting.

Gervaise describes the education of Macassarese children of noble birth as follows:

At the age of 5 or 6, young boys of noble birth should be educated by others to prevent them from their mothers' influence which might effeminate their virility. When they are 7 or 8 years

old, they learn to recite the Qur'an, to write and to study arithmetics under the guidance of a Haji (in this case a Moslem scholar who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and studied Moslem Theology in the Holy Land and/or Egypt) for two years, two hours a day, one hour in the morning and one hour in the evening. Besides, outside the classroom they are taught various handicrafts such as making shields of rattan, plaiting mats or baskets. They also learn dancing and doing some sports. This method of teaching has made the Macassarese rugged. Beside being rugged, however, they are very faithful to any friendship. They dare to face any danger if their friends need their help. If they feel being discredited, they will kill their offenders no matter how dangerous they might be. When there is a conflict between two persons, a friend will try to reconcile them in a mosque. To avoid such a thing, a woman is not allowed to receive any visitor, even her own brother or her brother in law, when her husband is not at home. After having been educated by others, those young noblemen return to their own families and are trained to use weapons such as 'crisses' (traditional daggers), swords, shields made of rattan and blow guns. Their most interesting games are e.g. whipping tops, playing kites and cock fighting. Their favourite meat is chicken, beef and mutton. They eat much fish. The most popular drink is 'sorbec' (Sara'ba'), but nowadays man used to drink coffee, tea and Mexican chocolate.

Concerning slavery, Gervaise pointed out that although the Macassarese used to enslave their prisoners of war, most of their prisoners did not live in Macassar because they were sold as slaves outside the country. For instance in 1685 when a French Ambassador visited Thailand, there was a Macassarese ship bringing Toraja slaves. One of them was bought by this Ambassador, another one was bought by another French Diplomat. They were the first Sulawesi people who went to France.

According to Gervaise, there is not any other nation in the world having higher nobility and still holding their rights stronger than the Macassarese ...¹

In general Gervaise's description of the island and the Macassarese society conforms to Lontara (chronological history). Of course there are some small errors which are understandable because he based his description merely on a story told by the sons of Daeng Mangalle', Pierre Daeng Ruru de Macassart and Louis Dauphin Daeng Tulolo de Macassart, when he taught them French. Daeng Mangalle is the brother of Sultan Hasanuddin. These two young boys were born in Java but then lived in Thailand and never returned to Sulawesi because their father was a DOCJA PACDI, the treasurer of Thailand under the reign of King Phra.

Gervaise' incomplete descriptions are concerned with the arms used by the Macassarese in the 17th century and the problems of education. It was widely known in the 17th century that the Portuguese had been visiting "o Macassar do baixo" (the southern part of the Macassar Island which means the southern part of South Sulawesi) since 1542, even in the beginning of the 17th century according to English merchants from Macassar who visited Batavia and informed that there were about ten to twenty two Portuguese ships visiting

¹Dr. Ch. Pelras, West European Library Source on the History of South Sulawesi, Memorial Volume of the 21st. Anniversary the Law Faculty, Universitas Hasanuddin, pp. 59-60.

Macassar every year.¹ They came from the harbours of Macao, Malaka and Coromandel; there were also about 500 Portuguese living in Macassar.² The Englishmen had also a trade office in this town from 1613 until 1667 when Macassar was conquered by the VOC.³ It is a fact that the Macassarese who traded with Europeans, had also fire-arms including canons, fortifying the fortress of Macassar which had been built in 1545 by Tunipalangga Ulaweng, the tenth King of Gowa (1543-1565).

Probably at that time some young noblemen had learnt foreign languages and sciences from the Portuguese and Englishmen because it is obvious that the Prime Ministers of Gowa, I Mangadacina Daeng Sitaba, Karaeng Patti-ngaloeng and the Secretary of State who had a Portuguese name - Francisco Mendes - had a good command of some foreign languages, especially Latin.⁴ There were also cases of mixed marriages as pointed out by J.S. Cummins: "Christian men kept Mahometan women, and Mahometan men, Christian women."⁵ One of the Bugis-Portuguese half breed, who was very popular, was M. Gidinho de Eredia.⁶

As far as I know, the Portuguese were the first people who made contact with the South Sulawesi people. Their views can be found in Tome Pieres' statements written in "Summa Oriental" as follows:

"pp. 226-227: The island of Macacar can be found in five days sea journeys from Malaka and Maluku via the island of Borneo. All the inhabitants are pagans and according to the people's belief there are more than 50 Kings ruling there. This island traded with Malaka, Java, Brunei, Thailand and all regions between Pahang and Thailand. They have so much in common with the Thais. They have their own unique language ... all of them are smart and many are warlike. There are a lot of food there. Its people are the greatest pirates in the world. They are very strong and have many ships. They sailed from their country as far as Pegu ... Maluku and Banda and all the islands surrounding Java to pirate. They take their women on board. They have their own markets where they can send their spoils and sell their captured slaves. They sailed around Sumatera. In general all of them are pirates. The Javanese called them Bajuus (Bajau)... and also Calates (= the people from the strait). They bring their spoils to Jumaia near Pahang, their permanent market. Those who were not pirates, brought their trade-goods on their ships which called 'pangajavas' (literary means 'a sailing ship which can run'). Their ships were big and well made. They bring with them a lot of food, white rice and some gold; they bring back with them woman's scarf, Cambay cloth, some cloth from Benggala and Keling with incense and benzoin. This island has a large population, a lot of meat, and its supply is superfluous. All men have crisses (short daggers). All of them are strong. They sail everywhere. All peoples

¹Dr. Ch. Pelras, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Abdul Razak Daeng Patunru, *Sejarah Gowa*, Makasar 1969, p. 29; C.R. Boxer, Francisco Viera de Figueirô, *A Portuguese Merchant Adventurer in South East Asia, 1624-1667*, Verhandeligen, 'sGravenhage, 1967, p. 3-4.

²C.R. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³Basset, *English Trade in Celebes 1613-1667*, IMBAR, 31, 1938.

⁴C.R. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 4, 5, 13.

⁵C.R. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶J.V. Mills, JIMBRAS, VIII, 1930.

are afraid of them, and even all the other pirates obeyed them because they are worth to be obeyed. They possessed poisonous bullets. Although they did not have any big ship which is strong enough to protect them, nevertheless they can put other ships under their control ...
p. 156: Among the peoples visiting Sunda Kelapa were the Macassarese.

Insulinda I, p. 37: A letter from Tristao de Ataide to the King of Portugal, dated on the 20th of February, 1534:

"I have just made a decision to order a ship, San Jerimo, just arriving from India and having been repaired, to find Os Macassarese (people of the island of Makasar = South Sulawesi) which is between Kalimantan and ... Maluku ... I have received an information that they have brought gold to Malaka ... This ship will bring the cloth that belongs to Your Excellency to be exchanged with gold. Here the Moslems said earnestly that the gold came from a place not so far from here, probably only 70 'leguas' (between 380 and 450 kilometres) where an ethnic group called Celebes lived who came from a place not so far from Macacar (Macacar means people from North and Central Sulawesi), which is near Makasar ...¹

Although the Portuguese cannot differentiate the Bugis, Macassarese, Mandarese and Bajaunese, it can be noted from their writings, however, that the people from South Sulawesi had traded for a long time with foreigners, long before the fall of Makasar into the Dutch hands in 1667. It should be noted that many Bajaunese particularly in the Kingdoms of Bone and Gowa became citizens and obtained their civil rights from the Kings themselves. The Bugis, Macassarese and Mandarese were generally merchants, but it was not impossible if some of them would become pirates if they needed money and food. Some important figures among them were e.g. the Prince of South Sulawesi, known as Karaeng Samarluks, was said to have attacked Malaka in 1424 under the reign of Sultan Mahmud Syah² or Sultan Muhammad Syah or maybe more correctly "Seri Maharaja Muhammad Syah", who, according to Wan Samsuddin & Arena Wati, ruled his Kingdom from 1424 to 1444 when Malaka became an 'international harbour'. "Karaeng Samarluks" was strongly assumed to be *Sumange' rukka*, who, when he died, was also called 'Tunilaburi Suriwa', which literary means 'drown in Suriwa sea'. He was also King Tallo II.³ After being forced to retreat when he attacked the Moluccas with more or less 200 ships, Karaeng Samarluks went to conquer Passi. After living in peace with Sultan Mahmud Syah, he visited Malaka again. With the help of the Macassarese, Sultan Mahmud Syah codified the navigation and trade law for South Sulawesi. Probably the Karaeng Samarluks's navy covered Macassarese, Bugis and Bajaunese sailors. The systematic writings about navigation and trade law by Matoa - Kampong Wajo' III, La Patello' Amanna Gappa in 1676 proved that the people of South Sulawesi considered navigation and trade very important.⁴

¹Dr. Ch. Perlas, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²F. Valentijn, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

³Abdul Razak Daeng Patunru, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴L.J.J. Caron, *Dissertation*, 1937.

The Administration Note of L.A. Emanuel, the Assistant Resident, as mentioned above, is rather similar to that of de Greeve which is as follows:

The frankness of the Bugis people is the result of their openmindedness, unlike most of eastern people, from which we can easily learn their grievances ... This frankness including their cheerfulness and attachment makes the Bugis people symphathetic ... Furthermore their spirit of entrepreneurship is noteworthy ... especially in the economic field, which is related to trade, industry and transportation that the Buginese enterprises in 900, were more intensively involved in world traffic in the year \pm 900. The establishment of the oldest state in the gulf of Bone is estimated to occur in the 12th century (Loewoe) ...

Dr. H.J. de Graaf wrote the following:

One may compare these people, called by the Dutch as "the cocks of the East", with the Norwegian Vikings, who made enormous journeys accompanied only by a few devoted friends. That's why we have found the influence of Macassarese and Buginese almost throughout the Archipelago and even abroad as far as Thailand, similar to that of the Old Norwegians, whose dwelling places can still be traced throughout Europe and even America.

L.A. Emanuel, also wrote something about their sailing and trading nature as follows:

The Macassarese and Bugis people forming important groups in Sulawesi, were formerly known as famous and distinguished seafarers who with only small ships have sailed all over the Archipelago, they had been even visited Thailand, the Philippines and further India. At the time of the VOC they, "the little cocks from the East", were not only praised by the Dutch, but also by the Portuguese who were one of the most famous seafaring nations in Europe themselves. The Portuguese praised their courage. It is not an exaggeration if approximately 300 years ago the Portuguese called them 'the Celebres de Makassares'.¹

According to Emanuel, there were in 1947 still about 1807 ships enlisted in 1940 measuring up to 20 cubic metres and settled in South Sulawesi, where \pm 12% of its inhabitants earned their living as seafarers. Unfortunately, according to Emanuel, because of the Second World War, 50% of the fleet had been damaged by the decline of trade. If we now go to Gresik or Pasar Ikan (Fish Market) we will find that most of the ships of South Sulawesi are harboured in these two places. Heretofore the causes of their migration have never been studied.

In 1967, Boxer described elaborately the trade activities of the people of South Sulawesi, where the harbour of Makasar was freely opened to the peoples who are given the guarantee and facility by Sultan Malikussaid himself, who was later succeeded by his son, Sultan Hasanuddin. In the 17th century the people of South Sulawesi were of the opinion that a free trade and a free maritime conception should be maintained. In relation to this case Sultan Alauddin (1539-1639) sent a delegate with a message to the VOC, which prohibited the Macassarese to buy spices in Maluku in 1616, as follows:

¹L.A. Emanuel, *Memorie van Overgave van den Afgetreden Assistant Resident van Bone*, 1949, p. 154.

"God has created the sea and the earth. The earth has been given to His slaves, the human beings and the sea has been given to all people in the world. Nobody has ever heard that one is prohibited to traverse in the sea. If you do that, then you rob your fellowmen's livelihood. I am only a poor king".¹

Precisely 44 years afterwards, a similar letter had been sent by Sultan Hasanuddin to the delegate of the VOC who had ordered the Macassarese not to trade in Maluku. In this case C.R. Boxer wrote as follows:

"As the Macassar conflicted with the Dutch, this became increasingly unavoidable as the free trade policy of the rulers of Macassar conflicted with the monopolistic claims of the VOC on the Spice Islands. As the Macassar delegates told the Dutch-envoys at a final meeting on the 27th of April, 1659, when the discussion was held in Portuguese, the King considered that the Company's claim conflicted with the commandments of God, "who has created the world so that all men can enjoy the use there of. Or do you believe that God had reserved for your trade alone those islands which lie so far from your own country?"²

In that negotiation the delegates of Gowa claimed compensation from the VOC of destroying Sao Jodo Baptista, a Portuguese merchant ship including its cargo (trade goods belonged to Vierra De Figuero and Macassarese people).

Other important things for those who want to observe the migration of the people of South Sulawesi are the cultural values of SIRI and the attitudes of the leaders in South Sulawesi towards their people which may constitute one of the reasons of their migration.

SIRI is the Way of Life of the people of South Sulawesi, which implies ethical differentiation, distinguishing human being from animal due to self respect and moral honour characteristic of human beings. It also teaches ethics comprising encouragement, prohibition, rights and duties which guide the people of South Sulawesi to preserve and uphold their honour. "SIRI" also becomes a motivation to change, amend and develop individual or social fate. SIRI is the human being himself. If it is violated and destroyed, the people of South Sulawesi will feel not as a human being anymore but as an animal in human form. SIRI can be classified into SIRI 'RIPAKASIRI' and SIRI 'MASIRI'. The former occurs if one has humiliated his fellowman or treated him very inhumanly. The customary law, therefore, will allow him to take revenge which commensurates with the humiliation. But there are two exceptions which forbid the humiliated to take any revenge, i.e.:

¹La Side' Daeng Tapala, *L'expansion du Royaume de Goa et sa Politique, Maritime aux XVIe et XVIIe Siecles*, Archipel 10, SECMI, 1975, p. 7. Stapel, F.W., *Het Bongaais Verdrag*, Groningen en 'sGravenhage, J.B. Wolters, 1922, p. 14.

²C.R. Boxer, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

1. If the leaders have intervened to arbitrate and;
2. If the one who has humiliated and treated him inhumanly, has such a great power and such a strong position so that it will be impossible to take any revenge against him. Then in this case he, whose 'SIRI' has been violated, is compelled to leave his country and to do his utmost in foreign country so that in the future he will be able to come back and take revenge. If he does not come back he has to achieve great success. There is a popular saying written in a 'Lontara' (palmyra leaf used as papyrus).

Pala uragaē te' bakkē tongengngē, teccau' maēgaē, tessiēwa, situlaē (deceit might succeed but truth will survive and the multitude will never lose, and nothing is impossible).

SIRI' MASIRI' occurs if someone feels having lost his honour because he cannot achieve success or compete with another successful person in a legal or illegal way. (Such a person is not insulted by others). This kind of SIRI' arouses his firm determination and motivation to make progress and forces him to migrate to other places. Later if he succeeds, he will come back and show himself to his society that his SIRI' has been rehabilitated and that he has become a Bugis-Macassarese again. (As an example: the life of the late Tun Abdul Razak bin Husain, the former Malaysian Prime Minister).

Barbara Harvey has described the SIRI' brought about by the people South Sulawesi, as follows:

South Sulawesi is a society often described as "feudal" or "traditional". It is a society with a strong aristocracy and close adherence to the proceps of customary law (adat). At the time, however, it is a society characterized by fierce competition -- in which a person is judged not only by ascribed status, but by personal qualities, ... As the term is used in this essay, it refers to the society as it existed prior to the outright incorporation of the area into the Netherlands East Indies ... in 1905-1910. Many elements of that society persisted until the present time, although the pace of change in Sulawesi as elements has been rapid in the 20th century than in those which preceeded it".¹

Barbara Harvey's description needs some improvements I assume that many cultural values have begun to deteriorate since the 19th century, since Gowa (helped by Wajo' and Luwu') had been conquered by the VOC. The worst deterioration ocured during the Dutch and Japanese occupation. According to Andaya,¹ after conquering Gowa cs., La Tenritatta' Arung Palakka, the King of Bone, spoiled the Bone customs. He was against the agreement of Matajang's ruler in ± 1330, which laid down among other things, the rights and the duties of the King and the people of Bone, and also the non absolute authority of Ade' Pitue, which was formerly composed of

¹Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Tradition, Islam and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965*, Ph. D. Theses, Cornell University, June, 1974, p. 16.

seven Matoas (elected leaders). Formerly those seven Matoas consisted of the Bonese common people. Gradually their position was taken over by the aristocrats (through marriage?).

It should also be noticed that the basis of SIRI, i.e. the customary law had been replaced by the Dutch government with Western Law which was incompatible with the customs. After the Indonesian Independence the situation became worse due to uprisings. In such situation the value of a good traditional culture cannot be expected to develop. As an example it can also be noted that before South Sulawesi fell into Dutch colonialism in 1907, all the Heads of Villages, the Matoas, were elected by the people. During Dutch occupation, the Dutch interfered in the election, and today after the independence there has been no more election of village heads such as in Java.

There are only two noticeable remainders of the traditional culture nowadays: Fierce competition and prestige taking the place of achievement. Prof. Dr. H. Th. Chabot has classified the people of South Sulawesi as "a prestige society". Before becoming the 'White King of Serawak', James Brooke described the openmindedness of the people of Wajo in discussing and introducing its government's system constituting a form of an elective government which modified the arbitrary way of the rajahs and ensured the rights of the people in society. He has come to the conclusion as follows:

"Besides the constitution¹ of the government here detailed there is a general council of the people, composed of the heads of villages and all the respectable freemen, who are convened on extraordinary occasions, to state their opinions and discuss important questions ... From this review, it will strike us that the government (or constitution) of Wajo', though ruled by feudal and arbitrary rajahs, though cumbersome and slow in its movements and defective in the administration of equal justice between man and man, yet possesses a striking resemblance to the government of feudal times in Europe or rather that period in the Low Countries when rights of free citizens were first acknowledged. I regret, however, that I am compelled to give many details, which show that their practice is very much at variance with their written laws ... Our judgment, however, of their faults must be mild, when we consider that, amid all the nations of the East, amid all the people professing the Mahometan religion, from Turkey to China - the Bugis alone have arrived at the threshold of recognized rights, and have alone emancipated themselves from the fetters of despotism. We cannot fail to admire in these infant institutions the glimmer of elective government, the acknowledged rights of citizenship, and the liberal spirit which has never placed a single restriction upon foreign or domestic commerce. That a people advanced to this point would gradually progress if left to themselves and uncontaminated, and unoppressed, there is every reason to believe that in the decline of their circumstances, and the decay of their public institutions may be traced the evil influence of European domination ..."²

¹The constitution of Lopa 'deppa' in 1476 (writer's note).

²Brooke, James, *Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes down to the Occupation of Labuan*, Vol. 1, London, 1948, p. 64-67.

According to James Brooke before the Europeans dominated the whole Archipelago, "the natives were rich and powerful, with strong established government, and a thriving trade with all parts of the world.

There were two main factors causing the decline of Wajo, in Brooke's opinion, namely the despotic actions of the rajahs (Kings) or leaders against the people and the impunity of the aristocrats. Between 1834 and 1840 there was not any 'Arung Matoa' or 'Chief Magistrate' in Wajo'. This situation led to some bad effects, e.g. the rice fields and arable lands were deserted and uncultivated; the people migrated; the government did not guarantee the proprietary rights nor handle any case. One thing not mentioned by Brooke is that during the glorious history of Wajo in the 15th and 16th century the people's prosperity and welfare were due to the powerful, brave and skillful Arung Matoa and the true implementation of the 1476 constitution of the government. At that time it was written that some leaders had been dismissed, even some Kings and Princes had been condemned to death. The liberal spirit of the Bugis people was reflected in the government's constitution in Lapa'deppa' in 1476, which stated e.g. that Wajo people were free people; they were born free; they only served their own country and they adhered themselves to their customary law. This constitution also stipulated that the Wajo people were free to leave and to return to their country; they were free to exert their rights and should not be forced to do anything which was not based on their customary laws. Their right to be free is called "ade ammaradekangeng" (= the right of freedom) proposed by La Tiringeng To Taba', the Arung of Sitettempola more than five centuries ago:

"They have their proprietary rights; they may not be caught if they are not guilty; their families and prosperities may not be expropriated if they are not derived from or used to commit crime; they need not submit themselves to any absolute King; those who are not involved in any crime or conspiracy should not be accounted for; if they wander, they may not be caught; if they sleep, they may not be awoken. The Wajo's doors are always open to go in and out ..."¹

I have to mention this because:

1. Wajo is the place with the greatest rate of emigration.
2. The Kingdom of Wajo', which was formerly wellknown for its relatively democratic government, was declared by Jacqueline Lineton in 1975 as "the longest tradition of migration" and also "the most conservative and feudal of the South Sulawesi regions".²
3. According to Crawford, the enterprising character of the Bugis belongs especially to the tribes which go under the common name of Waju.

¹Free translation from Lontara Sukkuna Wajo (The History of Wajo).

²Jacqueline Lineton, *Pascompe' Ugi': Bugis Migrants and Wanderers*, Archipel 10, SECMI, Gueret, Paris, 1975, p. 199.

The liberal spirit, which aroused the sense of entrepreneurship especially if they lived outside their country does not as a matter of fact only belong to Bugis-Wajo people, but also to the other Bugis, Macassarese, Mandarese and Torajas.¹

II. THE ORIGIN OF THE MIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH SULAWESI

According to a folklore, the first migration happened during the reign of kings as mentioned in the literary work of I La Galigo. Because USSU, the centre of kingdom, and its surrounding area had been considered too crowded and too difficult to earn a living, they expanded and spread all over Sulawesi, even outside Sulawesi e.g. to the Moluccas and Ternate. In these new regions they built new kingdoms which were among other things the kingdoms of Wadeng (Gorontalo), Tompo'tikka' (Luwuk Banggai), Kaili and other kingdoms in Central Sulawesi, the kingdoms of China (Pammana, Wajo'), Wewanriu' (Bone), Siang (Pangkep kini), Sunrariaja (Kaili), Wolio (Buton), Gima (Bima), Taranati (Ternate), Mollucas (probably Hitu), Mangkasa (Makasar?), Balannipa and Menre (Mandar) etc. All these small kingdoms were centred in Luwu. The Bugis, Macassarese or the western writers agreed that the kings and kingdoms had come from Luwu.²

As commonly known, the Bugis migration occurred after Admiral Speelman and La Tenritatta Arung Palakka's army had conquered the Gowa-Wajo's army, but according to Lontara Sukkuna Wajo's (the official chronical history of Wajo) it happened after the fall of fort Tosora, in the capital of Wajo' into the hands of the joined army of Bone-Soppeng-Tanate and the VOC in the December 1670.³

What really happened, is, that when Bungaya's agreement was signed on November 1667, hundreds of Macassarese under the command of Karaeng Bontomarannu and Admiral Karaeng Galesong fled to Java to join Trunojoyo's armed forces fighting the Dutch and Mataram.⁴ The exact number of the Macassarese army was unknown, but they were regarded great because usually the Admiral of Gowa was accompanied by a large number of soldiers. It was also unknown how many of them had been brought back to Makasar by Arung Palakka after the joined armed forces of the VOC, Arung

¹ Compare it with *Mattulada*, Kompas, May 16, 1980, p. VIII, col. 7-9,

² Emanuel, *op. cit.*, p. 11-54.

³ Noorduy J., *Een Achteende-Eeuwse Kroniek van Wajo*, sGravenhage, 1955, p. 123.

⁴ De Graaf, *op. cit.*, p. 221-222.

Palakka, the Ambonese commanded by Captain Jonker, and the army of Mataram, had defeated the Macassarese army in Kakapar in 1679. De Graaf only wrote that Arung Palakka could only send 103 Macassarese women to be sold and most of the Macassarese army were brought back to their own country.¹ The others had fled to the mountain of Kelud. Daeng Mangalle, the brother of Sultan Hasanuddin, who at first fled to Java, only accompanied by 60 Macassarese families, went to stay in Ayuthia, Thailand in 1664. How many people remained in Thailand after the battle between Thailand and Makasar, nobody knew. Gervaise described only the following:

“Although the Thai armed forces consisted of 10.000 men and were supported by 40 European officers (French, English, Portuguese), the Macassarese, who comprised only a few hundred soldiers would not surrender. They had been still holding on for several days. Finally all of them fought fiercely. In this battle about 1000 Thais and 17 white officers were killed whereas almost all Macassarese including Daeng Mangalle were slaughtered. Only 55 soldiers were captured. Almost all of them including Daeng Ruru (14 years old) and Daeng Tolol (12 years old), the sons of Daeng Mangalle were severely injured.”²

It should be noted that the two sons of Daeng Mangalle were taken by a French Ambassador who was in Thailand when the battle took place. They were brought to Paris together with two Torajas, one of which was bought by the Ambassador and the other by another diplomat. Daeng Ruru, later known as “Louis Dauphin de Maccassart” became a captain in the French Navy on January 1692, when he was 20 years old. He had been adopted by King Louis XVI and killed in a battle against the English fleet in front of Havana (Cuba) in 1736, when he was 36 years old. At that time he was under the command of Admiral Ducasse. His brother, Louis Pierre Daeng Tololo de Maccassart became a lieutenant in the French Navy in 1712. He died on November 1726, in Brest, one of the French Naval Bases.³ These two Macassarese were supposed to have families in France.

The greatest Bugis migration happened in 1668, after the fall of Ujung Pandang's fortress into Speelman and Arung Palakka. According to Lontara Sukku'na Wajo' (LSW) about 10,000 Wajonese had taken part in the battles of Somba Opu and Ujung Pandang under the command of La Tenrilai, the Arung Matoa of Wajo'. Probably some Bugis, accompanied by the Wajonese who lived in Kampung Wajo-Makasar, migrated to East Kalimantan. According to de Graaf, the Wajonese were allowed by Sultan of Kutai to form a “Democratic Republic” in East Kalimantan which they called later ‘Samarinda’. According to Kartancgara (brother of the last Sultan of Kutai) the word Samarinda was derived from ‘sama rendah’ (equal). Probably it was so because the leader of Bugis people was not a king. He was elected directly by

¹De Graaf, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

²Dr. Ch. Pelras, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

³Dr. Ch. Pelras, *op. cit.*, p. 64-65.

the Bugis themselves. The head of their society was called 'Pua Adu' (Primus inter Pares). Afterwards Samarinda became a Bugis trade centre.

According to Lontara Sukkuna Wajo 343, when Wajo was under the domination of Arung Palakka and VOC from 1670 to 1736, there was a great famine and the Wajo's trade practically came to a standstill because the government prohibited them to trade with other people. Most of them suffered severely and migrated to Makasar, Donggala, Gorontalo, Bima, Kalimantan, Java, Sumatera, Singapore, Johor, Patani and Kampuchea. Some of them were forced to 'smuggle' (a term given by the VOC for trade). The trade, therefore, expanded because of two reasons:

1. Under the reign of La Salewangeng to Tenrirua, the Arung Matoa of Wajo (1713-1736) a kind of cooperative bank was formed to extend loans to the merchants who wanted to sell their goods outside of Sulawesi.
2. In some places like Samarinda, Pegatan, Bima, Sumbawa, West Kalimantan, Riau, Tumase (Singapore), Johor, etc., there were Bugis traders led by Matoa Dagang.

Many Macassarese were leaving their country because they had suffered the same bad luck as the Wajos. It was estimated that they migrated to places which were conquered by Gowa in the beginning of 17th century such as Bima (1617), Sumbawa (1619), Banggai and Sulu (1634), Timor (1640), Suma, Ompu, Sanggar, Kutai and Berau (1680), Buton, Muna, Bungku, Solor, Tedak, Manggarai (1626), Lombok, Gorontalo, Tondano and Sangir (1634), Burum Tobes and Bebe (1640).¹ According to estimation Bima and Sumbawa were mostly aimed at by the migrants because many cases of intermarriages had occurred among Macassarese, Bugis and people from Sumbawa and Bima since 1618.

The migration of the people of South Sulawesi was the result of a fact that Makasar which had been used formerly as an open harbour for all peoples replacing that of Malacca after it had been conquered by the Portuguese in 1511, could not be used anymore by the people of South Sulawesi since the VOC prohibited them to trade with other countries.²

According to Jacqueline Lineton, until 1669 people of South Sulawesi who had gone-abroad, were merchants. She did not call them migrants, but "nomads roaming the archipelago in search for trade in accordance with the direction of the prevailing monsoon".³ But it should also be noted, as cited by Dr. de Graaf, that at that time the people of South Sulawesi had been migrating to Samarinda.

¹La Side' Daeng Tapala, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

²Bastin, J., *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*. Essay presented to Sir Richard Windstedt, edited by John Bastin and R. Roolvink, Oxford: 1964, p. 145.

³Jacqueline, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

The fall of Makasar in the hands of the VOC caused a great deal of difficulties to the VOC itself, which, according to Jacqueline were:

1. A vast expansion of Bugis trade ('smuggling') and a growth of piracy, accompanied by the settlement of Bugis traders in many coastal areas of the archipelago;
2. The launching of a wave of conquest and infiltrations of other Malay states in Borneo, the Riau Archipelago, the Malay Peninsula and elsewhere by emigre Bugis princes and their followers.

Usually the Bugis-Macassarese emigrants were led by a nobleman or by people claiming to have white blood in their veins. It is common for every nobleman, especially if he was the leader of a group according to the customary law or a prince, to be surrounded by many relatives and followers who were strongly armed.¹ They obtained smuggled firearms from Singapore, Johor, Malaka, Thailand, etc. Land was not highly prized because of its large expanse. The welfare of any noblemen depended upon his relatives and the number of his followers.

A nobleman who had only a few followers would make efforts to form a group of followers from South Sulawesi or from any other tribe. Formerly the Bugis migrants had as motto:

Narekko some'ku ri wanuanna taue aja' mumaelo' mangcaji ana' guru, ancaji punggawako, namauni punggawa parapo'muna.

(If you sail to any foreign country, do not become a subordinate but become a leader even if it is only a pirate leader).

We can take Sekh Yusuf as an example. He was a prominent Macassarese figure who went with only a few followers, perhaps even alone. He went to Banten with just enough supply and went in an English ship from Banten to Europe. In Jeddah, he got off his ship and went to Mekkah. There he studied religion because he wanted to become a holy man. After returning from Mekkah, he lived in Banten and married one of Sultan Tirtayasa's daughters, Princess Syarifah² or Princess Aminah (according to the Banten genealogy register). He had a son named Sekh Jaliluddin (the genealogy of H.A. Galib).

It was told that Sekh Yusuf remarried a girl from Serang and had some children. As described by Shelly Errington in her lecture delivered in Hasanuddin University some years ago, it was common for a Bugis to expand their

¹ Jacqueline *op. cit.*, p. 176.

² Prof. Tudjinah, Sekh Yusuf Makasar 1626-1699, The Second National Seminar on History, 1970, Yogyakarta.

families through marriage because a Bugis family is like a net. Then the war broke out between Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa supported by Sekh Yusuf and his son Sultan Abu Nazar al Qahar on February 1682. Assisted by the Dutch, Sultan Abu Nazar defeated Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa. Although the latter was caught by the Dutch, Sekh Yusuf had continued his fight for 12 months until he was caught in 1683. The Dutch sent him into exile in Selon (Sri Lanka) in 1694 together with his followers and families, he was brought to Tanjung Harapan where he died and buried in Zandvield, an agricultural region in Stellenbosch, on May 23, 1699.¹ In "The Handbook of Cape Town and Suburb"² it was stated that "Makasar Duynan", near Zandvield was a place for people exiled from Makasar, one of whom was Sekh Yusuf or Tuanse, a Macassarese nobleman who had a great influence in Java and Makasar and throughout the archipelago. He was sent to Cape of Good Hope with 49 followers. On April 5, 1975, the bones of Sekh Yusuf, arrived in Makasar from the Cape of Good Hope. He was buried in Lakiung, Gowa. Sekh Yusuf was respected by the Bantenese not only as a holy man but also as a national hero who has had 4 cemeteries in Lakiung, Banten, Selon and Cape of Good Hope. His 49 followers had multiplied and become a 10,000 Islamic community by intermarriage between Macassarese and Bantenese.³ A research has not yet been made on the roles played by the exiled Indonesians in Cape Town.

III. THE EXPANSION OF THE BUGIS PEOPLE IN THE 18TH CENTURY

If the 17th century was regarded as the period of a large scale migration of Wajonese to East Kalimantan and of the increase of what the VOC called "smuggling by the people of South Sulawesi", then the 18th century could be regarded as "the expansion of the Bugis Trade".⁴ Most of the Bugis and Macassarese traders left their countries because of domestic conflicts which sometimes had been organized and intervened by the Dutch, and also because of "the stringent commercial restriction imposed by the Dutch on trade of Makasar".⁵ In this respect what was said by Andaya is noteworthy to know:

"This fact accentuates the argument of intolerable conditions back in Makasar ... (which) made it imperative that a new home be found somewhere away from the reaches of the warring Macassarese and Bugis rulers".⁶

¹Tujimali, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-8.

²Tujimah, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³Dr. G.Y. Drewes, *Djawa*, 6e jrg., 1926: pp. 87-88.

⁴Jacqueline Lineton, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁵Bastin, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁶Andaya, L. (1970), Unpublished essay on Bugis migration in the late century.

Aside from the situation mentioned above, this expansion, in Crawford's opinion, was the result of the entrepreneurial character of the Bugis particularly that of the Wajonese:

"The Tuwaju (read: To Wajo') ... at present found as settlers in almost every trading port of the Archipelago, native and European, having in some of the ruler countries, as Flores and Borneo, independent settlements. In Singapore, although of such recent origin, they already number from 200 to 3000.

James Brooke also stated that "distant enterprises (colonial and commercial enterprises) are almost confined to the people of Wajo', and they have a saying amongst them, that a Boni trader (Bone) from Soping (Soppeng) must have Wajo' blood in his veins". The Wajonese were often nicknamed as "The Chinese from Indonesia". Small parts of the Wajonese migrated to other parts of South Sulawesi, such as Pare-pare and Makasar, but most of them went away from South Sulawesi. They migrated to Sumbawa, Kalimantan, Ambon, Java, Sumatera, Singapore and Johor.¹

But not all of the Bugis left Sulawesi merely for trade. Some might look for adventure or earn their living or settle down in foreign countries because of SIRI' or other difficulties. The Lontara' described them as follows:

1. Daeng Matekko, the brother of La Ma'dukelleng, the Arung of Sinkang migrated to West Kalimantan, Riau, Lingga and Johor probably to trade but then he was involved in the Malayan civil war.²
2. La Ma'dukelleng, the Arung of Singkang, at first migrated to Johor, Sumatera, then to West and East Kalimantan, afraid that King Bone La Patan might try him. From 1714 to 1726 he operated as a pirate leader and in 1726 he became Sultan of Pasir and went back to South Sulawesi in 1736. Henceforth he joined forces with "I Mappasempa Karaeng Bontolangkasa" and Daeng Namuntulli, the Arung Keju of Bone to oust the Dutch out of Makassar, but they failed because of the split between the people of Bone and Gowa.³
3. "La Tatta' Ambaralla" (Ambarala probably means 'admiral') the son of La Kasi, the Punggawa (commander in chief), accused of a big crime by the King of Bone in the 18th century, fled with his brother, La Tenridolong To Lebae, the Datu of Pammana, and their followers to Cambodia. Both of them, were married to Cambodian Princesses and had some children. Afterwards La Tatta Ambarala, accompanied by his daughter, Raja Sitti,

¹Abdul Razak Daeng Patunru, *Sejarah Wajo*, Makasar, 1964: p. 88.

²Al Marhem Raja Ali Haji Riau, *Tuhfat al-Nafia*, Sejarah Melayu dan Bugis, Malaysia Publications Ltd., Singapore, 1965.

³Noorduyn, *op. cit.*, p. 10-125.

lived in Singapore. One of his wellknown rich descendants was Haji Nonci' who had an Arab father named Syarif Muhammad. People told that La Tatta had moved again to Patani. His children were left in Cambodia. La Tenridolong To Lebae was pardoned by the King of Bone and went back to Pammana (Wajo'), but his children lived in Cambodia.

The 'Lontara' did not tell much about the migration of the people of South Sulawesi in the 18th century. The 'Lontara' Sukku'na Wajo' and the 'Lontara' Bilang Gowa (diary of the King of Gowa and Tallo), the thickest lontara in South Sulawesi, did not tell anything about what had happened in the 19th and 20th centuries but they described the events of the 17th and 18th centuries.

The roles of the Bugis, Macassarese and Mandarese in Riau, Lingga, Johor, Selangor, Aceh, Mempawa and Sukudana should be searched for in the historiography of each region respectively. One thing is certain, that there was a Bugis village in West Kalimantan inhabited mostly by the Bugis from Wajo'. Many other Bugis people lived in Johor and Selangor while half breed Bugis spread over Malaysia.

Tuhfat al Nafia described that the four sons of Opu Tenriborong Daeng Rilekke had participated in local dynastic quarrels of the Kingdoms in Sumatera, Kalimantan and Malaya. It also described the adventures of some 'Opus; such as, Opu Daeng Parani, Opu Daeng Cella', Opu Daeng Manambung, Opu Daeng Marewa and Opu Daeng Kamase. (Opu is an exalted title given to Luru's descendants). At first they migrated to Batavia, Siantan, Cambodia and Bangka, afterwards they began to participate in conflicts occurring in Palembang, Johor, Selangor, Pahang and some surrounding areas. Besides, Opu Daeng Manambung and Opu Daeng Kakase operated in Matan and Mempawah, while "To Pasarai" (the cousin of Batari Toja, the Queen of Bone) and Daeng Matekko, the brother of La Ma'dukelleng, the Arung of Singkang, played their roles in Linggi.

I quoted some notes from Leonard Yuson Andaya's dissertation (1971):

"The ruling power structure of Johor was already transformed or in the process of transformation by 1728 ... Sultan Sulaiman owed his position to the arms of the Bugis and could not claimed the special daulat (sovereignty) of the previous dynasty. He was now propped up by the arms of the Bugis, rather than by his own Malay subjects or Orang Laut retainers. He and his descendants attempted to establish their own effective daulat, but it was circumscribed by the presence of an alternative source of loyalty in the form of the position of the Bugis Raja Muda. The "Orang Kaya", no longer in great favor with Sultan Sulaiman because of their betrayal in 1718 and their minor role in the recovery of the Kingdom from the Minangkabau, saw the positions of honour and confidence within the court usurped by Bugis Princes and War-leaders. The Bugis posts of Raja Muda and Raja Tua became of greater importance in the prin-

cipal decision making within the kingdom than the chief ministers and the Council of the 'Orang Kaya' ... the experienced seamen and warriors of Southwest Celebes ... The new daulat of Johor's Bendahara dynasty was now based principally on the military, political and economic skills of the Bugis. They had effectively replaced the traditional power structure within the Riau-Johor Kingdom and had succeeded in legitimizing their position in the kingdom with the blessings of Sultan Sulaiman. With the Bugis exercising an influential role in Riau-Johor and in Selangor and Linggi, and with the Minangkabau occupying an equally dominant position on the east coast of Sumatera and in areas of present day Negeri Sembilan, the affairs of the one proud and prestigious Malay Kingdom were now determined largely by non Malays who guided the course of Malay history in the Straits of Malacca up until the early 19th century".

Finally by marrying the children of Sultan, the descendants of Opu Tenriborong became Sultans of Johor, Selangor, Mempawah and Matan.

The same role was played by the Bugis in Aceh. When a revolt erupted in Aceh, the man who succeeded to ascend the throne without at first becoming Raja Muda, was a Bugis, such as Alauddin Ahmad Syah, the Sultan of Johor (1727-1735). He was a Bugis and popularly known as Maharaja Lela Melayu or Zainal Abidin, the son of Abdul Rahim, who, according to de Klerck, came from the Bugis of Malaka.

The same thing happened to La Ma'dukelleng, the Arung of Singkang. By marrying the daughter of the Sultan of Pasir, he became the King of Pasir.

Of course not all of these migrants were "mercenaries participating in local dynastic quarrels and wars" as told by Jacqueline Lineton. Some of them lived peacefully with the local leaders as done by Karaeng Aji', later named Toh Tuan, the ancestor of the late Tun Abdul Razak bin Husein, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia. Karaeng Aji' left his country, one of the Kingdoms in the Makasar region in \pm 1722, approximately coinciding with the arrival of Opu Tenriborong cs., To Pasarai, Daeng Matekko, the Arung of Lengnga, the Arung of Belawa, Anakoda Alang, Daeng Taliba', and the King of Pasir (La Ma'dukelleng), Daeng Massuro, Anre Guru La Mallo, Mara'dia Mandar and also Bugis, Macassarese and Mandarese leaders as mentioned in "Tuhfat al Nafis". According to Encik Zakaria bin Hitam, Karaeng Aji' had once ruled Makasar.¹ His followers opposed his policy of appointing "Landrof", his adopted son to be his special assistant because they considered him to be illegal. As a King getting SIRI', he descended from the throne. Accompanied by his followers, he went to Kota Tinggi, Johor and built a village on both sides of Pekan River. The village was latter called Mangkasar (Makasar) up to the present. He was treated as a leader, especially because he had a profound knowledge of Islam. Karaeng Aji' was the first "Indera Syahbandar" of

¹Encik Zakaria bin Hitam, "Relationship Between the Bugis Region (Sulawesi) and Pahang (Malaysia)", *Bingkisan Budaya Sulawesi Selatan*, January-March, 1978, Ujung Pandang.

Pahang. Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussin, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia was the tenth Indera Syahbandar. Karaeng Aji' also taught the art of weaving so that nowadays Pahang is famous for its woven product. According to the genealogy register given to me by Encik Zakaria, Tun Razak had Bugis blood because some of his ancestors had Bugis names: La Cangah and Daeng Sopok. From my interview with the Pahang people who admitted to be of Bugis, Macassarese or Aceh descendants, I had the impression that SIRI' MASI-RI' motivated Tun Razak to reach the top of his career.

Traditionally, the successful migrants from South Sulawesi would go back to their birth places to give evidence of their recovery from SIRI' by showing their glorious achievements. Thus Abu Bakar Riayatuddin Shah, the Sultan of Pahang, had visited Makasar just before he passed away. When I was visiting Kampung Mengkassar on June, 1977, in front of Karaeng Aji's tomb, I made a joke to some people of Pahang: "Well, well, after changing its name into "Ujung Pandang", now Makasar has moved to Pahang. I hope the Makasar spirit as seen in the SIRI' cultural value is still preserved in Malaysia".

The Bugis trade expansion in the 18th century seemed to be directly related to the establishment of the European trade centres particularly in Singapore due to the Chinese migration to the Southeast Asian regions. The Bugis supplied the European trade centres with sea-cucumbers which were highly favoured by the Chinese; they supplied them also with pearls and other goods from the eastern part of the Indonesian Archipelago and received goods from Europe and China. According to Crawford and Earl, the Bugis Trading Emporia was stimulated and strengthened financially by the Chinese.¹ Crawford stated that they had grown in several places, e.g. in Bonerate (Selayar), from which the Buginese and Macassarese sailed annually to Bali, Batavia and Singapore, Irian, Maluku and Manila.

This Bugis migration could be proved by the discovery of a Southeast Asian map made by the Bugis in 1828 and the codification of the maritime and trade law by La Patello'Amanna Gappa, the Matoa of Kampung Wajo III in 1676.² The article of Prof. Dr. A.A. Cense and the PH.D. Theses of C.C. Macknight also described the voyage of the Bugis and Macassarese to the north coast of Australia, Irian, particularly to the bay of Carpenter to collect sea-cucumbers. On February 17, 1803, Matthew Flinders met six Bugis ships near the cape of Wilberforce. Flinders received an information from Pobassoo (Puang Aso') that these six ships were part of the 60 Bugis ships commanded

¹Earl, G.W., *The Trading Ports of the Indian Archipelago*, Journal of the Indian Archipelago, IV, 1850, p. 492.

²A.A. Cense and H.J. Heeren, "Studies and Cultural Influences of Macassarese and Bugis at the North Coast of Australia", Bhratara, 1972.

by Salloo. This fleet belonged to the King of Bone and had sailed 6 or 7 times to Marege (a country of black people called 'ORO' in the book of I La Galigo). To remember this meeting one of the Pobassoo's sons using Bugis alphabets 'Pojosenge' wrote down the name of the Harbour of Jackson which was also Flinders base. Later on, when he was in Kupang, Flinders received the information that the Macassarese had been collecting sea-cucumbers by the islands around Java and also in the southern part of Roti for a long time. And it was said that about 20 years before (by the end of 18th century) one of their ships drifted as far as the coast of New Holland and there they found so many sea-cucumbers that they hence-forth sent their fleet regularly to look for sea-cucumbers in that newly discovered place. The last ship visiting that place was 'Bunga Ejaya' which belonged to PU'DU' DAENG TOMPO' in 1906, one year after the great Kingdoms in South Sulawesi had been conquered by the Dutch. Because of the prohibition imposed by the Australian government, this profitable sea-cucumbers trade was terminated. If there are some Bugis and Macassarese in Australia nowadays, they are not sea-cucumbers collectors, but truck drivers, hard workers, restaurant-owners, students etc. It was said that some of them have been naturalized by marrying natives or Australian citizens.

IV. MIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH SULAWESI IN XXTH CENTURY

Since I have never made any research concerning the migration of this period, I cannot describe in details what happened in this period. A few days ago I just received the observations part II made by Lembaga Kependudukan Universitas Hasanuddin, 1975. Therefore, there is not enough time for me to study them.

I would like, however, to present in this paper all what I know, although it is far from perfect, since the outflow of the people from this region has never been published.

The census of 1930 indicated that the outflow has lasted for several decades. As an example, about one fifth of the whole population of Kalimantan, except British Borneo, were born in South Sulawesi. We can imagine the total number if it should be added with those born in Kalimantan, since the emigration had begun in the 17th century. The figure will increase if we have to enumerate also the "half-breed". (Many of them are proud to have Bugis-Macassarese blood). In 1930, it was estimated that 10% of the people of South Sulawesi lived outside South Sulawesi. Two percent of the Macassarese also live outside South Sulawesi. To get a clear idea on that situation, see Table I.

Table 1

THE POPULATION - 1930
DISTRIBUTION OF THE BUGIS, MACASSARESE AND MANDARESE¹

	Bugis	Macassarese	Mandarese
Residency of Celebes	1,380,334	630,144	175,271
Residency of Manado	27,477	1,630	1,571
Borneo	95,048	3,008	5,846
Sumatera	10,170	1,044	11
Residency of Timor	11,652	2,718	796
(Sumbawa)	(8,232)	(1,975)	-
Bali & Lombok	2,468	276	2,296
Maluku	1,293	1,622	103
Java & Madura	4,593	2,298	3,293
British Malaya	4,961	23	-

According to this table, the region with the greatest number of South Sulawesi (Celebes) emigrants is Kalimantan:

- a. 95,048 Bugis
- b. 3,088 Macassarese
- c. 5,846 Mandarese

103,982

Those who live outside Indonesia, e.g. in Malaysia, are:

- a. 4,961 Bugis
- b. 23 Macassarese

My guess is that the Buginese, Macassarese and Mandarese who have lived and have multiplied since the 17th century in those two regions are not included in the Table I.

Fifteen per cent of the people of the districts of Pontianak and Balikpapan are Bugis. Most of them are Wajos. According to the census of 1920 among the 50,000 Bugis descendants there were 47,000 still speaking their particular language in Southeast and West Kalimantan.²

When I spoke with the officials of the United Local People Institution in Pontian, Johor, Malaysia in 1977, I received the information that there were about 60,000 Bugis in Johor. Almost all of them came from Wajo'. They did

¹Volkstelling (Census) 1930, Vol. V, pp. 20-21.

²Barbara Harvey, *op. cit.*, 10 nt. 3.

not know how many people lived in other regions and how many are half-breeds. Most of them said that their fathers or ancestors had left Wajo before the Second World War. Answering my question why they had migrated, all of them referred to making a better living. There were some people who replied in a verse:

“De ga passa’ ri lipu’mu, balanca ri kompommu, mulanco mabela?
Engka pasa’ ri lipu’ku, balanca ri kampokku ulampa mabela, iakia’ innawani kusappa”.

(Is there not any money and market in your country so that you left it?
We have market and money in our country, but we migrated to seek love and tranquility).

Whatever their answer are, this verse illustrates the reasons of their migration. In their villages, they have prosperity, rice fields, and jobs but they don’t feel any love from their fellowmen especially from their leaders.

After the Indonesian Independence, the exodus of the Bugis in 1949 which was followed by Macassarese, Mandarese, Toraja, Selayar and Duri Enrekang, got fresh impetus from the rebellion of DI/TII (1951-1965)¹ due to treatment of warlords who controlled their economic resources.² The government of the Province of Central Sumatera estimated that in 1956 there were about 10,000 people from South Sulawesi settling in Jambi and Riau. There was also a report that 5,000 sailors from South Sulawesi came to East Kalimantan in 1956.³ A Bugis who arranged the lodging and the transportation for the people of South Sulawesi in Jakarta explained that 1955 was a year of record in terms of rate of migration when more than 10,000 migrants left their birth places for Sumatera through Tanjung Priok. As a rule they went together in a large group of 45 or more.⁴ Jacqueline Lineton received an answer from some migrants in Tanjung Priok that “they had migrated in the 1950s and the early 1960s because conditions of insecurity had made it impossible for them to make a living at home”. According to Lineton, the census of 1961 indicated that new settlement areas in Batanghari (Jambi), Indragiri and Riau Islands were established. According to the data of this census, though not yet complete, more than 42,000 born in South Sulawesi, settled in Jambi and Riau Islands. According to Makaliwe’s notes, the migration were continuously proceeding and when his writings were published, approximately 5,000 people were estimated to have migrated each year to Jambi, Central and Southeast Sulawesi.⁵

¹ Jacqueline Lineton, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

² Barbara Harvey, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

³ Mc Nicoll, G., Internal Migration in Indonesia, *Descriptive Notes Indonesia*, No. 5, 1968.

⁴ Jacqueline Lineton, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁵ Makaliwe, W.H., “An Economic Survey of South Sulawesi”, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. V, 2, pp. 17-36.

The census of 1961 and 1971 indicated that the district of Wajo' held a record of lowering the population growth:

1961 - 345,996 people (census of 1961 : 13)

1971 - 322,225 people (census of 1971 : 100)

What about the migration nowadays? No data are available since no research has ever been made. A senior lecturer estimated that about 15,000 South Sulawesi people leave their birthplace every year. Nowadays some of them go to East Malaysia through Pare-pare.

Table II

THE SETTLEMENTS OF THE SOUTH SULAWESI PEOPLE IN 1971 BY PROVINCE

Province	Total
1. Special territory of Aceh*	-
2. North Sumatra	1,958
3. West Sumatra	911
4. Riau	16,499
5. Jambi	32,927
6. South Sumatra	11,867
7. Bengkulu	11
8. Lampung	2,503
9. Special Territory of the Capital City of Jakarta	33,031
10. West Java*	-
11. Central Java	14,499
12. Special Territory of Yogyakarta	2,002
13. East Java	20,175
14. Bali	1,724
15. West Nusa Tenggara	10,695
16. East Nusa Tenggara	3,201
17. West Kalimantan	531
18. Central Kalimantan	293
19. South Kalimantan	9,342
20. East Kalimantan	10,636
21. North Sulawesi	25,751
22. Central Sulawesi	36,129
23. Southeast Sulawesi	23,225
24. Maluku	6,883
25. Irian Jaya	5,068
Total	266,811

Notes: *Data unknown

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta.

The exact number of the people of the South Sulawesi Province who have migrated to other provinces from 1930 heretofore is not yet known, but from

the table written below, it can be estimated that the migration rate is high by observing the population growth rates from 1961, 1971, and 1975, which had a tendency to decline.

Table III

THE SOUTH SULAWESI POPULATION GROWTH RATES 1930-1973

Year	Population	Annual Growth Rate (% = percent)	
		Increase	Decrease
1930	2,692,851	—	—
1961	4,516,544	1.7%	—
1971	5,186,445	1.4%	0.3%
1973	5,296,191	1.1%	0.3%

(copied from the causes of the South Sulawesi Outflow, Stage II, Demographic Institution of Universitas Hasanuddin, 1975, p. 21).

These facts support the opinion that many of the people from South Sulawesi have migrated to other regions.

Through this observation the districts with minus population growth rates in 1961-1971 are:

1. Enrekang - 2.4 per cent
2. Jenepono - 1.27 per cent
3. Wajo' - 0.71 per cent

The districts with the highest population growth rates are:

1. Majene + 6.04 per cent
2. Polewali-Mamasa + 3.26 per cent
3. Sinjai + 3.83 per cent

From the study made by the Demographic Institution of Universitas Hasanuddin in Sentani, Jayapura (Irian Jaya) and Muba (South Sumatera), it should be noted that the people of South Sulawesi who migrated to other regions belonged to the educated labour force, as can be noted from Table IV.

According to this report, the respondents who settled in the Kecamatan (Sub-district) of Sentani (Irian Jaya) came from many different regions, which are as follows:

1. Pinrang - 10 per cent
2. Tana Toraja - 50 per cent
3. Sindenreng-Rappang - 10 per cent
4. Ujung Pandang - 30 per cent

Table IV

RESPONDENTS' AGE STRUCTURE IN THE PROVINCES OF IRIAN JAYA AND SOUTH SUMATRA BY SUB DISTRICTS

Age-Group	Irian Jaya		South Sulawesi	Total
	Sentani	Jayapura	Muba	
15 - 19 (%)	-	-	8 (16%)	8
20 - 24 (%)	2 (4%)	4 (8%)	7 (14%)	13
25 - 29 (%)	4 (8%)	16 (32%)	10 (20%)	30
30 - 34 (%)	- (-)	8 (16%)	17 (34%)	25
35 - 39 (%)	4 (8%)	2 (4%)	5 (10%)	11
40 - 44 (%)	-	4 (8%)	2 (4%)	6
45 - 49 (%)	-	6 (12%)	1 (2%)	7
50 - 54	-	-	-	-
55 - 59	-	-	-	-
Sum Total	10	40	50	100

(Copied from the research made by the Demographic Institution of Universitas Hasanuddin, Report Part II, 1975, p. 292).

The respondents who settled down in the Kecamatan of Jayapura, came from the Kabupatens of:

1. Tana Toraja 13 per cent
2. Ujung Pandang 20 per cent
3. Enrekang 13 per cent
4. Barru 5 per cent
5. Soppeng 20 per cent
6. Bone 15 per cent
7. Maros 3 per cent
8. Pangkajene Kepulauan 13 per cent
9. Wajo' 3 per cent

This report is an indicator that the District of Tana Toraja holds the first rank in the migration of its people to the two sub-districts of Irian Jaya, while Ujung Pandang holds the second rank. It is quite reasonable on account of the limited land for settlement and lack of employment opportunities in those two regions.

It is quite remarkable that all of the respondents in the sub-district of Muba, South Sumatera are Wajonese, while only 3 per cent of the respondents who settled in Sentani and Jayapura are Wajonese. If we trace back the history of South Sulawesi we will find out that since the 17th century many Wajonese have migrated to Sumatera, East Kalimantan, Singapore and Malaysia.

This research, if observed carefully, shows us that no one of the respondents in those three sub-districts is illiterate, while only 8,2 per cent have not undergone any schooling. These data indicate that the educational rates of the respondents are as follows:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| 1. Elementary School (3 years) | 17.2 per cent |
| 2. Elementary School (6 years) | 20.4 per cent |
| 3. Junior High School | 20.7 per cent |
| 4. Senior High School | 13.7 per cent |
| 5. Sarjana Muda (Bachelor) | 9 per cent |
| 6. Sarjana (Full Degree) | 0.7 per cent |

These data indicate that the migrants are not just workers, but are learned workers.

It is also important to know the data concerning the way of life of the respondents who settled down in those three sub-districts in order to know whether they are wandering people or not. From the respondents' perspective, it can be concluded that the assumption is:

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| Quite right | (8 per cent) |
| Right | (10 per cent) |
| Entirely wrong | (-) |
| Wrong | (8 per cent) (only respondents from Irian Jaya) |
| Don't know | (66 per cent). |

Although 66 per cent of the respondents did not give their answer, those who support this assumption are higher (18 per cent) than those against it (8 per cent) at the ratio of 9 : 4.

Having a knowledge about whether they still have property in their respective country or not, might help us to get a clear idea about the motivations of their migration. It turned out that 78 per cent of the respondents have properties in their birthplaces, covering:

- | | |
|----------------|-------------|
| 1. Houses | 43 per cent |
| 2. Fields | 46 per cent |
| 3. Rice Fields | 48 per cent |

4. Estates	12 per cent
5. Dry Fields	5 per cent
6. Cattles	4 per cent
7. Fish Ponds	1 per cent

The use of cattle to cultivate rice fields is rare, because many of them were stolen in chaotic situations.

According to research, 88 per cent of the respondents can be self-sufficient/supporting. Only 12 per cent of them are financed by their relatives and no one by the government. It means that they are not poor.

The data received from Irian Jaya and South Sumatera cannot be used to analyze the causes of migration since in the two regions there were not many South Sulawesi people. According to the 1971 census, there were 11,867 South Sulawesi people in South Sumatera, while in Irian Jaya there were only 5,068. More South Sulawesi people lived in the other provinces, e.g.: 36,129 in Central Sulawesi; 33,031 in the Special Territory of the Capital City of Jakarta; 32,927 in Jambi; 25,751 in North Sulawesi; 23,225 in Southeast Sulawesi; 20,175 in East Java; 16,499 in Riau; 11,449 in Central Java; 10,695 in West Nusa Tenggara and 10,636 in East Kalimantan.

In my opinion these figures do not include those who have migrated from the 15th century until the beginning of the 20th century. I base my opinion on the fact that according to the 1971 census there were only 531 South Sulawesi people in West Kalimantan, while according to the opinion of those who have visited this province, there were thousands of Bugis there. According to history they have migrated since the 17th and 18th centuries.

According to a senior lecturer from Hasanuddin University, there is an annual migration of 15,000 South Sulawesi people to other regions, particularly to East Kalimantan, East Malaysia and Southeast Sulawesi. The 1975 population growth rate in South Sulawesi is estimated to be less than 1 per cent (may be 0.98 per cent). It should be noted that according to this research, before migrating, 85 per cent of the respondents are full-time workers. Thus only 15 per cent of them were not full-timers of whom 6 per cent were part-timers. It means that before migrating their conditions had not been so bad, especially if we observe that 78 per cent of them still had a property in their respective regions.

Finally, as a conclusion, the team of researchers in those three sub-districts pointed out that the main motivation of their migration is the economic factor (See the Tables).

TABLE V

THE ISSUES AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO WERE
CONCERNED ON THE ISSUES HAPPENING IN THEIR PLACES OF
ORIGIN

No.	Issue	Percentage of the number of people
1.	Economic Factor: Employment	72.9%
2.	Social Factor: Social interrelationships	28.7%
3.	Cultural Factor: Society's way of thinking and attitude	28.9%
4.	Political Factor: Relation between the local rulers and the people	33.3%
Total number		163.8%
Average		40.95%

CONCLUSION

Based on the facts that: the total number of the South Sulawesi migrants is gradually increasing, while they belong to the educated and energetic labor force; the number of buffaloes and cows used to cultivate rice fields is decreasing; the unwillingness of the youth, who have been educated in high schools, to cultivate their fields; one may conclude that:

1. The plan to make South Sulawesi a rice barn is very difficult to realize;
2. The entrepreneurship in villages will decrease, because the tough and energetic entrepreneurs migrate to other regions, even to East Malaysia.

To get more exact data about the expansion of the South Sulawesi people in the framework of national and regional development, further research is needed.

NOTES

1. Andi' Zainal Abidin, *The I La Galigo Epic Cycle of South Celebes and Its Diffusion*, Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, No. 17 (April), Ithaca, N.Y., 1974, pp. 161-169.
2. Ibidem; R.A. Kern, *Catalogus van de Boegineesche, tot den I La Galigo - cyclus behoorende handschriften der Leidsche Universiteitsbibliotheek alsmede van die in andere Europeesche Bibliotheek, Leyden, U.B., 1939, biz. 8: "... als men het gedicht leest, kan men zich moeilijk aan de gedachte onttrekken dat zijn figuur - een historischen achtergrond heeft, hoe dan ook opgesmukt tot onherkenbaar wordens toe. De geschiedenis van Sawerigading schijnt op zekere hoogte de geschiedenis - des Boegineeschen volks"*.
3. Gervaise, N., *Description historique du royaume de Macacar*, Paris, 1688.
4. Some of Dr. Chr. Pelras sentences are condensed.
5. Andi' Zainal Abidin, *Notes on the Lontara' as Historical Sources, Indonesia, ... No. 12 (October), 1971, pp. 159-172.*

Suplement

Table VI

THE PERCENTAGE OF MIGRANTS, VIEWED FROM THEIR MOTIVATION, AND THE AVERAGE PERIOD OF MIGRATION

No.	Kabupaten	Percentage seen from their Motivation					Average (in year)
		Employ ment	Inner Peace	Security	Others	Total Number	
1.	Gowa	17	77	6	0	100	1
2.	Maros	50	0	25	25	100	1
3.	Pangkep	60	0	40	0	100	2.3
4.	Soppeng	90	5	5	0	100	2.5
5.	Enrekang	24	0	15	61	100	1
6.	Tator	20	0	40	40	100	2
7.	Sidrap	49	17	17	17	100	1
8.	Wajo'	86	0	14	0	100	2.5
9.	Bone	57	7	21	15	100	2
10.	Sinjai	60	0	20	20	100	2.5
Average		51.3	10.6	20.4	17.6	100	1.7

Table VII

THE RESPONDENTS' MOTIVATION OF MIGRATION BY THE TWO OBSERVED REGIONS

Motivation	Irian Jaya	South Sumatra	Total
1. Economic (%)	45 (90)	32 (64)	77 -
2. Social (%)	1 (2)	3 (6)	4 18
3. Cultural (%)	4 (20)	14 (28)	18 -
4. Political (%)	- -	1 (2)	1 -
Grand Total	50 (100)	50 (100)	100

Table VIII

THE SITUATION OF THE RESPONDENT' AREAS OF ORIGIN

Description	Irian Jaya	South Sumatera	Total
1. Having still relatives in their areas of origins	50 (100)	50 (100)	100
2. Having no relatives	-	-	-
3. Still having parents in their areas of origin	39 (78)	45 (90)	84
4. Still having brothers and sisters in their areas of origin	41 (82)	50 (100)	91
5. Still having brothers/sisters in law in their areas of origin	23 (46)	50 (100)	73
6. Still having sons/daughters	9 (18)	5 (10)	14

Notes: Figures in parenthesis indicate the relative frequency of respondents with regard to the total number of the samples (in percentage).

Table IX

IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE AREAS OF ORIGIN BEFORE THE MIGRATION

Events	Irian Jaya	South Sumatera	Total
1. Disorder (%)	3 (6)	- -	3
2. Climatic disturbance (%)	5 (10)	3 (6)	8
3. Natural Disaster		-	-
4. Epidemy (%)	1 (2)	-	1
5. Lack of food (%)	4 (8)	- -	4 -
6. Miscellaneous (%)	1 (2)	-	
7. Unknown Factors (%)	36 (72)	47 (94)	83
Total	50 (100)	50 (100)	100

Table X

THE RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT SITUATION BEFORE MIGRATION IN TWO
OBSERVED REGIONS

Description	Irian Jaya	South Sumatera	Total
1. Limited employment opportunity with sufficient income through hard labor	8 (16)	-	8
2. Limited employment opportunity with appropriate income which is commensurate with the effort	6 (12)	-	6
3. Limited opportunity of light/easy (without hard labor) work with high income	1 (2)	-	1
4. Limited work opportunity with immediate cash	-	-	-
5. Limited employment opportunity aside from the agricultural sector	4 (8)	2 (4)	6
6. Scarcity of farm land to be cultivated	-	-	-
7. Difficulty in rearing a family due to the limited work opportunity (economic facilities)	6 (12)	8 (16)	14
8. Disadvantageous working condition due to illegal financial burden	5 (10)	3 (6)	8
9. Unknown factors	20 (40)	37 (74)	57
Total	50 (100)	50 (100)	100

Notes: Figures in parenthesis indicate the relative frequency of the total number of samples (in percentage).

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PIDGIN MALAY AS SPOKEN IN IRIAN JAYA

Raden S. ROOSMAN

Only after World War II in 1945 did the Dutch — upon returning to West New Guinea — introduce instruction in Dutch in their public education system in Irian Jaya. In the primary schools, most of which were run by government subsidized Christian missions, Malay functioned as the vernacular language of instruction. Contacts with the local Melanesians were conducted in Malay, a pidgin form of which has been established for at least 100 years as a lingua franca along the coast as a result of barter trade with seafaring Malay traders from the West.

Direct trade relations must have come from the neighbouring Moluccas — once the famous Spice Islands — which in medieval times represented a link in the inter-insular Indonesian trade which was connected further West with the Mediterranean and West European trade. The Indonesian part was undertaken for centuries by Malays and Javanese, but was taken over by the Portuguese and the Dutch, when they successively occupied the Spice Islands.

A simple trade vernacular — referred to as "Melayu" (Malay) — was already in use along Indonesia's coastal areas when the Portuguese arrived there in the 16th century. In fact the Portuguese, and later the Dutch had to resort also to the use of this Malay pidgin when dealing with native chiefs.

It was in the Moluccas that in the course of time a local version developed from pidgin Malay, commonly referred to as "*Melayu Ambon*" (Ambon Malay) named after the capital-island of the administrative Molucca district which, before World War II, also included West New Guinea.

Ambon Malay, with pidgin Malay as its basic stratum, contains words, terms, and idioms derived from Moluccan languages and dialects, generically categorized as "*basa tana*" (speech of the land), many of which have now

become archaic, and yet reportedly still being spoken only on remote islands and inland areas of the Moluccas. For most of the Moluccans now, Ambon Malay has become their first language.

Apart from being propagated through trade, Ambon Malay became further popularized in West New Guinea through Dutch administration and proselytizing. West New Guinea has always lagged behind in its development; as a result public servants and teachers of religion have to be imported from elsewhere. The Dutch recruited their personnel from Ambon, and given the shortage of manpower also from Christianized areas such as the Northern Celebes (Manado and Sangir), Flores, Timor and the Kai Islands. Similarly, the Christian missions trained natives to become "*guru*" (teachers of religion) from these area to be sent to West New Guinea.

Thus Ambon Malay became established as the lingua franca in West New Guinea; there is no doubt that this pidgin of Malay — as it is spoken there — differs from place to place due to influence from the speeches of incoming migrants and the various tongues locally spoken. The Portuguese and Dutch languages had also exerted some influence on pidgin Malay, as part of pidgin Malay vocabulary is Portuguese and Dutch borrowings; this aspect was carried over through Ambon Malay. Long before 1940 the Bible was already translated into Malay, and sermons in the churches in West New Guinea were delivered in Malay.

With the Indonesians taking over West New Guinea in 1963, the Indonesianisation of the newly acquired territory started. From then on West New Guinea was called "*Irian Barat*" (West Irian), and in 1973 renamed "*Irian Jaya*". Great emphasis was laid by the Indonesians on teaching *Bahasa Indonesia* — the national language — from the first grade of primary school. Since *Bahasa Indonesia* was developed from Malay, to most West Irianese who speak Pidgin Malay as first or second language, the "new language" should not be entirely unfamiliar. Pidgin Malay, and in the case of Irian Jaya, Ambon Malay, has until now remained the daily spoken lingua franca in the territory. However, the influence of *Bahasa Indonesia* is already noticeable in the speech of the present generation of West Irianese who use more and more *Bahasa Indonesia* vocabulary in their Ambon Malay conversations. The utilization of *Bahasa Indonesia* in mass media such as newspapers, official correspondence, government announcements, public speeches, radio broadcasts, movies and religious sermons has accelerated the spread of *Bahasa Indonesia* in Irian Jaya. Ambon Malay — still spoken widely in Irian Jaya — however is gradually becoming referred to as "*basa kampung*", a colloquial vernacular as "it is spoken in the villages (*kampung*) outside town."

AMBON (IRIAN) MALAY

1. Halo pace-pace tukang mancaci karja. So taukah OB sakarang jadi tukang tender buat pemborong yang kase tawarang paling tinggi OB kase dia tutup parigi-parigi di jalang-jalang basar di Entrop, muka Markomdak deng kantor kajaksaan Jayapura dan tra tau lage di mana. Soalnya bekeng-bekeng bae jalang itu musiman jadi, sakarang akang pung musim buka tender, pada hal so tau sandiri OB pung dompet kosong malompong tapi OB mo samangat lantaran pace-pace yang pung doi bekeng jalang propinsi di Jayapura pura-pura tidur sono. ("Mingguan Tero-pong", 6 April 1976)

Translation:

Hey, you people who are experts in criticizing (someone else's) work. Do you know that OB has now become a tender for contractors with the best bids? OB will give them the job of filling the holes in the roads at Entrop, in front of the Police Headquarters and the Attorney's Office in Jayapura, and maybe somewhere else. The problem of repairing highways has become seasonal (i.e. depends on when the money is released by the provincial government). Now we are in the season of opening tenders. You know, OB's wallet is empty to the last penny; however, OB is optimistic because those public servants have received plenty money from the government for the repair of provincial roads in Jayapura, although they pretend not to know anything about the matter.

Note: The articles in Ambon (Irian) Malay were written by Mr. Fred Hengga, the Editor of the "Minggu Teropong" (Observation) weekly published in Jayapura, who used his pseudonym of "Oom Bual" (Mr. Puff).

2. Kitong pung cucu cicit tra usa disuntik deng cacar poknya haratis alias tra bayar asal anak sehat. Iyo bapa mantri deng dokter kase ingat bagitu for kitong samua supaya kitong pung anak kecil deng maitua datang rame-rame ke rumah sakit. Abis anak-anak deng maitua hamil mesti dikase suntikan kekebalan anti sakit. Apa pace deng mace tra takut dengarkan? Anak-anak yang paling banya kena penyakit deng mati. Kasian mol ("Minggu Teropong, 1st-2nd week of April 1977).

Translation:

As long as our children and grandchildren are healthy they do not have to get a free shot against smallpox. But you know the doctor and his assistants reminded us that our children should come with their mothers to the hospital anyway. Children and pregnant mothers should be inoculated to make them immune against the disease. Aren't you afraid of hearing that most of the children who contracted the disease have died? Don't you feel sorry for them?

PIDGIN MALAY

Halo bapak-bapak tukang mencaci kerja. Sudah tahukah OB sekarang jadi tukang tender buat pemborong yang kasih tawaran paling tinggi OB kasih dia tutup perigi-perigi di jalan besar di Entrop, muka Markomdak sama kantor kejaksaan-Jayapura dan tidak tahu lagi di mana. Soalnya bikin-bikin baik jalan itu jadi musiman, sekarang akan punya musim bukan tender, pada hal sudah tahu sendiri OB punya dompet kosong melompong tapi OB semangat lantaran bapak-bapak yang punya duwit bikin jalan propinsi di Jayapura pura-pura tidur sana.

Kita orang punya cucu cicit tidak usah disuntik cacar pokken gratis, alias tidak bayar asal anak sehat. Ya bapak mantri sama dokter kasih ingat begitu buat kita orang semua supaya kita orang punya anak kecil sama ibu-ibu datang ramai-ramai ke rumah sakit. Habis anak-anak sama ibu-ibu hamil mesti dikasih suntikan kekebalan anti sakit. Apakah bapak sama ibu tidak takut dengar? Anak-anak yang paling banyak kena penyakit sama mati. Kasihan!

3. Orang bilang kata ator ayam dikandang talalu syusya daripada ator manusia syusya bukan maen. Kalo dolo-dolo Oom dorang di Lalu Lintas Jalan tambah apa-apa laeng so tao OB pung filsafat tadi tra usah syusya-syusya bekeng terminal taksi, soalnya lebe bebas cari panumpang lebe liar bagerak sampe rasanya dia sandiri lebe mardeka buat stop-stopon sabarang. Mangkali itu rambu-rambu dekat kantor PTT musti pake tulisan TAMPA STOP BUAT MANUSIA BODOH ATURAN. Kalo trada Oom-oom Polantas OB-lah ganti jaga sambunyi-sambunyi lur dari balakang marong kopi.

("Minggu Teropong", 1st-2nd week of March 1976).

Translation:

People say to keep order among chickens in a pen is more difficult than organizing people (which is already extremely hard). When I worked for the Traffic Control I already adhered to the philosophy that I should make no effort to build a taxi terminal, because the taxi drivers were taking the freedom of getting passengers by driving anywhere and stopping at any point they like to pick up people. Maybe the traffic signs next to the Post Office should have the wording "No Stopping for People Ignorant of Traffic Regulations". Whenever there are no traffic officers around, OB would like to substitute them by standing guard secretly and watching from behind an eating stall while sipping coffee.

4. Paitua Polisi mungkin bisa tengok-tengok sadekekah ke Kloofkamp? Iyo taksi-taksi di dekat jembatan Kloofkamp so mau enak sandiri putar tra karuan lalu parkir di situ. Apa bapa sopir tra lia lia dolokah kendaraan yang lewat di situ lalu banting stir. Yang celaknya di situ taksi-taksi basusun tunggu panumpang situ terminalkah? OB sarankan lebe bae sedia payung sebelum ada korban. Iyo terutama jam satu anak-anak deng cucu cicit OB banya yang jalang kaki pulang sekolah lewat di situ.

("Minggu Teropong", 3rd-4th week of March 1977).

Translation:

Police officers should have a quick look at Kloofkamp. It is true that taxi drivers when approaching the Kloofkamp bridge make turns whenever they want to in a disorderly manner, and park their cars right there. Before they make a turn, don't they look at the traffic first? It is unfortunate that those taxis are crowding there, waiting for passengers like at a terminal OB suggests "to get an umbrella before it rains" (i.e. to prevent accidents). That's right, particularly at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, when many of OB's children and grandchildren walk home from school and pass by that point.

Orang bilang kata atur ayam di kandang terlalu susah daripada atur manusia susah bukan main. Kalau dulu-dulu Oom dia orang di Lalu Lintas Jalan tambah apa-apa lain sudah tahu OB punya filsafat tadi tidak usah susah-susah bikin terminal taksi, soalnya lebih bebas cari penumpang lebih liar bergerak sampai rasanya dia sendiri lebih merdeka buat sebarang stop-stopon. Barangkali rambu-rambu dekat kantor PTT itu mesti pakai tulisan TANPA STOP BUAT MANUSIA BODOH ATURAN. Kalau tidak ada Oom-oom Polantas OB-lah ganti jaga sembunyi-sembunyi lihat dari belakang marong kopi.

5. Sio Dongso bilang jaga ketertiban kota tapi OB pusing sana sini pikir punya pikir mana bukti. Coba pace-pace pikir sade-kekah. OB sanang makan ikan bakar deng cium-cium bau-bau bakso punya enak. Lantara dong tra kabaran tapi jam 15 siang so pasang pondok tenda deng uruf basar-basar pung tulisan "Ikan Bakar Bakso". OB tukang urus jalang jangang sampe deng taksi bako sium muka abis katorang pung jalang dong so tutup deng pengganti rambu-rambu jalang.
('Mingguan Teropong', 11 June 1976).

Sio Dongso bilang jaga ketertiban kota tapi OB pusing sana sini pikir punya pikir mana bukti. Coba bapak-bapak pikir sedikit! OB senang makan ikan bakar sama cium-cium bau-bau bakso enak.
Lantaran dia orang tidak keberatan jam 15 siang sudah pasang pondok tenda sama huruf besar-besar punya tulisan "Ikan Bakar Bakso." OB tukang urus jalan jangan sampai taksi baku cium muka habis kita orang punya jalan dia orang sudah tutup sama pengganti rambu-rambu jalan.

Translation:

Sio Dongso told OB to keep order in town, and OB went around town but there is no proof of order in town. Just imagine, gentlemen, OB loves to eat grilled fish while sniffing at the aroma of meatball soup. Because nobody has any objections, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon people start putting up their eating tents with big signs "Grilled Fish and Meatball Soup". OB is a street controller, but don't let it happen that two cars have a head-on collision, just because the road signs are obscured by the many eating stalls.

6. Siapa bilang OB tra tau lae bumi terang utan badendang burung deng rusa jantang. Kasiang dorang rusa tarancam punah cenderawasih dorang sikat deng tembak tra tau lae.
Dorang abis di bumi so tra mau ada lae. Cucu-cucu OB sadeke sadarkah, atau dorang abis bekeng batul. Deng kalo perlu masukin kamar gelap di Abe. OB sanang bila burung bakica dan Irian Jaya tetap kaya deng anugerah Tuhan. OB penyang deng pung hati kebinatangan ... e ... peri kemanusiaan juga nyelamatin hewan.
(Mingguan Teropong, 1st-2nd week May 1976).

Siapa bilang OB tidak tahu bumi terang hutan berdendang burung sama rusa jantan. Kasihan dia orang rusa terancam punah cenderawasih dia orang sikat sama tembak tidak tahu lagi. Dia orang habis di bumi, sudah tidak akan ada lagi. Cucu-cucu OB sedikit sadar, atau dia orang habis bikin betul. Sama kalau perlu masuk kamar gelap di Abe. OB senang bila burung berkicau dan Irian Jaya tetap kaya sama anugerah Tuhan. OB penyang sama punya hati kebinatangan ... e ... peri kemanusiaan juga nyelamatkan hewan.

Translation:

Who says OB does not appreciate a beautiful world with forests full of singing birds and strutting bucks? I feel sorry for the deer who are threatened with extinction, and the birds of paradise killed indiscriminately by gunshots. They will be extinct from this earth, and there won't be any left. My grandchildren, OB is aware of it. He will try everything possible to improve the situation. If necessary he is willing to go to jail in the Abepura prison, because OB would be only happy when the birds are singing and Irian Jaya remains full of bliss from the Lord. OB is an animal lover with his "animal" oh, sorry ... human heart to safeguard the animal world.

CONVERSATION TAPED IN SERUI
YAPEN-WAROPEN DISTRICT, IRIAN JAYA, IN JUNE 1976

Husband:

1. Mama, mama yol
mum mum hey
2. Bekeng apa di dapur?
make what in kitchen
3. Bekeng aer panas ka?
make water hot interrogative
4. Saya sore ini ada punya tamu.
I afternoon this there is have guest
(emphasis)
5. Jadi bekeng aer panas sadeke ka?
so make water hot little bit interrogative
6. Ada gula?
There is sugar?

Wife:

7. Tida ada!
No there is not!
- H: 8. Suru ana dong pi bawa di kios ka?
Order child he go bring at little store interrogative
- W: 9. Iyo nanti Willem datang.
Yes later William come
- H: 10. Dia ka mana?
He to where.
- W: 11. Dia ronda-ronda di pante.
He round-round at beach.
- H: 12. Suda malam bagini panggil dong ka mari di ruma suda.
already night like this call he to here at house already.
13. Jangang nanti giling oto ka?
Don't later run over car interrogative
- W: 14. Iyo.
Yes.
- H: 15. Mama musti ator dorang bac.
You must organize he good.

H: 16. Kalo dong nakal pukul di kapala e!
If .he naughty beat on head huh!

W: 17. Ka, biasa kasi .ukum apa?
Interrogative usually give punishment what.

H: 18. Kasi rotan ka?
Give rattan interrogative.

W: 19. Jangang nanti dorang kapala basar.
Don't later he head big.

Translation:

- H: 1. Hey, mum!
2. What are you doing in the kitchen?
3. Are you boiling water?
4. I have a guest this afternoon.
5. So then are you making some hot water?
6. Have you got sugar?
- W: 7. There isn't any.
- H: 8. Send our boy to the store to get some.
- W: 9. Yes, William will be here shortly.
- H: 10. Where is he going?
- W: 11. He is taking a walk on the beach.
- H: 12. It's very late now, call him back home!
13. A car could have struck him, isn't it true?
- W: 14. Yes.
- H: 15. You must handle him wisely.
16. If he is naughty, beat him on the head, huh.
17. Well, what kind of punishment do you usually give him?
18. Do you lash him with a rattan stick?
- W: 19. Don't, he might become a big head.

I. VOWELS

No.	Symbol	Ambon (Irian) Malay	Pidgin Malay	Bahasa Indonesia
1.	a	[a]	[a]	[a]
2.	i	[i]	[i]	[i]
3.	u	[u]	[u]	[u]
4.	o	[o] , [ɔ]	[o] , [ə]	[ɔ]
5.	e	[e] , [ɛ]	[e] , [ɛ] [ə]	[ɛ] [ə]

II. DIPHTHONGS

6.	au	[o] , [u]	[o] , [u]	[au]
7.	ai	[e] , [ɛ]	[e] , [ɛ]	[ai]

III. CONSONANTS

loanwords	8.	c, b, d, g, h, j, k, l, m, n, p, r, s, t, w, y.	same	same	same
	9.	f	[f]	[p]	[ʃ] , [p]
	10.	sy	[s]	[s]	[ʃ] , [s]
	11.	kh	[k]	[k]	[X] , [k]

IV. POSITIONS

diphthongs consonants			in.	med.	fin.	in.	med.	fin.	in.	med.	fin.
	12.	h	±	+	—	±	+	+	+	+	+
	13.	k	+	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+
	14.	glottal stop	—	—	—	—	+	+	—	+	+
	15.	t	+	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	+
	16.	au	—	+	[o] , [u]	—	+	[o] , [u]	—	+	+
	17.	ai	—	—	[e] , [ɛ]	—	—	[e] , [ɛ]	—	+	+

in. = initial position

med. = medial position

fin. = final position

NOTES

1. (Ad. 5) The swa [e] in Pidgin Malay (PM) = [a] in Ambon Malay (AM):

A.M. sandiri	=	PM sendiri (alone, own),	(page 3)
sambunyi	=	sembunyi (to hide)	(3)
sakarang	=	sekarang (now)	(1)
basar	=	besar (big)	(1)
mardeka	=	merdeka (free)	(1)
samangat	=	semangat (spirit)	(1)
samua	=	semua (all)	(2)
balakang	=	belakang (behind, rear)	(3)
sanang	=	senang (happy)	(5)

2. (Ad. 6) Diphthong au in Bahasa Indonesia (BI) = [o], [u] in AM, PM:

B.I. kalau	=	PM kalo, kalu (if)	(3)
		AM	
saudara	=	sodara, sudara	

3. (Ad. 7) Diphthong ai in BI = [e] in AM, PM in final open syllable:

sampai	=	sampe (until, reach)	(7)
pakai	=	pake (to use)	(3)
ramai-ramai	=	rame-rame (noisy)	(2)
pantai	=	pante (beach)	(7)

4. (Ad. 12) Similarly to PM initial h is often omitted in AM:

habis	=	abis (finished)	(6)
hutan	=	utan (forest)	(6)
huruf	=	uruf (letter of alphabet)	(6)
hukum	=	ukum (law, punishment)	(7)

5. (Ad. 14) In cases of a final glottal stop (k), there is a tendency of open syllabicity in the final syllable:

A.M. bae	=	PM baik (good)	(1)
bapa	=	bapak (father)	(2)
banya	=	banyak (many)	(2)
tida ada	=	tidak ada (absent)	(7)

6. (Ad. 12) Final aspirated h in PM is omitted in AM:

A.M. kase	=	kasih (give)	(1)
lebe	=	lebih (more)	(2)
ruma	=	rumah (house)	(7)
suru	=	suruh (to order)	(7)
-ka?	=	-kah interrogative	

7. (Ad. 15) Final *t* in PM is omitted in AM:

A.M. <i>lia</i>	=	<i>liat, lihat</i> (see)	(4)
<i>sadeke</i>	=	<i>sedikit</i> (little bit)	(5)
<i>lau</i>	=	<i>laut</i> (sea)	(7)

8. Final *-n* in PM occurs as *-ng* in AM:

A.M. <i>akang</i>	=	PM <i>akan</i> (future aspect)	(1)
<i>jalang</i>	=	<i>jalan</i> (road)	(1)
<i>bekeng</i>	=	<i>bikin</i> (made)	(1)
<i>jangang</i>	=	<i>jangan</i> (don't)	(5)
<i>laeng</i>	=	<i>lain</i> (other, different)	(3)

9. The past aspect *so* (PM *sudah*):

A.M. <i>so tau, so tao</i>	=	PM <i>sudah tau</i> (already know)	(3)
<i>so tra mau</i>	=	<i>sudah tidak mau</i> (don't want)	(6)
<i>so pasang</i>	=	<i>sudah pasang</i> (already set up)	(5)

10. The negative *tra* (PM *tidak*):

<i>tra tau</i>	=	<i>tidak tau</i> (don't know)	(1)
<i>tra takut</i>	=	<i>tidak takut</i> (no fear, not afraid)	(2)
<i>trada, tra ada</i>	=	<i>tidak ada</i> (there isn't)	(3)
<i>tra kabaran</i>	=	<i>tidak keberatan</i> (no objection)	(5)
<i>tra lia lia</i>	=	<i>tidak liat-liat</i> (not looking around)	(4)

11. The possessive *pung* (PM *punya* = possess, possession; comparable to Pidgin English *bilang*):

<i>kitong pung ana</i>	=	<i>kita orang punya anak</i> (our child)	(2)
<i>katorang pung jalang</i>	=	<i>kita orang punya jalan</i> (our road)	(5)
<i>pace-pace yang pung doi</i>	=	<i>bapak-bapak yang punya duwit</i> (the authorities who have money)	(1)

12. Regular occurrence of contractions and abbreviated forms in AM:

Personal pronouns such as PM *dia orang* (he, she or they) are abbreviated and contracted as *dorang* or *dong*, and *kita orang* (we) as *kitorang* or *katorang* (5) and further abbreviated as *kitong*.

Abbreviated forms occur also in cases such as *deng* (PM *dengan* = with), and *pung* (PM *punya* = possess, possession; see 11).

Other examples:

PM, BI <i>tidak ada</i>	=	AM <i>tara ada, tra ada, trada</i> (there isn't)
PM <i>pigi bawa</i>	=	AM <i>pi bawa</i> (bring)
PM <i>duwit</i>	=	AM <i>doi</i> (money)

THE VOCABULARY OF THE ELITE: AN EXAMINATION OF CONTEMPORARY LOAN WORDS IN INDONESIAN

Michael SMITHIES

In an article entitled 'The Growth of the Indonesian Language: the Trend towards Indo-Saxonization'¹ Ziad Salim, examining principally 1976 issues of the magazine *Prisma*, commented on "the trend towards excessive borrowing of English-American words in the Indonesian language" and appealed for a more rational approach in the introduction of alien words. The appeal of loan words is great in any language, even with those who legislate ineffectually against their use, as do the French; English itself, of course, consists largely of borrowings. There comes a point where the scale of the introduction of loan words is such that the very comprehensibility of the text may be in doubt. In an attempt to discover current trends in Indonesian, an examination was made of the four April 1979 issues of the widely-read and reasonably authoritative weekly periodical *Tempo*. All loan words appearing were recorded and classified, and deductions from the results extrapolated. Though the sample might appear relatively small, it was more than sufficient to give an indication of trends.

The loan words were grouped initially into two, those coming from Asian languages, and those from European languages. In the first category there were only three sources, Javanese, Sanskrit, and the Jakarta dialect. In the latter, the identifiable sources were Dutch, French, Spanish, Latin, and English. Indonesia, in common with most other languages, has been quite free in its borrowings from different sources over many centuries, and words from Arabic, Portuguese, Dutch and more recently English have been assimilated into the language. In the examination described here, assimilated words were noted but for reasons of space are not listed. These would include words in international use, like *presiden*, *doktor*, *menu*, abstractions like *administrasi*,

¹Salim, Ziad, 'The Growth of the Indonesian Language: the Trend towards Indo-Saxonization', *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Jakarta, Vol. V, No. 2, April 1977, pp. 75-93.

korupsi, *nasionalis*, verbs like *parkir* and adjectives like *modern*, *normal*. A great many of the well-assimilated words in international use probably came into Indonesian through Dutch but increasingly they more clearly derive from English sources, as with concrete terms like *hostes*, *karir*, *kru* (crew), *lift*, *partner*, *travel agen*, generalities like *famili*, *start*, *subsidi*, verbs like *mengrokot*, adjectives like *hot*, *top* and the expression now apparently universal *oke* (OK). The question of relative assimilation is more closely considered below.

In the lexical examination described, there were twenty-six examples of Javanese words, six from the Jakarta dialect and three from Sanskrit. Given that approximately 90 million of the total population of some 147 million Indonesians are Javanese, it is no surprise to find Javanese words in written Indonesian. Some Javanese words are more or less interchangeable (e.g. *separo* for *setengah*, half, *taman* for *kebun*, garden). Javanese is precisely expressive and therefore appears to have more flavour to the majority who are mother-tongue speakers of Javanese: examples found were *bopong*, to carry in the arms, instead of Indonesian *membawa*, to carry, *nongkrong*, to squat when eating in a snack shop, instead of *jongkok*, to crouch. *Wereng*, the rice-eating hopper, seems, linguistically if not geographically, an exclusively Javanese pest. *Windu*, which provided three examples (*windu*, *dwiwindu*, *triwindu*), derives from the complex eight year cycle in the Javanese calendar, but this calendar is basically Sanscritic in origin.

What is surprising is that there are not more borrowings from Javanese into the language, given the wide currency and lexical wealth of the former. One is inclined to suspect that, in using Indonesian, there is an attempt to play down one's Javaneseness. Two more likely reasons are that many Indonesian journalists are Sumatrans and modern Javanese is hardly a written language any more. Educated Javanese today write in Indonesian rather than Javanese, though they more naturally speak Javanese when among themselves. It is less surprising to find in the borrowings the introduction of cocky phrases used in the capital: *cewek*, and *cowok*, the girls and boys who constitute the bright young things of the big city, have as terms a flashy attraction which *perempuan* and *laki*, or the Javanese *wedok* and *lanang*, do not have. However, the small number of Jakarta words found – a total of six – may indicate the lack of a completely self-contained dialect in the capital.

There were very few examples of recent Sanskrit loan words; two were political abstractions, *dasasila* and *pancasila*, and the vague term *wiraswasta* was used in art criticism. No examples were found of unassimilated Arabic words, and in this Indonesia is in complete contrast to Malaysia. There is a distaste for these imports in contemporary Indonesian, perhaps reflecting the *abangan* nature of many Javanese and the importance of *kebatinan*, Javanese mysticism. Not surprisingly, no examples from the many other languages used

in the Indonesian archipelago were found: the number of speakers of any one of them is comparatively very small, and any such loans would simply not be understood. There were no words found in the sample deriving from Chinese or Japanese.

Loans from Western languages other than English produced some surprises. Only two examples were found of unassimilated Dutch words; one of these is specific, *Kompeni*, a Dutch East Indies company soldier, and the other, *spooring*, balancing, which it could be argued is almost as assimilated into the language as other automobile-related Dutch terms like *versneling* (gear) or *onderdil* (spare parts). It has to be remembered on the one hand that many Dutch words have been totally absorbed into Indonesian (e.g. *rok* for women's dress), and on the other that the Dutch-educated generation is dead, dying or about to be pensioned off; since 1942 there has been no complete span of education in Dutch, and to have finished a secondary education by 1942 one would now, forty years later, be reaching or have reached retirement age. The use of Dutch is therefore fast dying out in Indonesia, and, coupled with a possible deliberate avoidance of Dutch borrowings for obvious political reasons, no new loans can be expected from this language.

The eleven clearly French words found in the sample were almost certainly introduced through Dutch; the common Indonesian term for pavement, *trottoir* (not an example noted), occurred in this way. Eight of the words can be found in international use e.g. *debut*, *restoran*. *Kudeta*, *kup* are derived from concepts which do not exist in Holland, England or North America. The twenty Latin terms found have all come into Indonesian through Dutch, with the Roman-Dutch legal system as the agent for many of the words e.g. *a priori*, *pleno*, *bonafiditas*. Some again are quite international in use e.g. *anti*, *sic*, *plus*, *pro*, *ex*, *super-* and three relate to educational constructions, *aula*, *laboratorium* and *podium*. Two examples of Spanish words were found: one, *ponco*, is specific to a costume, and the other *salud*, the drinking term, may be used in default of any equivalent in Indonesian (*selamat* is too general, and of course drinking is a recently imported custom confined to the elite). As was to be expected, there were no unassimilated words from Portuguese: the period of loan words from Portuguese, which gave in the 16th century among others *meja* (table), *kursi* (chair), *jendela* (window), *sepatu* (shoe), has long since passed. There were no words of obviously German origin in the sample.

Loan words in international currency, deriving from European languages though not necessary from English, totalled 959. This by any standards is a large number, the more so as only four issues of a periodical were examined to produce them. However, nearly half of these could be said to be assimilated by the wide currency they have in contemporary Indonesian. The problem of when a word is assimilated or not is by no means easy to resolve, and judgment

is likely to be subjective. There is no doubt that the words *monumen* or *administrasi* are totally assimilated, for example; everyone knows what they mean, and uses the words. Terms like *autopsi*, *display*, *kondensasi*, *konflik*, *pluralisme*, *semikonduktor*, *statuta*, *torso*, have very restricted use in specialised registers within the educated class. They can therefore fairly be considered non-assimilated. But there are certain grey areas where, without a good deal of research into contemporary writing (including journalism) and into radio and television use, it is difficult to decide whether a word is completely assimilated. *Piknik* for example probably is, *narkotik* could be disputed, *krisis* probably is, *kondisi* is arguable. The argument comes down to a simple question 'Assimilated for whom?' but an answer is by no means so simple. If we were to take the average educated Indonesian, a person, probably urban in background, who has finished upper secondary school but not necessarily passed on to university, and ask him whether he understood particular terms or not, we might arrive at an approximation of passive, though not necessarily active, assimilation. A term recognised by such a person would probably not be assimilated at the kampong level, of course. But in a country as large and with such variety as Indonesia, finding the 'average educated Indonesian' would be no simple matter, and there are bound to be vast differences between schools, regions, even race perhaps, in linguistic aptitude and certainly in individual IQs.

Some of words considered assimilated, as defined above, have only recently passed into general use; examples are, in concrete nouns, *butik*, *diskotik*, *gaid* (guide), *hit*, *isyu*, *kaset*, *kontrasepsi*, *narkotik* (placed here, after our definition, as an accepted term) *telekomunikasi*; in abstractions like *devaluasi*, *frustrasi*, *inflasi*, *partisipasi*, *revaluasi*, *subsidi*; verbs like *mengroket*, *kestabilan*, *ditargetkan*, and adjectives like *mini*, *nonstop*, *sintetis*, *urban*.

Of course, many of these terms, as lexical imports, are unnecessary. It could be argued that *golongan* is just as good as the more recent *kategori*, *ulasan* is as good as *komentar*, and that *posisi* is no better than *kedudukan* or *seleksi* than *pilihan*. But one cannot stop change in languages; people take little notice of what grammarians, purists or even governments say. A word is accepted in the language or not by its usage. There are sometimes advantages of brevity in the borrowings, as with *romantis* (instead of *aliran perasaan*), *spontan* (instead of *timbul terus dari hati*) or *subversi* (instead of *menggulingkan pemerintah*). More often than not the borrowing is simply more fashionable, as with *nostalgia*, opposed to *rindu*, or *sabotase* opposed to *perusakan*.

Within specialist fields, there is always a tendency to use words unlikely to be understood by the general public. Linguists use the word 'registers' to cover areas of specialised vocabulary, where terms are not necessarily limited to

specialists but where their use has limited currency.¹ In the periodical issues examined, there seemed to be ten such categories which clearly emerged. The least surprising was the medical register, where eighteen unabsorbed terms like *antigen*, *dermatologist*, *enzim*, *feses*, *haematologi*, *oral*, *terapi* and *virus* were noted. It is probable that the words *aborsi*, *akupunturis*, *psikiatri* and *psikologis* have sufficient currency to be fairly generally understood, though not by everyone. There were eleven terms deriving exclusively from computers, and it is to be expected that the terminology of *bytes*, *main frame*, and *peripheral* be taken over unchanged. Science and technology inevitably provided a large group of unabsorbed words e.g. *akustik*, *elektrodinamika*, *hidrokarbon*, *kwantum*, *neutron*, *prototype*, *seismik*. In all there were thirty-five in the grouping (terms like *logarithma*, *artikel* and *radius* not being counted), and an allied category relating to machines provided a further twenty-nine terms. However, most of these (*brakes*, *clutch*, *kaburator*, *oil*, *seals*, *steering*, *transmisi* and *trimware* among them) were to be found in two advertisements, one from a Singapore firm and the other the Australian Trade Commissioner, neither of which had bothered to Indonesianise their terminology to any great extent.

Business and financial terms formed another self-contained register with thirty-three unassimilated words like *barter*, *defisit*, *eksekutif*, *likwiditas*, *productivitas*, *proteksionisme*. Words like *akuntan*, *budget*, *finansial*, *spekulasi* were assumed to be known, and *boikot*, *deposito*, *mafia* and *masinal* to be virtually assimilated. Art and music provided terms like *abstrak*, *flop*, *horror*, *koreografer*, *perkusi*, *skor*, journalism and literature *artikel*, *box*, *editor*, *klise*, *triler*, and architecture and planning *akomodasi*, *kloset*, *lobi*, *zone*. These groups were relatively small, as were the terms relating to high life, like *car-pooling*, *dee-jay*, *elite*, *kosmopolitan*, *postur*, *snobisme*.

Rather more than sixty terms however, and in fact forming the largest of the specialised registers, related to politics and administration. Some of these were very far indeed from being in general parlance, and the readers of the articles containing the terms *emansipasi*, *feodalistis*, *judikatif*, *koeksistensi*, *liberalisasi*, *otokratis*, *proletar*, *sentris*, *supremasi*, for example, needed a fairly good knowledge of English to understand the drift of the author.

The number of words which could be assigned to no particular register, and which were therefore apparently assumed to be in general currency, was astonishingly large. If terms like *aksi*, *aktif*, *drastis*, *efek*, *erotis*, *faktor*, *favorit*, *formil*, *permanen*, and *spiritual* are considered as generally

¹A good working definition of 'register' can be found in R.R.K. Hartmann and F.C. Stork, *Dictionary of Language and Linguistics* (London, Applied Science Publishers, 1972) p. 194: "variety in language used for a specific purpose, as opposed to a social or regional dialect (which varies by speakers). Registers may be more narrowly defined by reference to subject matter (field of discourse) ..."

understood, and words like *akademik*, *alternatif*, *amunisi*, *data*, *dominir*, *efisien*, *ekologi*, *ekspresi*, *identifikasi*, *independen*, *kapasitas*, *kongkrit*, *konsekuensi*, *konsep*, *kwalifikasi*, *pragmatis*, *prioritas*, *profesi*, *radikal*, *reedukasi*, *relatif*, *suplai*, *teologi*, *topik*, and *universil* are deemed to be within the vocabulary of high school graduates (a point many Indonesian teachers of English might dispute), there remain 140 direct unassimilated borrowings from English, listed in Appendix A. The need to use most of these words is highly questionable, and one doubts whether, without a good knowledge of English, terms like *anakronisme*, *eksponen*, *hipotesa*, *integritas*, *ironisme*, *kontradiksi*, *otoriter*, *rasional*, *sarkastis*, *transisi* could be understood at all.

Of particular note, in this very large category of unassimilated anglicisms, is the considerable number of words with the ending *-asi*. This appears to be a favoured method of Indonesianifying an alien term, though only very superficially. Thus the *-ation* ending of English gives *aksentuasi*, *antisipasi*, *argumentasi*, *aspirasi*, *deklarasi*, *diversifikasi*, *identifikasi*, *intensifikasi*, *interpretasi*, *investasi*, *klasifikasi*, *manipulasi*, *observasi*, *persuasi*, *rekomendasi*, *reorganisasi*, *reservasi*, *retardasi*, and *stimulasi*. Where the vowel before the consonant plus *-ion* was other than *-a-*, then fairly regularly the borrowing ends *-si*, as in *ekspresi*, *evolusi*, *instruksi*, *introduksi*, *kontradiksi*, *proporsi*, *revisi*.

Also of interest in the apparent attempt to absorb the loan words into Indonesian is the use of indigenous prefixes and suffixes. This can be seen with nouns like *likwiditasnya*, *legalitasnya*, *stafnya*, *parabolnya*, *argumentasinya*, *eksistensinya* and *impaknya*. It is most noticeable with verbs, and the following examples were recorded: *mengassembling*, *beraudiensi*, *berdialek*, *berdialog*, *mendominir*, *dieliminir*, *dihemolisir*, *mengisolir*, *mengklaim*, *berkompeten*, *mengkonsolidir*, *mengkover*, *meneutalisir*, *mempublisir*, *merealisir*, *merekomendasi*, *disuplai*. There were three examples of verb forms with both prefixes and suffixes, *mendokumentasikan*, *mengidentifikasikan*, and *diklasifikasikan*, which seem singularly hybrid. However, it could be argued that when a word is regularly used with native affixes, then it is well on the way to assimilation.

Journalism is by its nature ephemeral, and the subjects discussed in different issues of a weekly review are unlikely to be of particular interest with the passage of time. Yet one would not expect the language of journalism to be as marked by ephemerality as its content. The journalistic predilection for acronyms and abbreviations is a different matter and has been discussed elsewhere.¹ The source of the journalistic material however is of importance in this context. Most of the stories arriving from overseas come from English

¹Smithies, Michael, 'Abbreviations and Acronyms in Journalese Indonesian', *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Jakarta, Vol. IX, No. 2.

language agencies like Reuter or United Press International, and a hasty rendering into Indonesian, with weekly (or even daily) publication deadlines to meet, is likely to let slip a number of anglicisms which either cannot be readily translated into Indonesian or which the journalist-translator assumes his audience will understand. The source of non-Indonesian material, and the speed with which it has to be translated into Indonesian, are two contributing factors to the intrusion of unassimilated anglicisms into an Indonesian text.¹ However, there is less excuse for this phenomenon with stories and articles derived from internal sources, though clearly linguistic habit exercises considerable influence. In this respect it is surprising that the special register of politics and administration should have so many unassimilated borrowings from English; the inference is either that whole concepts are non-indigenous, or else that the people implementing them (or those writing about them) are steeped in the alien concepts.

The use of words like *elegansi*, *elite* and *snobisme* is not without implications for the readership of the articles. This can be gauged on three counts; subject of articles, advertisements, and cost. The general interest contents of the issues examined included letters and commentaries, editorials, crosswords, a story, general feature articles, a slice of life feature called *Suka Duka*, crime stories, people in the news (*Pokoh dan Tokoh*), and sport. In the four issues examined, the highest number of specific articles related to economy and business, overseas reports, and regional surveys (thirteen each). Next came city reports (eleven), national politics (ten) and legal reports (eight). Cultural features, including book reviews, film reports, articles on music, dance, the plastic arts, the media, architecture, and cultural reports, totalled twenty-three or nearly six per issue. The rest was accounted for by articles on the environment (five), health (four) and amusement (four), and technology, general knowledge and religion (three each). The spread of articles into sophisticated specialist areas is indicative that *Tempo* is not seeking to interest a mass public, but an educated one wishing to keep abreast of political, scientific and cultural developments inside and outside the country.

Advertisements are an economic indicator of the readership. Business firms are only likely to spend money on advertisements if they expect to sell their products more by doing so. Advertisements in proportion to text were high, varying from 27 to 36% for the four issues examined. Machinery and apparatus counted for nearly 20% of the advertisements, luxurious watches for more than 10%, luxury hotels (of which two were in Singapore) counted for nearly 10% and international airlines 8%. One Jakarta discotheque had a full page advertisement, in two issues out of four, exclusively in English. Even the cost of *Tempo*, at 400 rupiah per issue in 1979, put it out of the reach of the

¹The effect of press agency English on the West African language Hausa is the subject of a recent postgraduate thesis submitted to the University of Leeds.

ordinary public; taking the then World Bank figure of US\$ 180 per capita per annum income, four issues represented 17% of the average person's monthly income, which is clearly more than could be justified for an inessential.

So *Tempo* is writing for the elite, of administrators, businessmen, senior educators and military men who can understand anglicisms. The vocabulary of the elite is permeated with conscious borrowings. The question arises as to whether the language of *Tempo* is typical. There seems little doubt, both from general observation and the particular instances recorded by Mr. Salim with a different periodical in 1976, that it is. Mr. Salim somewhat regressively, after admitting it was difficult if not impossible to control language use, recommended a general 'Sancritization' (his term) to indigenise new concepts. This is likely to produce still greater confusion than already exists (exemplified by *wiraswasta*, presumably from *wira* = 'brave' and *swasta* = 'welfare' or 'privately owned', which was noted in the *Tempo* samples) and has not worked elsewhere ¹

The tendency to use English words where Indonesian ones would do, shows every sign of increasing rather than otherwise. One wonders if the Indonesian language might eventually become a series of English noun and verb roots, linked together by Indonesian prepositions and conjunctions, and enriched by some native prefixes and suffixes. Such an extreme position is fortunately most unlikely. However there is the possibility that this form of anglicised Indonesian might become a semi-private language of the bureaucratic superstratum, who would use ordinary Indonesian when addressing someone of a different level. If this were to happen, one of the very reasons why Indonesian was chosen as a national language, in preference to the numerical weighting in favour of Javanese, will have been side-stepped.

It is clearly not in the national interest to pepper the national language with scarcely understood borrowings from whatever source. It is to be hoped that there will be a reaction to this wholesale and often unnecessary anglicisation of the vocabulary of Indonesian and that the language will settle down, coming to terms with twentieth century concepts in its own style. This is unlikely to be done by inventing Sanskrit substitutes, which would be still more obscurant, or by rejecting words which appear to be rooted in contemporary use (as with *korupsi* instead of *penyuapan*), but in a saner attempt by writers, particularly journalists, to communicate with everyone, not just the English-speaking elite. One should not need, after all, a knowledge of English in order to read and understand a magazine article in Indonesia.

¹Thai attempted much the same, using Sanskrit-based terms instead of borrowings from English. Some caught on, like *torosap* for telephone. Some did not: the word *borihan* has not replaced 'service' as was intended by its inventor, the late Prince Wan Waithayakorn.

Appendix A:

UNASSIMILATED BORROWINGS FROM ENGLISH USED IN NON-SPECIFIC REGISTERS.

agresif	follow-up	kontinuitas	rasional
aklamasi	formalitas	kontradiksi	(me) realisir
aksentuasi	formula	kontras	referensi
akurasi	hipotesa	konvensi	(me) rekomendasi
akut	homogen	(meng) kover	relevansi
anakronisme	honor	kriteria	reorganisasi
antisipasi	ideal	kultural	representatif
argumentasi (nya)	identitas	laten	reproduktif
aspek(nya)	idol	legendaris	reservasi
aspirasi	inductif	logika	reses
asumsi	ilusi	loyal	responsif
banditisme	impak(nya)	makrokosmos	retardasi
basis	individu	mandat	(di) revisi
definisi	inisial	manipulasi	rivalitas
deklarasi	inisiatif	melankoli	sarkastis
demonstratif	insiden	mikrokosmos	sekte
detil	instruksi	misteri	sensationil
(ber)dialek	integritas	momentum	sensitif
dilema	intensifikasi	nonsens	siklus
dimensi	interpretasi	observasi	sistematik
diversifikasi	introduksi	optimis	spartan
dominasi	introspeksi	otoriter	spektakuler
eksistensi(nya)	inventarisasi	persuasi	sporadis
eksklusif	investasi	pesimis	statement
eksotis	ironisme	phisic	(men)stimulasi
eksponen	(meng)isolir	platonis	struktur
ekstrim	kapabilitas	postel	subjektif
elemen	(meng)klaim	potensiil	sugest
(di)eliminir	klasifikasi	predikat	surprises
empirik	kolosal	preferensial	survai
evolusi	(ber)kompeten	proporsi	temperamen
exposur	kompromi	prosedur	tesis
fantastis	konservatif	prospek	transmisi
fasilitas	konsistensi	(mem)publisir	
finish	(meng)konsolidir	puritan	

CHRONICLES

JANUARY-MARCH 1982

Internal Affairs

In his message to the nation President Soeharto said that: (1) any voices alleging that the coming general elections are undemocratic or against the nation's constitution, are entirely unfounded and groundless, because the coming general elections will be based on provisions of laws in the framework of implementing democratic life and the 1945 Constitution; (2) the coming general elections should not divide the people but unify them; (3) by the wake of 1982, Indonesia would take precautions and make efforts to enhance her economic resilience in order defend herself against any uncertain world economic disorders; (4) the ratification of UU HAP (Criminal Procedural Law) showed that development and the upholding of law constitute a heavy task for all law enforcement agencies.

Presidential Decision No. 1/1982 declared the increase of petrol and oil prices which would be effective as of January 4, 1982. Minister of Mining and Energy, Prof. Subroto explained that the fuel and oil price rises owing to the decrease of all kinds of fuel subsidies was aimed at strengthening Indonesia's capability to implement her development programmes and maintaining her current momentum of development.

In a plenary Parliament Session held on January 5, President Soeharto announced that the draft state budget for the 1982-1983 fiscal year amounted to 15,6 trillion rupiahs. It means that state budget will increase 12 percent compared with the 1981-1982 state budget. President Soeharto explained that in this draft state budget the development expenditures would exceed the routine expenditures due to the decrease of all kinds of fuel subsidies and the increase of state revenues from taxation.

Chairman of the BKPM (Capital Investment Coordination Board), Ir. Suhartoyo told in Jakarta on January 9, that: (1) BKPM, in principle, would approve and provide facilities to any kinds of foreign investments if they aimed at improving non oil exports, and if their products could be bought by foreign importers. Domestic investment increased by 16.5 percent, totalling at

about 2,143.6 billion rupiahs and foreign investment increased also by 34 percent, totalling US\$ 1,207.3 million. On January 14, he explained that in 1982 the total amount of investment in Indonesia is projected to rise by 60 percent.

Central Bureau of Statistics noted in his bulletin that the total value of Indonesian exports during the period of January-September 1981 declined at about 11.27 percent compared with that of the previous years during the same period, but it should be viewed in the light of rise of currency value which stood at about 1.29 percent.

In his decree No. 3/1982 President Soeharto gave directives on the ways to conduct the coming election campaign which are among other things: (1) the election campaign should last 45 days; (2) there should be a 5 day 'cooling off period' before polling day which will occur on May 4; (3) no campaign activities would be allowed during this period.

Minister of Trade and Cooperatives, Mr. Radius Prawiro said that as of January 18, 1982, all non oil commodities could be exported on consignment.

On January 20, President Soeharto inaugurated the first stage of the Asahan Project valued at about 1.2 trillion rupiahs.

In his meeting with non indigenous entrepreneurs held in Jakarta on January 23, Minister of Trade and Cooperatives Mr. Radius Prawiro said that trade or economy should be the pilot project and practical field for the assimilation process between indigenous and non indigenous entrepreneurs. Through economic activities the gap between them would disappear and the people's welfare could be improved.

After calling on President Soeharto in Jakarta on February 1, Head of Bakin (State Intelligence Coordinating Board), General Yoga Sugama in a press release explained that "Kelompok Petisi" (Petition-Group) would still continue its activities even after the 1982 General Elections. Generally most member of the "Petition Group" criticized the implementation of the coming general elections which according to them is very undemocratic. They criticized also the appointment of several figures to be members of DPR (House of Representatives) and MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) through a Presidential Decree.

Following a limited Cabinet Session on economic, financial and industrial affairs held in Jakarta on February 3, State Secretary Sudharmono in a press release said that: (1) in January 1982 the inflation rate amounted to 4.7 percent due to oil price rise and to bad climate which affected the price of foodstuff;

(2) the inflation rate in January was quite high compared with that of the ten month period of the 1981/1982 fiscal year which amounted only to 9.08 percent. But it was lower than that of the same period in the 1980/1981 fiscal year, which amounted to 14.45 percent.

On February 10, Indonesian Attorney General Ismail Saleh said to the Committee III of DPR that the "Team for the abolishment of Corruption", would be more activated in 1982. The members of the team holding a meeting on February 18, 1982 are the Attorney General himself, Chief Justice, Minister of State for the Reform of State Apparatuses, Minister of Justice, Chief of the Police, and the Commander in Chief of the Command for the Restoration of Order and Security.

On February 13, the district prosecutor who brought Imran bin Mohammad Zein for trial, prosecuted him to be condemned to death on charges of subversion. Imran bin Muhammad Zein, who stood on trial at the Central Jakarta District Court on charges of subversion, was sentenced to the death penalty. In his prosecution read before the court, the prosecutor stated that the accused had deliberately through his sermons and speeches discredited and denounced the state's ideology. He was also accused for attempting to undermine the authority of President Soeharto, for instigating the people to create conflicts. He has also established an Islamic society of which he was elected as the Imam (Religious Leader) and is against the 1945 Constitution and the Guide for the Living and the Practice of Pancasila.

Governor of BI (Indonesian Bank) explained before the Commission VII of Parliament on February 12, 1982 that the Indonesian foreign exchange reserves at the end of January amounted to US\$ 6.5 milliard which was a decrease of about US\$ 800 million compared with the targeted US\$ 7.3 billion. These reserves would be decrease until the end of March 1982 due to the harvest season but they would increase again by the end of April.

The Minister of Defence and Security, General M. Jusuf said in the district of Maros, South Sulawesi on February 17, 1982, that the Indonesian Armed Forces will buy up-to-date arms to improve their fighting forces. He emphasized, however, that the arsenals were meant to defend and protect the Indonesian nation and country.

Head of Bakin (State Intelligence Coordinating Board), General Yoga Sugama in his address to the Commission I of the House of Representatives explained that: (1) the main threat to Indonesia was subversion and not espionage because Indonesia has no secrets; (2) it is the duty of Bakin to safeguard the State's Budget in order to prevent its political impact which might endanger the government.

The Minister of Finance, Dr. Ali Wardhana at a meeting with House Budget Commission in Jakarta on February 18, said that the government's revenue from the 1981/1982 export taxes amounted only to 40 percent of the targeted revenue due to the decrease of the non oil commodity exports. The revenue was estimated to total 150-155 milliard rupiahs while the targeted amount was expected to reach 381 milliard rupiahs.

Following a meeting with President Soeharto in Jakarta on February 20, Minister of Information, Ali Moertopo said that: (1) in general the national stability from the pre-election period to the coming General Conference of the People's Consultative Assembly will be better compared with the situation of the previous general elections. The laying down of Repelita IV (Fourth Five Year Development Plans), therefore, will be better so that they will be more acceptable; (2) after the next General Conference of the People's Consultative Assembly, the activities of the frustrated people will automatically disappear.

On March 14, Minister of Defence and Security, General M. Jusuf emphasized that by continuing to carry out their dual function and to participate in non-military affairs the Indonesian Armed Forces had nothing else in mind but to serve the nation for the sake of the perpetuation of the Indonesian State and Nation based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. He said this explanation was necessary because there were certain people who probably thought that through their dual function and involvement in non-military affairs the Armed Forces would kill democracy and society's initiative in the political and economic spheres. Giving newsmen a run-down of the results of a Armed Forces High Command Conference held in Bandung recently, M. Jusuf said the Armed Forces dual function and active participation in non-military affairs were, of all things, to spur the growth and fulfilment of political democracy and economic democracy in the country. The conference had succeeded in making clear formulations of the Armed Forces dual function and participation in non-military affairs and these formulations would become the basic guide for every serviceman in the performance of his daily duties in the service of the state and nation. The Armed Forces dual function and participation in non-military affairs are to ensure the attainment of unity among all layers of society in promoting the growth of economic and political democracy. "There is nothing here that aims to disrupt political democracy or to unsettle or control the economy", Jusuf said.

International Relations

On January 5, about 50 youth members of KNPI (Indonesian Youth National Committee) launched a strong protest note to the Soviet Embassy con-

cerning Radio Moscow's broadcast on the congratulatory message of PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) addressed to President Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of his 75th birthday.

Foreign Office Secretary General of Gabon, Mr. Sylvestre Rantangan visited Indonesia and called on President Soeharto on January 6. He said that Gabon would like to have bilateral relations with Indonesia. Indonesia and Gabon have many things in common, and have never been involved in any dispute against one another in the UN forum, even concerning the problem of East Timor.

A working meeting of heads of Indonesian diplomatic mission in the Asian and Pacific regions was held in Jakarta on January 18, to discuss 4 core problems which were as follows: (1) the Indonesian basic strategies for a complete solution concerning conflicts on Kampuchea; (2) Indonesian foreign policy concerning the situation and development in Northeast Asia; (3) Indonesian foreign policy concerning the states in the Southwest Asian region; (4) Indonesian policy concerning the existence of the superpowers in the Indian ocean.

In a ceremony held at the State Palace on January 23, 1982 Vice President Adam Malik was awarded a "Dag Hammarskjold International Award" by President of the Academie Diplomatique de la Paix "Pax Mundi".

British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington visited Indonesia on January 28-31 to hold talks with some Indonesian leaders. He offered Prof. Subroto, Indonesian Minister of Mining and Energy, British contribution in the field of technology comprising offshore oil drilling, coal mining, electrical hydrocrackers, aeroplane projects, and the use of satellites for aero-survey to facilitate the finding of oil-reserves. He also held some talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister Prof. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja concerning international issues concerned with the Southeast Asian region such as the problem of Kampuchea.

On January 30, President Soeharto installed six new Ambassadors in Jakarta; they are Admiral Raden Eddie Soeprapto for the Republic of Korea, General Achmad Tirtosudiro for Saudi Arabia, R. Supangat for Kenya, Mohammad Isnaeni for Rumania and Admiral R.M. Subroto for Nigeria and Liberia. President Soeharto asked the new Ambassadors to promote Indonesian exports.

Prime Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Li Jong Ok arrived at Jakarta on February 3, for a six day official visit. In a banquet given to his honour, Vice President Adam Malik stated that as developing countries and as members of the Non-Alignment Movement, Indonesia and

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have common stance. In a meeting with President Soeharto, the two leaders discussed the ways to enhance bilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, technology and commerce and the ways to strengthen ties among the Non-Alignment Movement countries.

A French Parliament Delegation led by the Deputy of the Head of Foreign Affairs Commission visited Indonesia on February 2-8, 1982 to discuss the renewal of the bilateral relationships between the two countries in economic and socio-cultural fields. It was the first visit since the Socialist Party had won the general elections in May, 1981. Claude Estier said among other things that: (1) Indonesia has a key position in Southeast Asia; (2) France and Indonesia agreed that Vietnam had to leave Kampuchea and let the Kampuchean people establish their own government; (3) France and Indonesia agreed that the Camp David's peace process should be renovated; in order to reach a true global peace the Arab Countries should take part in that process.

On February 8, Department of Foreign Affairs announced the ouster of a Soviet diplomat/Assistant Military Attache from Indonesia, Lt. Colonel S.P. Egorov on charges of espionage. Furthermore, the Indonesian Government had also arrested the head of the Aeroflot Soviet Airlines, Alexandre Finenko, who had no diplomatic status (and suspected to be a agent of KGB), and an Indonesian Lt. Colonel Soesdaryanto. On February 13, the Soviet diplomat, G. Odariuk left Indonesia while A. Finenko was deported. The Soviet Aeroflot Airlines office was closed by the Indonesian government.

Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Drs. C.J. van Dijk was in Indonesia in February 6, to prepare the annual IGGI's Conference which would be held next spring in Amsterdam.

On February 10, Indonesia and India signed a bilateral cooperation in science and technology which include exchange of expertise and information on facilities of training, industry, education, researchers, experts and students.

Regis Debray, special envoy of French President visited Indonesia on February 13, to collect information concerning the problems of the Indochinese refugees. On February 15, he held a meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja to discuss the problems of Kampuchea.

Indonesian Vice President, Adam Malik visited Bangkok to take part in the 31st Pacific Asian Travel Association (PATA) annual conference. He held several talks with the Thailand Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulanonda and attended a reception organized by Mexican National Tourist Council.

Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa Hitam visited Indonesia on February 17, to hold talks with some Indonesian leaders. Honouring his guest at a banquet, Vice President Adam Malik said among other things that: (1) the growing cooperation between the two countries would mutually benefit both countries and would be conducive to the stability of the Southeast Asian region; (2) ASEAN would always keep and support the spirit of solidarity particularly in the face of the problems in Kampuchea which might affect the Southeast Asian region. In his counter speech Datuk Musa Hitam said that: (1) the problem of Kampuchea is very serious and needs immediate solution; (2) ASEAN would support the people of Kampuchea to establish a coalition government opposing the Heng Samrin regime.

On February 25, Indonesia and Malaysia signed an agreement on the regime law of archipelagic state. This agreement provides that Malaysia firmly recognizes the territory of the Indonesian archipelagic state while Indonesia recognizes Malaysia's right to conduct communications either by sea or by air between Western and Southern Malaysia.

The 17th Conference of the Educational Ministers of Southeast Asian Countries (SEAMEC) was held in Denpasar on February 25-March 1, 1982.

Minister of Mines and Energy, Prof. Subroto said in Jakarta that the reduction of the Indonesian crude oil production to 1.3 million per day (instead of 1.6 million b/d capacity) would not affect Indonesia's development budget. The Minister made this statement to reporters immediately after his meeting with the President at Bina Graha to report the result of his mission to Europe dealing with the 6th International Tin Agreement (ITA-VI) and the OPEC Meeting in Vienna. Subroto was accompanied by Minister Coordinator for Economy, Finance and Industry, Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro when reporting to the President. The reduction of the Indonesian oil production to 1.3 million b/d would surely affect the state's revenue (70 per cent of which derived from oil proceeds), Subroto admitted. However, he quickly added, the government has resolved that it would not disturb the development budget. There are many ways to do that, he said. One of which will be to effect saving in the government routine budget and also in the use of fuel oil.

Referring to the OPEC Vienna Meeting, Subroto said that the OPEC countries had agreed to reduce their total oil production to 17.5 million b/d, with Saudi Arabia lowering its output to 7.5 million b/d while the rest producing a maximum total of 10 million b/d. Indonesia in this connection is to decrease its production to 1.3 million b/d. This self-imposition by the OPEC member countries is to be effected in the second quarter of this year while the oil situation is expected to improve in the third quarter when the industrialized countries will start replenishing their stock. According to Subroto in spite of the reduction of the Indonesian oil production, the government would strive to maintain the level of its oil export.

CONTRIBUTORS

Kirdi DIPOYUDO, Head of the Department of International Relations, CSIS; Editor of *Analisa*, the monthly journal of CSIS.

Juwono SUDARSONO, gives lectures at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Indonesia; obtained his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1978.

J. PANGLAYKIM, Ph.D. in Economics; Member of the Board of Directors, CSIS; consultant to private industries, banking and other types of business.

A. ARISMUNANDAR, Director for Energy Resources Development, Directorate General of Power, Department of Mines and Energy; Secretary, Technical Committee on Energy Resources (PTE); Member, Working-Group for the Formulation of Research and Technology Programmes on Natural Resources and Energy (PEPUNAS-RISTEK II), Jakarta, Indonesia.

W. Donald McTAGGART, Department of Geography and Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, USA.

Andi Zainal ABIDIN, Professor, Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University, Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi), Doctor of Letters, University of Indonesia.

R.S. ROOSMAN, Doctorandus of Indologi, Leyden (1956); Lecturer of Indonesian Studies in Foreign Countries. He has written a number of articles in English, Indonesian and Javanese on Indonesia, West Irian and Papua New Guinea.

Michael SMITHIES, Head of the Department of Language and Social Science, Papua New Guinea University of Technology (since the end of 1976); British Council's Director of the Staff English Training Unit at Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta (1974-1976). He is the author of a number of books and articles on English language teaching and Southeast Asian Studies.

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